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Chapter 1
Crisis, banks and business power
1.1 Das Bailout
The failureofLehmanBrothers in the fall of 2008 startednot only afinancial crisis,
but a crisis for capitalism. Banks, the epitome of the capitalist firm, hinged on the
support of the state. No investor or insurance firm could stem the losses; only the
state could restore confidence.
The failing banks also prompted a crisis for democracy. Faced with spread-
ing turmoil in markets, politicians cobbled together rescues within a couple of
weeks. This haste prevented journalists from penetrating the bailout options and
explaining the diﬀerence to the public. It also curtailed deliberations in parlia-
ment. Government oﬃcials made policy decisions in closed rooms negotiating
with bankers. Importantly, governments around the world channeled huge sums
into their banking sectors. The rescue of banks amounted to a colossal national-
ization of risks. Banks had incurred more and more risks in overheating markets,
and when markets turned sour, the state picked up the bill. These bailouts bring
to the fore the primacy of business power and cast ever greater doubt on the ability
of democracy to produce equity. The issue is no longerwhether Schattschneider’s
(1960) heavenly chorus sings with an upper class accent, but whether the act has
turned into a business solo.
The rescue of banks created an unlikely alliance of censure across the politi-
cal spectrum. Leftist critics decry the support for rich bankers. Critics from the
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right condemn state activism as big government,Atlas Shrugged turned real.ƥ The
left and right demand diﬀerent alternatives—state support for struggling home-
owners and the nationalization of banks on the left, market discipline on the right
(e.g. Lendman, 2011;Woods Jr, 2009;Melloan, 2009), but both ideological camps
vilify state support for banks.
The use of the term “bailout” captures some of this widespread criticism. In
American public debates, the suggested name by the government for the rescue,
TARP, never really stuck. Instead, policymakers and pundits referred to the res-
cue as the bailout. The term featured prominently in the news; it was themost fre-
quently looked-up word in Merriam Webster’s and was chosen by the American
Dialect Society’s for the 2008wordof the year. Bailout is oftenused to evoke aneg-
ative image, as in titles like “Financing Failure: ACentury of Bailouts” (McKinley,
2011) or “Das Bailout”Ʀ (to evokeMarx). The common dictionaries, however, de-
fine the term innocuously as “the act of rescuing something (such as a business)
from money problems.”Ƨ I use the term in this sense, as synonym for rescuing
banks frommoney problems, and its politics are the topic of this thesis.
Thepundits of theday lauded theBritish government for its decisive andwell-
designed rescue plan. At the same time, they criticized the American crisis man-
agement as catering to Wall Street. This verdict fits the partisan view that right-
wing governments look out for their constituency in the financial sector. It also
conforms to the interest explanation thatWall Street iswell connected to theTrea-
sury and to the oﬃces on Capitol Hill. Moreover, it goes well with the account of
ineﬃcient policies due to the many constraints in the American political system.
But time has flipped that assessment. The British government lost a substantial
sum of money, and the two banks it saved are lingering rather than thriving. The
American government carried away a net gain from the banking interventions,
and this was not mere luck. The American government implemented a policy
that broadened the risks and allowed the government to recover its costs by par-
1. Moore, Stephen. “ ‘Atlas Shrugged:’ From Fiction to Fact in 52 years.” Wall Street Journal,
9 January 2009.
2. James Pinkerton, “Das Bailout: A Conversation With Karl Marx”Huﬃngton Post, 3
January 2009. Available at http://www.huﬃngtonpost.com/james-pinkerton/das-bailout-a-
conversatio_b_155014.html[Accessed 1 July 2014].
3. Definitions of bailout: “An act of giving financial assistance to a failing business or econ-
omy to save it from collapse” (Oxford Dictionary), “the act of saving or rescuing something
(such as a business) from money problems” (MerriamWebster), “A rescue from financial diﬃ-
culties: a government bailout of a corporation” (American Heritage Dictionary).
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ticipating in the recovery of the banks, while the British government bought the
shares of the weakest banks only.
The American crisis management performed well against the odds: the Wall
Street-Treasury complex with a former Goldman-Sachs CEO as Treasury Secre-
tary, a right-wing party, and a gridlocked political system. This outcome is puz-
zling and raises a series of questions: Why has the American government imple-
mented a strict bailout? Howdoes business power shape bailouts? Are leftist poli-
cymakers friendlier to banks? And do veto-players constrain crisis policymaking?
Asmany studies have shown, business tries to influence policymaking by lob-
bying, financing political campaigns and using their links to policymakers. And
their trying—along with favorable outcomes—has often been taken as evidence
for the power of business to shapepublic policy. My argument is that instrumental
business power is overstated in the case of banking bailouts. Banks want govern-
ment support, and for that they lobby, but banks are not alone in wanting govern-
ment intervention. Financial crises threaten people’s livelihoods and pensions,
and this threat brings politicians to rescue banks. Because there is a broad elec-
toral demand for interventions to restore financial stability, banks’ instrumental
power is immaterial. Governments rescue banks irrespective of their lobbying.
And importantly, instrumental business power cannot explain the varying costs
of bailouts across countries.
Another kind of business power, however, does matter. What came out of
the negotiations between the government and banks depended on banks’ struc-
tural power. Large and financially healthy banks that have much business abroad
can invoke their impunity to regulatory sanctions and block unfavorable propos-
als. The presence of these structurally powerful banks precludes a distribution
of risks and shifts the bailout costs to the government and, ultimately, to the tax-
payer. The large diﬀerence in the costs of bailouts across countries thus depends
on this strategic structural power of banks. The British bank HSBC was large,
healthy and highly international. It could resist taking part in the government’s
program. In the United States, all major banks depended on the domestic market
and were susceptible to regulatory sanctions. No bank could aﬀord to object to
the government’s plan. In the next section, I elaborate this argument and place it
within the wider debates.
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1.2 Selling out to cronies
The banking rescues were notmerely bailouts; theywere sellouts. Politicians sold
out democracy to bankers; they saved the bankers of Wall Street, not the people
on Main Street. That, at least, is the widely shared view among various schol-
ars, regulators and observers. There are a number of reasons for politicians to
privilege banks over voters: Banks donate heavily to political parties. By cross-
ing banks, politicians jeopardize an important source of revenues to finance their
campaigns for reelection. Banks have also excellent political connections. Many
banking CEOs personally know the finance minister and even the president or
prime minister. Thus, bankers can bring their issues to the government’s atten-
tion andpromote their preferred solutions. And the revolvingdoorbringsbankers
into government and provides lucrative jobs after public oﬃce. Banks have thus
their lieutenants inside the finance ministry, and future jobs give policymakers
the incentive to keep banks happy. These connections between government and
business via personnel and money evoke a label usually reserved for Asian and
African countries—crony capitalism—and bailouts are often seen as politicians
helping their cronies at taxpayers’ expense.
Governments have been bailing out banks before the recent crisis. Especially
in developing countries, governments responded to banking crises with large res-
cue programs for banks (Honohan and Klingebiel, 2003; Laeven and Valencia,
2008). Scholars have argued that these interventions resulted from crony capital-
ism. A crony is a close friend,ƨ and crony capitalism refers to friendships between
public oﬃcials and business executives. It alludes to political favoritism which
distorts government decisions to allocate resources in favor of friends (Johnson
and Mitton, 2003; Wei, 2001). In crony capitalist systems, politically connected
firms do better than their peers (Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Faccio, Masulis and
McConnell, 2006). Crony capitalism does not necessarily imply corruption, but
many authors see a strong positive relation between the two (Wei, 2001; Rosas,
2006). It is usually associated with developing countries, and some scholars have
found that its political favoritism hurts economic development (Braun and Rad-
datz, 2010). Thismirrors the results of development researchmore broadly which
4. The Oxford dictionary defines crony as “close friend or companion,” andMerriamWeb-
ster as “close friend especially of long standing.”
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found that democratic institutions curtail corruption and promote development
and growth (e.g. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002).
Thefirst political-economyscholars of bailouts, SylviaMaxfield (2003),Guill-
ermo Rosas (2006) and Philip Keefer (2007), study banking bailouts against the
background of these studies. They view bailouts as politicians’ favors to cronies
and argue that democratic accountability curbs these favors. Where policymakers
face little accountability, they can embezzle public money to rescue their friends’
banks. The first quantitative study on bailouts supported this view of bailouts.
Honohan and Klingebiel (2003) found that accommodating crisis policies strain-
ed public finances and inhibited economic growth. The optimal policy is, in their
view, not to bail out banks, but to intervene quickly, avoid forbearance and shut
down struggling banks. Maxfield, Rosas andKeefer diﬀermerely onwhichmech-
anisms make politicians accountable. Sylvia Maxfield (2003) analyzes bank bail-
outs in Latin American countries, and she argues that future voter mobilization
enhances politicians’ accountability and prevents them from wasting money on
bank rescues. Keefer (2007) and Rosas (2006, 2009) emphasize the importance
of elections. If elections are competitive, people will throw out politicians who
hand out favors to bankers. In this view, electoral threat disciplines politicians
and inhibits banking bailouts.
These studies focus on the crises before 2008, but scholars on the recent bail-
outs strike the same tone. They find political favoritismdue to the revolving door,
banks’ campaign contributions and bankers’ access to policymakers. Duchin and
Sosyura (2012) analyze the banking recapitalizations in the American TARP pro-
gram, and they observe the same eﬀect of political connections that Faccio, Ma-
sulis andMcConnell (2006) had found for bailouts in other industries: Politically
connectedbanks aremore likely to get government funds, and government invest-
ments in connected banks yield less than those in other banks. Johnson andKwak
(2010) emphasize Wall Street’s access to policymakers. They write that “not only
did key policymakers have long-standing ties to Wall Street, but during the crisis
they gave tremendous access to their Wall Street contacts” (Johnson and Kwak,
2010, 187). Even former supervisors argue in this vein, like Sheila Bair. She sug-
gests that Citi’s political connections helped the bank to get a better bailout deal
(Bair, 2012). Not only scholars of the American bailout find political connections
to be important. Studying the banking rescues on the other side of the Atlantic,
in France, Jabko andMassoc (2012, 562) conclude that the French “bank support
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plan should be viewed as a gift that members of the same elite group extended to
each other in exchange for future, albeit still indeterminate, counter-gifts.” Thus,
Jabko andMassoc join most scholars and argue that bankers get sweetheart deals
because of their connections to politicians.
There are exceptions to this view on bank bailouts. Hindmoor and McGee-
chan (2012) argue that governments bailed out banks because of their structural
power, but that this came from earlier instrumental power. That is, banks get a
bailout because they lobbied successfully before the crisis. And Cornelia Woll
and Emiliano Grossman explain diﬀerences in bailouts across countries by the
organization of banks (Grossman andWoll, 2014;Woll, 2014). Woll (2014) likens
financial crisis management to a game of chicken, in which two drivers race their
cars towards each other until one of them yields—or until they crash. In her
metaphor, governments and banks risk the crash by waiting for the other party
to act. She captures this idea—in reference toOlson (1965)—as the power of col-
lective inaction. If banks are unwilling or incapable to act, they prompt the gov-
ernment to give in, rescue the financial system and bear the bailout costs. I agree
that non-cooperation of banks shifts the costs of bailouts onto the government,
but I argue that this is the result of banks’ deliberate action, and whether banks
can intentionally obstruct the government’s crisis management depends not on
the lack of organizational ties, but on their structural power (see Chapter 4). I
return to these arguments in the context of the American government’s ability to
wrench a tough rescue from banks. Before that, I address themore common view
which emphasizes lobbying of banks and their connections to policymakers.
Despite the widespread notion of bailouts as a product of connected bankers,
the way governments responded to the recent financial crisis conforms poorly to
the view that politicians sold out to banks. American banks spent large amounts
on the financing of both parties; they had access to policymakers, and even the
Secretary of the Treasury was a former investment banker. In other words, Amer-
ican banks had substantial instrumental power. And if instrumental power is im-
portant, wewould expect a particularly generous bailout for American banks. But
Americanbankspaiddearly. Unlike theBritishorGermangovernment, theAmer-
ican government got its money back from the bailed out banks. Comparative evi-
dence from the crisis thus fails to support the importance of instrumental power.
And explanations based on crony capitalism are similarly insuﬃcient. If competi-
tive elections curb bailouts (Keefer, 2007; Rosas, 2006), bailouts should be small
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in advanced democracies. But governments in advanced democracies spent the
most. And within the groups of advanced democracies, the size and the costs of
bailouts varied considerably. This is a variation that electoral accountability can-
not explain. The recent interventions, thus, stand at odds with crony capitalism
and politicians selling out.
Why do these theories fail to explain the bailouts? They fail because they
mistakenly assume that bailouts only harm voters and stand against the interest
of the general public. Bailouts do require the government to take on large risks,
and these can turn into a huge burden for the state and the taxpayer. But finan-
cial turmoil, failing banks and an ensuing recession hurt the general public as well.
Bailouts aim to restore financial stability and to that extent, they are in the interest
of voters. The sellout view neglects this aspect of bailouts. For instance, Rosas
(2006, pp. 179, 185) and Keefer (2007, p. 618) consider, but dismiss the idea that
bailouts work in the public interest. They characterize bailouts as zero sum games
between banks and taxpayers. Undoubtedly, there are aspects of bailouts which
pitch the interests of banks against those of voters. But to the extent that bailouts
restore financial stability, they benefit both banks and the general public. And this
alignment of interests reverses the eﬀect of electoral accountability. For this rea-
son, it is important to distinguish the instances when voters’ and banks’ interests
tally and when they collide. In the next section, I outline my argument for when
their interests coincide.
1.3 The argument
Beyond private interests
Banking crises devastate the economy. Banks fail, stock markets plummet, credit
freezes, and firms stop investing (Reinhart and Rogoﬀ, 2009). For people, bank-
ing crises create two sources of risks. One source is the contracting economy.
People suﬀer income cuts or even job loss. The second source of risks is people’s
investments. In most countries, large parts of people’s savings accounts are in-
sured by a deposit insurance system, but other savings and investments have no
such protection. Financial turmoil creates especially large risks for people who
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rely on pensions invested in financial markets.Ʃ It threatens their income during
their retirement. And these risks prompt people to demand government action.
In other policy areas, the connection between risks and demand for state inter-
vention has been well documented. For instance, Rehm, Hacker and Schlesinger
(2012) have shown that people who face higher income risks demand more so-
cial insurance. In the same way, financial risks during the crisis change people’s
preferences towards more state intervention.
The insight that banking bailouts correspond to people’s preferences turns
Keefer’s (2007) andRosas’ (2006) argument upsidedown. They argue that politi-
cians implement smaller bailouts if they areheld accountable through competitive
elections. But if people prefer the government to restore financial stability, com-
petitive elections should prompt banking bailouts. Accountability makes politi-
cians consider voters’ preferences to mitigate financial market risks. And this rea-
soning is not limited to electoral accountability, but also applies to salience. Based
on the literature on interest groups and salience (Culpepper, 2011), one could ex-
pect that governments spend little onbank rescues because public scrutiny is high.
But since bailouts satisfy public demand to restore financial stability, salience has
no such eﬀect. Faced with a financial crisis, politicians will spend billions to save
banks regardless of public scrutiny.
What does this argument imply for analyzing banking bailouts across coun-
tries? First, governments should spendmore on bailouts the larger the size of the
crisis impact. With banking bailouts, policymakers respond to financial turmoil
and the risks it creates for voters. Bailouts are a problem solving policy, and their
size depends on how big the problem is. Where banks suﬀer severely, policymak-
ers respond with larger interventions than in countries where banks experience a
mere hick-up. This comes as no surprise, but some studies have omitted to con-
trol for crisis impact (Rosas, 2006; Keefer, 2007). A trivial case of this argument
is the absence of crisis. No one expects bailouts when there is no banking crisis.
Second, bailouts increase with holdings of pension investments. Banking cri-
sis have a direct impact on people’s wealth by depreciating financial investments.
5. With pensions invested in financialmarkets, I mean the assets in pension funds. Thereby,
I don’t distinguish the type of asset classes, e.g. between stocks, bonds or deposits. Although
stocks are riskier than other asset classes, even pension funds with little or no stocks are risky
and fell in value during the crisis. Fir instance, the pension funds in Slovakia which hold only
bonds or deposits lost about 12 percent in 2008, and in Germany, the value of pension funds,
consisting mostly of bonds, dropped about 9 percent (OECD, 2009c).
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In countries with defined-contribution pension systems, the largest investments
ofmany people are their pension savings. The crisis creates large financial risks for
people with funded pensions. Politicians recognize this threat to large parts of the
population. And elections motivate politicians to mitigate these risks and inter-
vene forcefully with bailout programs. These risks and politicians’ motivation to
mitigate them increases with the holding of private pension assets. If bailouts fol-
low broad societal interests, rather than the narrow interests of bankers, I expect
bailouts to be larger in countries with funded pension systems.
A positive relation between pension assets and banking rescues would speak
against the sellout view of bailouts. It would suggest that policymakers bail out
banks to act on voters’ interests rather thannourish their friendshipswith bankers.
I test this correlation in a quantitative analysis inChapter 3. This analysis includes
responses to the banking crisis in some 50 countries around the world.
Conflicting interests and structural business power
Restoring financial stability is in the interest of the voters as well as banks. Both
voters and banks want the government to calm markets, sustain asset prices and
protect deposits. To this extent, the interests of banks and voters align. But for
other issues, the two interests collide. Most importantly, this conflict occurs for
the distribution of risks and costs. Who bears the risks of the interventions and
who pays for them—the banks or the taxpayers?
Among the crisis responses, the American bailout has received particular at-
tention. Scholars, journalists, and former regulators have written about TARP
and other crisis programs. The dominant argument is that banks were gener-
ously saved because they had direct access to policymakers. The revolving door
between banks and government brought in bankers into government, which gave
bankingCEOs anopen ear at theTreasury. Additionally, banks had given somuch
money to parties that either side catered to banks. Essentially, the argument is that
banks enjoy instrumental power and control policy. While there were undoubt-
edly these connectionsbetweenWall Street andWashington, these accounts exag-
gerate the importance of instrumental power. Whether governments could make
banks pay for the bailouts depended on banks’ structural power. With that, I do
not mean structural power in the sense that policymakers automatically conform
tobusiness interests (Lindblom, 1977), but that firmsuse their structural positions
intentionally and strategically to influence policy decisions.
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This notion of using structural power intentionally is at odds with the usual
understanding of business power. In the last two decades, scholars have put busi-
ness power into the two categories of instrumental and structural power. With
instrumental power, they refer to the power that“stems from its ability to staﬀ gov-
ernments with business supporters and to exert direct influence on government
decision makers through campaign contributions and lobbying eﬀorts” (Hacker
and Pierson, 2002, 280). And they set instrumental power in opposition to struc-
tural powerwhich they understand as business’s “privileged position” (Lindblom,
1977): Politicians cater to business because they depend on business to create em-
ployment and economic growth.
Categorizing business power into structural and instrumental is useful, but it
is misleading if structural power is equated to automatic power, and instrumental
to strategic business power. Hacker and Pierson (2002, 281) write that structural
power “is structural because the pressure to protect business interests is generated
automatically and apolitically.” They imply that instrumental power is not auto-
matic, but that it requires an intentional act. This way of classifying is intuitive,
and it is accurate—for many cases. Instrumental power is often intentional, as
structural power is often automatic. Business does not need to lobby politicians
for them to know that lower taxes or less regulation will spur investment. Know-
ing about market incentives suﬃces. And instrumental power is often intentional
and strategic. Giving money to parties or lobbying politicians to water down re-
forms are strategic acts. But for some cases, this classification is insuﬃcient.
Not all forms of instrumental power are strategic. The revolving door ex-
changes personnel between government and business, and the presence of pro-
business policymakers favors firms. But they involve no strategic action on the
part of business. And neither are all forms of structural power automatic, as I will
show below. Classifying business power requires, thus, a diﬀerent definition.
It is better to define business power as structural when it stems from the func-
tion of the firm in the economy, when it derives from investing, producing and
making profits. This is at the core of Lindblom’s privileged position. Politicians
create a business friendly environment so that business does what it is meant to
do: investing, making profit and generating economic growth. Business power is
instrumental when it comes from activities other than the firm’s function in the
economy, from givingmoney to political campaigns or hiring lobbyists to furnish
policymakers with policy proposals. The revolving door and business-friendly
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policymakers are also sources of instrumental power because they lie outside the
core of business activities.
The advantage of separating the characteristics of intentional vs. automatic
from instrumental vs. structural is that it recognizes other types of business power,
in particular, instances of structural power that work not automatically, but with
intent. Consider what Tasha Fairfield (2011, 429) calls investment strikes, namely
a “deliberate political decision [by business] to withhold investment.” Like Lind-
blom’s privileged position, this power stems from business’s role in the economy.
But unlike Lindblom’s characterization, investment strikes require an intentional
eﬀort; they don’t arise from firms producing and investing according to market
incentives. The intentional eﬀort is related to the core function of the firm, not
to lobbying or access to policymakers. Accordingly, I take this as an example of
intentional structural power.ƪ It is this type of business power that explains the
banking bailouts. For bailouts, banks obtain power through their position in the
economy. They need to be healthy, they need to be large, and they need to make
most of their revenues abroad.
First, banks must be financially healthy. If they run out of liquidity, they de-
pend on the government and have to accept any deal. These banks have no power
to negotiate. Second, banks must be large. If a bank doesn’t matter to the over-
all economy because it is small, the government can ignore its demands. Third,
banks must make most of their money abroad. Sustained by foreign revenues,
these banks can absorb domestic regulatory costs. This impunity allows them
to ignore the government’s threats and decline any unpleasant deal. Banks that
depend on the domestic market are vulnerable to regulatory sanctions; penaliza-
tions by the regulator hit them in full. This aﬀords the government the ability to
make them an oﬀer they cannot refuse. This power is structural because it de-
pends on the position of the firm in the economy. Banks attain power through
their importance in the domestic economy and through their foreign sources of
revenue. However, this structural power is not automatic. Policymakers do not
automatically heed banks’ interests. There are no market incentives that would
tell policymakers whether banks will comply. Rather, these banks have to use
their position strategically. They have to tell policymakers that they don’t need
6. In contrast, Tasha Fairfield (2011, 429) considers these types of strikes by business to fall
“within the realm of instrumental power, not structural power, because this form of protest is
politically-coordinated rather than market-coordinated.”
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government help (because they are healthy), that they care little about regulatory
costs (because they make their money abroad), and that they will not accept the
government’s deal. This strategic act by banks, based on their structural power,
determines whether banks share the bailout bill. It helps to explain the sharply
diﬀerent costs of bailouts across countries. A large, healthy bank with large inter-
national revenues can block government eﬀorts to include all banks in a support
scheme. This veto leaves the government with the costly alternative to intervene
in weak banks only. I demonstrate this argument using case studies in Chapter 4.
Legislatures in crisis
Before negotiating with banks over bailouts, most governments have to get a res-
cue law passed by their legislatures. Accordingly, the literature suggests that leg-
islatures shape banking bailouts. Keefer (2007), for instance, argues that legisla-
tures with veto power discipline executive policymakers and prevent them from
privileging banks. With high salience and toughmedia scrutiny, legislators should
be keen to avoid the impression of catering to bank’s special interests. For legis-
lators, high salience is a good antidote against selling out to business (Culpepper,
2011). On the other hand, legislators depend on banks to finance their political
campaigns—especially in the United States. Blau, Brough and Thomas (2013)
andMian, Sufi and Trebbi (2010) find that banks’ lobbying influences lawmakers
to vote in favor of the bailout bill.
In contrast toboth views, I argue that legislators neither curbnor extend favor-
able bailouts. Instead, legislatorsmostly defer to the executive branch. The reason
for this unusual behavior by legislators is the crisis. A financial crisis changes the
legislative calculus in two ways. First, the crisis creates urgency. The high pace of
financialmarkets during crises require solutions quickly, in amatter of a fewweeks
or even days. Second, the crisis poses a threat. When financial turmoil ends in a
domino of failing banks, the consequences for the economy and employment are
disastrous. Policymaking, thus, becomes a gamble with huge stakes. These two
crisis characteristics—urgency and threat—pose a dilemma for legislators. Leg-
islators require a well-designed policy, but they have only very little time to work
one out. Unfortunately for legislators, they are ill-equipped to develop a new pol-
icy fast. To do so would require the type of resources the executive branch has, a
large staﬀ and in-house expertise.
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As legislators have little resources to design a policy on short notice, they can
either fall back on a successful policy from the past, or they can grant authority
to the executive branch. Given the potential disaster of the crisis, legislators loath
experimenting and trying out new policies. One way out would be to copy suc-
cessful policies from elsewhere, but in the crisis rush, it is diﬃcult for legislators
to assess how—and whether—these copied policies would work. They can fall
back, however, on their own policies that did well before. Legislators know how
these policies work, what the downsides are, and how they fit into their (partisan)
preferences. But as no crisis is the same, legislators would rarely find a complete
crisis solution among former policies. Rather, they will find policy elements that
address recurring problems of crises. Legislators can include such elements into
current legislation, and thus shape crisis policy.
When legislators find no successful policy oﬀ the shelf, they defer to the ex-
ecutive branch. In contrast to the legislature, the executive employs a large staﬀ,
including financial market experts. It can also increase its expertise by hiring con-
sultants and lawyers. These resources make it much easier for the executive to
come up with crisis policies and to adjust them to changing circumstances. Be-
cause a failure to contain the crisis leads to economic and electoral disaster, leg-
islators have the incentive to delegate crisis management to the executive. Legis-
lators, thus, expect the executive to manage the crisis. Rather than prescribing a
bailout policy assembled in haste without the necessary expertise, legislators give
the executive the autonomy to decide on the best policy.
Since the crisis prompts lawmakers to defer to the executive, it essentially
eliminates the legislative veto point. InChapter 5, I show the eﬀect of crisis on leg-
islative policymaking for a very strong legislature, the US Congress. Even there,
the crisis shifts the power balance in favor of the executive. I relate this eﬀect to
the wider debates about legislative-executive relations, arguing that these debates
have neglected the importance of real world events. Financial crises, akin to war,
increase the power of the presidency over Congress.
In the next chapter, I develop categories to analyze bailout policies and de-
scribe the interventions across countries and over time. Subsequently, I demon-
strate the argument with diﬀerent empirical material. In Chapter 3, I use quan-
titative cross-national data to assess what determines the magnitude of bailouts.
It speaks to existing empirical studies which argue that bailouts are a product of
crony capitalism. Chapter 4 compares the crisis management in theUnited States
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and the United Kingdom, and explains why the American government obtained
a better deal against the odds. This chapter focuses on the banks’ strategic use of
structural power. These two chapters also show that legislatures, theUSCongress
in particular, have little influence on crisismanagement. InChapter 5, I look closer
at this finding andargue that the crisis shiftspower fromCongress to thepresident.
Finally, I bring the results together in Chapter 6.
Chapter 2
Banking and bailouts
Banking crises change democratic policymaking. They pose a large threat and re-
quire policymakers to act fast. This chapter lays out why this is the case. I start by
describing what banks normally do, what banking crises are and what they imply
for governments. Subsequently, I present the diﬀerent ways to support struggling
banks and analyze their distributive consequences. Finally, I recapitulate the res-
cue eﬀorts during the recent crisis across countries and over time.
2.1 Banking – in good times and in bad
The essence of banking is to allocate savings to investments. Banks collect savings
from households. These savings are small individually, but add up to substantial
sizes through the sheer number of savers. Banks lend this money to a few busi-
nesses. These loans are large, and the banks grant them for a long period because
businesses invest in large projects that need time to generate returns. This long
time frame, however, conflicts with the needs of savers. Households can com-
mit some money to the long-term, like savings for retirement, but they also need
money to be available on short notice to cover costly contingencies. For instance,
they may have to replace a car after an accident or pay for their children’s wed-
dings. Households need the bank to fund these unforeseen events, and banks
meet these sudden withdrawals by borrowing from and lending to each other.
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In this way, banks can attract savers, meet their demands and lend to businesses.
Banks thus serve two functions: they bridge the size and the time discrepancies
between households and businesses. In this way, they channel savings to invest-
ments and add value to the economy.
This description, of course, sounds like a romantic account of banking, long
gone. It leaves out many forms of modern banking. Banks today also buy out and
sell oﬀ companies, they hedge risks or speculate for their clients and their own
accounts. But the point is that this simple task of banking—taking deposits and
giving out loans—makes banking inherently fragile. Depositors can take out their
money at any time, and if they withdraw it all at the same time, a bank runs out of
cash. It has to liquidate loans before its investments are due. This involves losses,
and the bank may find itself unable to redeem its depositors. Importantly, such a
run canwreck abank thatwasperfectly profitable. A rumor that a bank is bankrupt
may be self-fulfilling, and it can trigger a banking crisis. This is not, however, what
usually happens; banking crises start for a reason.
Banking crises emerge when there are deeper problems in the banking sys-
tem: Asset prices rose to exaggerated heights, banks increased credit too fast and
gave loans to dubious borrowers, or regulation was lax andmissed somemistaken
incentive in the market (Claessens, Ayhan Kose and Terrones, 2010, 248ﬀ). Still,
the above-mentioned fragility of banking remains important. When these prob-
lems loom in the banking sector, depositors have good reason to run to their bank
and get their money when they hear a rumor about its insolvency. In turn, the
bank is very susceptible to bank runs because it shares some problems with the
wider banking sector (or indeed has more than its fair share of these problems).
In this situation, it is diﬃcult for a bank to find funding from other banks or to sell
its assets. More specifically, the bank will get loans only at high interest rates, and
it will have to sell assets at steep discounts. And this combination of high costs
and low yields is what drives banks into bankruptcy whether they were insolvent
before or not.
For this reason, the traditional way for central banks to solve a crisis is to pro-
vide liquidity freely for solvent banks—a recipe propagated by SirWalter Bagehot
in the 19th century. In turn, the regulator should close down insolvent banks (c.f.
Rosas, 2006). This recipe is clear in theory; in practice, however, it is ambiguous.
In times of crisis, illiquidity and insolvency become indistinguishable (Beck et al.,
2010, 14). One reason is that a bank’s assets are opaque, and an outsider can hardly
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determine their value. Another and more fundamental reason is the above men-
tioned discount: Selling long-term assets at fire sale prices generates losses and
cause insolvency. A clear distinctionmay not even emerge when the crisis is over,
as in the case of Northern Rock (Beck et al., 2010, 14).
What they say about swallows in early summer also applies to banking crises:
One failure doesn’tmake a crisis. Failures of small banks occur regularly and often
go unnoticed. In 2001, for instance, four American banks failed (Sinclair National
Bank, Superior Bank - FSB, Malta National Bank and First Alliance Bank & Trust
Co). More banks fail when the economy slides into recession. The burst of the
Dot-com bubble and its ripple eﬀects on the economy increased the number of
bank failures. A year later, in 2002, not four banks failed, but eleven. And in the
boom years of 2005 and 2006, no bank failed. This is not to say that individual
bank failures cannot have disastrous eﬀects and precipitate a crisis. The collapse
of Baring Brothers in 1890, and recently, the failure of Lehman Brothers triggered
banking crises with disastrous eﬀects (Cassis, 2011, 8).
This discussion hints at the diﬃculty of defining a banking crisis. They es-
chew an easy definition because there may be a banking crisis in which not a sin-
gle bank goes bankrupt. This happens regularly, and stems from government in-
terventions or preventative action by other banks. That is, private—but most of-
ten—public actors save a failing bank inorder to prevent the crisis fromescalating.
A definition derived from the causes of banking crises is not convenient ei-
ther, because they vary. Scholars resort in the end to a broad definition that refers
to multiple actual or only potential banking failures. Claessens and Kose (2013,
12) propose this—relatively—concise definition: “In a systemic banking crisis,
actual or potential bank runs and failures can induce banks to suspend the con-
vertibility of their liabilities or compel the government to intervene to prevent this
by extending liquidity and capital assistance on a large scale.” Reinhart and Ro-
goﬀ (2009, 10) use a similarly terse definition; they merely add bank mergers and
takeovers. Laeven and Valencia (2008) go a bit beyond that and include common
consequences of banking crises:
Under our definition, in a systemic banking crisis, a country’s corpo-
rate and financial sectors experience a large number of defaults and
financial institutions and corporations face great diﬃculties repay-
ing contracts on time. As a result, non-performing loans increase
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sharply and all or most of the aggregate banking system capital is
exhausted. This situation may be accompanied by depressed asset
prices (such as equity and real estate prices) on the heels of run-ups
before the crisis, sharp increases in real interest rates, and a slow-
down or reversal in capital flows. In some cases, the crisis is trig-
gered by depositor runs on banks, though in most cases it is a gen-
eral realization that systemically important financial institutions are
in distress. (Laeven and Valencia, 2008, 5)
To return to the reference above and to stress the point, these scholars rec-
ognize the summer when they see or believe that there should have been some
swallows. They define banking crises as “actual or potential bank runs” and “runs
on banks, though in most cases…the general realization that…financial institu-
tions are in distress” (Laeven and Valencia, 2008, 5). I do not mean to criticize
these definitions, but want to emphasize the diﬃculty of pinning down banking
crises. The causes and the symptomsof banking crises vary and allowonly a broad
definition. And these definitions show that the government is a core element in
the course of banking crises. More often than not—and unfailingly in the crises
of the past thirty years—the government or the central bank intervened.
Moreover, this definition emphasizes that “financial crisis” is not synonymous
with banking crisis. Instead, financial crisis is an umbrella term for diﬀerent types
of crises involving the financial sector (Claessens and Kose, 2013, 11f): One of
these crisis types is a currency crisis. This crisis involves a speculative attack on a
currency, which leads to a drop in the country’s international currency reserves or
even to a devaluation of the currency. Another type is a balance of payment crisis in
which investors withdrawmoney from a country. This often increases the interest
rate (or credit spread) for government bonds. In other words, the country has to
paymore to borrowmoney. Finally, there are debt crises. In a foreign debt crisis, the
government defaults on its debt by not redeeming its bonds. In a domestic debt
crisis, the government defaults on its debt by means of inflation. High inflation
melts away its debt in real terms.
These types of crises describe distinct phenomenons, but in practice, they
can occur together. For instance, banking crises often precede a currency crisis,
which in turn aggravates the problems in the banking sector (Kaminsky andRein-
hart, 1999). For this, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) coined the term “twin crisis.”
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Similarly, the crisis experience of Spain in 2012 shows that a vicious circle exists
between banking and balance of payment crises as well. In this case, the currency
was stable, but the downgrading of the government bonds and the increase of the
credit spread interactedwith the problems in the banking sector, magnifying each
other. Nevertheless, these types of crises show distinct characteristics, and the
crisis of 2007-09 clearly constitutes a banking crisis.
2.2 The threat and urgency of banking crises
As banking crises are not “real,” in the sense of being nominal and relating to the
currency, what is its impact on the economy? The impact is real, devastating and
poses a threat to to policymakers. Scholars widely agree that banking crises are
linked to economic downturns (Reinhart and Rogoﬀ, 2009, 165). Ben Bernanke
(1983) lays out the basic, destructive impact of banking crises. They inhibit credit
to the real economy, which depresses aggregate demand and slows down growth.
While recessions may spark banking crises, banking crises themselves aggravate
the economic contraction. Some studies disentangle the simultaneity problem
between banking crisis and economic contraction. For instance, Peek andRosen-
gren (2000) show that the Japanese banking crisis caused credit to contract in the
United States (where the economy was fine) and slowed down the real economy
there. Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache and Rajan (2008) also confirm the eﬀect of bank-
ing crises by showing that sectors that relymore on external financing suﬀermore.
Thus, it seems safe to say that banking crises cause or amplify the economic down-
turn.
The public was not aware of these studies, but it gaged the possible eﬀects
of the financial turmoil from the well-known banking crises. The images from
the Great Depression in the news and the public’s collective memory illustrated
what could be coming: run on banks, lost livelihoods and unemployment. In-
deed, the 1930s were grave. Between 1929 and 1932, world industrial output fell by
36percent, and the averageunemployment rate in theUnitedStateswas around 30
percent (Cassis, 2011, 22). This was the world’s worst crisis, but others depressed
growth aswell. The Japanese crisis in the 2000s led to a “lost decade”with stagnat-
ing growth and lost output ofmore than half of Japan’sGDP (Hoshi andKashyap,
2004; Laeven and Valencia, 2012). Japan’s crisis management is commonly criti-
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cized, but evenwell-managed banking crises cost dearly. For example, Laeven and
Valencia (2012) estimate that the banking crisis in the 1990s cost Sweden a third of
its economic output. These dire consequences are the background against which
crisis management takes place. And this threat of economic disaster is one of the
characteristics that distinguish policymaking in times of financial crisis from nor-
mal policymaking.
Another characteristic is urgency. The crisis requires policymakers to find a
solution fast. Financial markets distinguish themselves by the speed of market
movements. Stock markets are infamous for their sudden sharp drops. For in-
stance, on “Black Monday” in the fall of 1987, the American stock market fell 20
percent on a single day (Carlson, 2007, 2). Bank deposits can dry up at compara-
bly high speed. Only hours after Robert Peston of the BBC leaked the emergency
loans for Northern Rock, the first people started to withdraw money (House of
Commons Treasury Committee, 2008, 66). More people stood in line over the
next few days, and the run only subsided after the government guaranteed their
deposits three days later. This run, when people needed to physically go to their
bank and demand their money, was quick. In wholesale markets, where investors
queue electronically, a run can drain a bank of its liquidity even faster. The Amer-
ican investment bank Bear Stearns ran out of liquidity in a week. The bank’s trea-
surer said that he hadneverworried about liquidity—that repo lendingwould dis-
appear—up until the first week ofMarch 2008 (Financial Crisis InquiryCommis-
sion, 2011, 288). On the following Thursday, Bear Stearns was out of cash. These
crisis events set the pace for crisis management, and it is fast.
All policymakers involved in the recent banking crisis emphasize time pres-
sure. Ben Bernanke, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve said that he would
call his book on the management of the crisis “Before Asia opens” (Wessel, 2009,
1). This title refers to the recurrent weekends when Bernanke and his colleagues
in the Fed and the Treasury rushed to devise interventions before the markets
opened Monday morning in Asia. In some cases, wholesale runs on troubled
banks required interventions the same day. Alistair Darling recounts how the
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) would have been out of money at the end of the
day: Only the emergency liquidity from the Bank of England carried it over the
banking hours (Darling, 2011). For the systemic interventions in the fall of 2008,
the governments in theUnited States and theUnitedKingdomhadmore than just
hours. Both governments had created contingency plans before the crisis turned
Banking and bailouts 21
systemic. But from that point, both governments devised and implemented a
sector-wide scheme in less than three weeks.
In sum, banking crises pose a big threat to policymakers, and they require a
fast reaction. Historic experience showed that full-blown banking crises have dev-
astating eﬀects. And banking crises escalate at high speed, which forces policy-
makers to react in a short amount of time. These two characteristics—threat and
urgency—change policymaking.
2.3 Comparing bailouts
To stabilize the banking system, what can governments and central banks do? In
this section, I present the diﬀerent instruments that governments used during the
crisis. This overview provides the basic terms to compare how government in
diﬀerent countries intervened in their banking sectors.
Policy options
A bank’s balance sheet oﬀers the clearest layout to organize the basic “menu” of
policy options. It provides a categorization of policy instruments by their in-
tended target on the balance sheet of banks. The balance sheet, as presented in
Figure 2.1, lists assets on the left-hand side and liabilities on the right-hand side.
Accordingly, one set ofmeasures targets the liability sideof thebalance sheet. One
of these measures aiming at the liability side is for the central bank to provide liq-
uidity to banks (L1 in Figure 2.1). When the central bank gives liquidity to solvent
banks it acts as “the lender of last resort,” and this support is a standard function
of central banks. Another measure is for the government to insure the deposits of
ordinary savers (L2). This is very common and relatively uncontroversial in the
economic debate of banking regulation. Deposit insurance helps prevent bank-
runs and protects retail savers.
Amore extensive step is for the government to guarantee not just the deposits
of ordinary savers, but the bank’s entire debt (L3). This guarantee helps the bank
to receive funding, because the government pledges to stand behind the bank’s
debt in case the bank were to fail. The state’s guarantee allows the bank to obtain
credit again at low interest rates, which improves its liquidity. The flip-side is that
the government bears the risk of the guaranteed debt. Since bank debt can be-
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come very large, so does the risk for the government. An important governance
problem with this intervention is that the creditors no longer have an incentive
to monitor the bank. Finally, the government can inject capital into a bank (L4).
Thereby, the government pushes up the capital in order to absorb losses and it be-
comes a shareholder of the bank. As a shareholder, the government participates
in the future losses, but also in the future profits, and could share the fruits of a
recovering economy.
Assets Liabilities
Assets A1)Widening central Debt & L1) Liquidity
(e.g. loans) bank collateral deposits L2) Deposit insurance
A2) Asset guarantee L3) Debt guarantee
A3) Asset purchase Equity L4) Capital injection
Figure 2.1: Balance sheet targets of government interventions
The second set of measures targets the left-hand side of the balance sheets,
the assets. First, the central bank can widen its collateral standards, which means
it accepts lower quality assets in exchange for funds (A1). This intervention allows
banks to get additional liquidity. The second type of measure is an asset guaran-
tee. By issuing this guarantee, the government insures banks’ assets against future
losses in exchange for a fee (A2). This makes the bank a more secure business
parter by eliminating the bank’s “tail-risk.” That is, other banks don’t have to fear
that the bankwill incur huge losses on these questionable loans. Instead ofmerely
insuring assets, the government can buy them (A3). Usually, governments subse-
quently sort the assets, the decent ones into a “good bank” to later sell them again,
the poor assets into an “assetmanagement company” or “bad bank” to wind them
down. One rationale for the government to purchase all assets, including the poor
ones, is that the government can keep them until they recover. Assets regain their
value if they were sold at depressed prices in a fire sale—when everybody tries to
sell at the same time. That was the case in the Nordic crisis in the 1990s (Borio,
Vale and Von Peter, 2010), but may not be the case in this crisis, because assets
were overvalued (Hellwig, 2009). Both asset programs should take the risks from
the bank’s balance sheet so that others trust the bank again and provide it with
credit.
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Governments can implement these interventions in diﬀerent ways. For bad
banks, for instance, an important distinction is whether the assets are integrated
into a centralized asset management company (AMC) run by the state or left in
custodywith the banks (Klingebiel, 2000; Gandrud andHallerberg, 2013). A cen-
tralized AMC oﬀers the advantages of having many assets in one place including
better possibilities to standardize practices and to securitize these assets and of
having some leverage over debtors. At the same time, the centralized company
may be more diﬃcult to wind down and has less information on borrowers than
a decentralized AMC for the original bank (Klingebiel, 2000, 6).
A further distinction is whether the government saves an individual failing
bank or whether it intervenes in the whole banking sector. In the course of the
crisis, governments often do both. In the early part of the crisis, a number of gov-
ernments, among them the American and the British, rescued individual banks.
Later, when the crisis aﬀected the banking sector as a whole, they drew up sys-
temic interventions for all banks. In the next section, which describes how the
crisis progressed over time, I will come back to this pattern.
Oﬃcial reports on banking interventions commonly use these distinctions
to compare policies across countries. A number of countries, like Ireland, tried
to stabilize their banking sectors with debt guarantees. When the guarantee is
credible, it solves the liquidity problems of banks. However, such a policy, does
not remove any bad loans from banks’ balance sheets. So that banks can clear
their balance sheet, they require more capital or need to transfer these assets to
“bad banks.”
While a comparisonaccording to thesedistinctionshelps explain themechan-
ics of the bailouts, they do not speak to the success of the bailouts or how the costs
were divided between banks and the state. These questions require further ways
to compare policies.
The costs of bailouts
For many people, the most important question about a bailout is: Does it work?
But whether a bailout is successful is an intricate question. There are a case in
which this judgment is easy. In Ireland, for instance, the bailout failed. The gov-
ernment guarantees in the fall of 2008 failed to calm markets, and the banks col-
lapsed anyway, forcing the Irish government to seek assistance from the IMF and
the EU.On the other hand, in theUnited Kingdom andGermany, the bailout was
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successful in the sense that it stopped the crisis and stabilized banks andmarkets.
But considering their impact on state finances, one cannot say that they were a
success with the same confidence.
While the public cares about how the bailout worked, whether it averted cri-
sis or not, this yardstick is less helpful for an analytic comparison. The policy out-
come—whether it worked—depends on amyriad of factors, not only the govern-
ment policy. Accounting for all relevant factors is impossible. The policy output,
however, can be compared. The policy output includes which types of instru-
ments governments used and howmuch money they spent.
Like every policy, bailouts have several aspects that can be compared. One
aspect is the overall size of the bailout, or the amount of money the government
pledges to support its banking system. Aggregating the diﬀerent measures is not
without problems. With some instruments, like capital injections, the govern-
ment spends actual money; with guarantees, there is merely a certain probabil-
ity that the government will have to spend that money. Chapter 3 addresses this
problem in more detail and analyzes the size of interventions across countries.
Another important aspect is who pays for the intervention, the state or the
banks. Surely, themain goal for the government should not be tomakemoney oﬀ
the banking rescue. The government is not an investment bank which buys out
and re-sells companies for profit. Its aim is above all to restore financial stability.
But one aim, governments often state, is to minimize the costs to taxpayers. That
is, the government should not generate profits, but it should not be leftwith losses
either. For that, one can look at who pays for the stabilization eﬀorts.
Oneoption is tomake creditors pay. Thiswayof stabilizing a bank is knownas
“bail-in.” Rather than the state bailing out the bank and servicing all of the bank’s
debt, those who hold the bank’s debt forgo full repayment or convert their debt
into equity. The creditors usually targeted are the bond holders who rank above
common bank depositors. The purpose of the bail-in is to restructure the bank’s
liabilities to restore its solvency. If successful, this debt restructuring puts the bur-
den on private investors, and the state gets oﬀ the hook. The advantage of this
resolution is not only that the state avoids subsidizing the bank and its creditors,
but that it fosters market discipline: If bond holders know that they have to pay
if a bank fails, they should monitor the bank closely and withdraw their funds if
they anticipate problems in a bank. And to attract funds at reasonable rates, bank
managers should be more careful about the risks they incur (Goodhart and Av-
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gouleas, 2014; Zhou et al., 2012). The main disadvantage of bail-ins is the risk of
contagion (Goodhart and Avgouleas, 2014). Cautious bond holders induce dis-
cipline in good times, but they may also escalate the crisis. If they withdraw their
money from banks, they can cause liquidity to drain from the market and drive
banks into bankruptcy. During the systemic banking crisis of 2008-09, govern-
ments abstained from bailing in creditors.
Otheroptions include thegovernmentoutlays, whichmay still require thepri-
vate sector to bear some of the costs. The government can retrieve its investments
to save weak banks by several means. It can get back the money from the other
banks, those that did not fail. This is for good reason in that they too can profit
from a stabilization of the banking system. Saving the failing banks is an implicit
guarantee that the government will save the remaining banks too should they fail.
This provides themwith a directmonetary advantage: their cost of borrowing be-
comes lower due to this implicit guarantee. Thus, this payment is a cross-subsidy
among banks.
There is another cross-subsidy, not among banks, but over time. A bank that
failed during a crisis may become profitable again in the future, after it has been
saved. Thegovernment can achieve this cross-subsidyover timebyobtainingwar-
rants or shares of the weak banks. Warrants give the holder the possibility to later
purchase further shares at a previously fixed price. If the bank performs well, and
its share price rises, the government can sell the shares at a profit to recoup the
investment.
Another possibility to cross-subsidize the rescuewas, alas, not available when
the crisis started. This alternative is to levy a fee in good times, anduse these funds
to support banks in times of crisis. For deposit insurance systems, this is common
practice.
These analytical distinctions of cross-subsidies, across banks and over time,
oftenmix in practice. For instance, the costs guaranteeing the deposits of a failing
bank is partly covered by that bank’s earlier contribution to deposit insurance. Yet,
other banks paid into these funds too, and theymay never receive a dime from the
deposit insurance system. That does not mean, however, that these banks pay
for nothing. To the contrary, they receive protection from the deposit insurance
which makes them trustworthy. Depositors who save their money in a bank that
participates in a deposit insurance system know that they will keep their savings
even if the bank fails.
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Also, the government can combine a cross-subsidy over time with one across
banks. The American government supported weak banks on the condition that
healthy banks accept capital and oﬀer warrants. In 2009, many of these healthier
banks recovered and the warrants paid the government handsome returns.
There are a number of ways for the government to attempt to get its money
back, but one particular way is unlikely to work, to charge weak banks. Charg-
ing for support during the crisis—like a hefty fee for a guarantee or a capital in-
jection—only undermines the already weak position of the bank. This approach
may require the government to put more capital into the weak banks. As a result,
the government owns a larger share of the bank. This has an unwanted eﬀect: if
the government charges a high fee, it ends up charging itself. Thus, high fixed fees
for government support is likely to be ineﬀective in getting the money back.
Taken together, the expected cost for the government is a useful metric for
comparing bailout policies. Its calculation is, however, very diﬃcult. First, it re-
quires detailed knowledge of the individual terms and requires, evenmore daunt-
ing, reasonable assumptions about how the bailed-out bank, the banking sector
and the economy will fair in the future. For the United States and the United
Kingdom, it is possible to compare the two policies and state that the expected re-
turn is larger for the American program than for the British one. But it is beyond
the scope of this thesis to provide a precise estimate for a large sample of countries
for statistical analysis.
2.4 Bailouts during the recent crisis
In this dissertation, I focus on the recent bailout programs for the banking sector
as a whole and compare them across countries. But governments’ eﬀorts hap-
pened not all at once, and governments didn’t start with sector-wide programs.
They began supporting banks as early as 2007, and most governments continued
some form of help until 2009. Their large programs came, however, in the fall of
2008.
In this section, I turn to this sequence of the crisis response, and I focus here
on the events in theUnitedKingdomand theUnitedStates. Theymirror the crisis
experience of many other countries. The first signs of the crisis concerned single
banks, like Northern Rock in the United Kingdom. Later, when Lehman Broth-
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ers declared bankruptcy, the crisis struck the whole banking sector—and caused
financial turmoil around the globe. To avoid further escalation of the banking cri-
sis and restore financial stability, governments around the world bailed out their
banks.
The recent crisis is neither the only global crisis, nor is it the only banking cri-
sis in the United Kingdom and the United States. Both countries saw banks fail
before. In the City of London, Baring Brothers & Co. collapsed in 1890, and on
Wall Street, Knickerbocker Trust failed in 1907. Both failures caused a crisis with
international repercussions (Cassis, 2011, p. 8ﬀ). The other large, global crisis is
the Great Depression between 1929 and 1933. More recently, the United States
experienced a major crisis during the 1980s when hundreds of Saving and Loan
institutions went bankrupt (Isenberg, 2013). The focus of this thesis, however, is
on the recent crisis. The banking failures, and the rescues by the state, occurred at
the same time in response to similar shocks and was understood in similar terms.
Even within this setting, the crisis responses varied considerably, and I aim to ex-
plain this variance. Thus, I concentrate on the Great Recession.
The early crisis: Individual failures
The beginning of the global financial crisis is commonly dated at the beginning of
August 2007 when problems with sub-prime investments in the American hous-
ing markets became evident. On August 9, the French bank BNP Paribas an-
nounced that it could not value some sub-prime related assets and suspended the
trading of three of its investment funds (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission,
2011, 250). This served as a wake-up call for markets, and fear of hidden risks
spread. Banks were reluctant to lend to each other, and the interest rate in in-
terbank markets shot up. This hike is clearly visible in Figures 2.2 and 2.3, which
depict the risk premium in the British and American interbank markets. The risk
premium reflects the mistrust of banks in each other and traces the course of the
crisis. These figures include vertical reference lines tomark important dates of the
crisis.
The most prominent victim of the liquidity squeeze in the summer of 2007
was Northern Rock, a British bank headquartered in Newcastle. Northern Rock,
a former building society, relied heavily on short-term, wholesale funding andhad
not arranged suﬃcient insurance or standby facilities. This left it incapable of cop-
ing with interbankmarkets drying up (House of Commons Treasury Committee,
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Solid lines at August 9, 2007 (BNP announcement) and September 15, 2008 (Lehman
bankruptcy). Source: Reuters EcoWin as in European Commission (2009a).
Figure 2.2: Risk premium in UK interbank market. Spread between 3-month Libor and
T-bills
Solid lines at August 9, 2007 (BNP announcement) and September 15, 2008 (Lehman
bankruptcy). Source: Reuters EcoWin as in European Commission (2009a).
Figure 2.3: Risk premium in US interbank market. Spread between 3-month Libor and
T-bills
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2008, 19). The Financial Services Authority (FSA) became aware of Northern
Rock’s funding diﬃculties shortly thereafter. The Tripartite authorities, which
consists of the Treasury, the Bank of England and the FSA, debated several solu-
tions. They favored a private take-over by another bank, but they failed to find a
viable bid without substantial government subsidies. Moreover, the Bank of Eng-
land did not provide extra liquidity in August.
The authorities considered covert liquidity support for Northern Rock, but
found it impractical. Thus, they agreed to an emergency facility by the Bank of
England. The bank would be granted access to liquidity against collateral at a
penalty rate. Importantly, they agreed to postpone the announcement from Sep-
tember 13 to the nextMonday in order to finish the details of the facility. However,
news about the help leaked to the press causing depositors to go to the bank and
withdraw their money. Queues formed outside the bank’s branches. The oﬃcial
statement about the emergency support, including anemphasis on the solvencyof
the bank, only increased the queues. The Tripartite authorities perceived this vis-
ible bank run to threaten the general trust in the British financial system. For this
reason, Chancellor Darling announced that the government would guarantee all
savings and certain wholesale liabilities of Northern Rock on September 17. This
stopped the retail run on the bank. It also calmed interbank markets, as shown in
the drop of interbank credit risk in Figures 2.2 and 2.3. However, it did not solve
the underlying problem that Northern Rock was greatly exposed to themortgage
market. In the followingmonths, the authorities intervened several times provid-
ing liquidity, granting loans and purchasing equity in order to avoid the collapse
of the bank. Yet, a sustainable solution still had to be found.
Under the existing law, both bankruptcy and nationalization boremajor diﬃ-
culties. Bankruptcy would havemeant that retail depositors would losemoney, as
theywould rank just above shareholders in bankruptcy proceedings. On the other
hand, nationalization through the purchase of equity by the Treasury would have
triggered takeover rules: Shareholders could have blocked a takeover at the low
prices the Treasury as prepared to pay. Hence, the Treasury’s preferred solution
was a private takeover. But it didn’t find a buyer that would have met its condi-
tions.
For these reasons, the authorities decided to introduce new legislation and
nationalize Northern Rock. Chancellor Darling rushed the Banking Special Pro-
vision Act 2008 through parliament in only three days (Black, 2010, 100). It pro-
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vided the government the power to nationalize banks in diﬃculties, which it used
to take over Northern Rock only a few days later on February 23, 2008. As part
of the resolution process, the government split Northern Rock into a bad bank
(Northern Rock Asset Management) and a good bank on January 1, 2009. The
good bank was subsequently sold on November 17, 2011 to Virgin Money. The
bad bank was to be wound down.
TheNorthern Rock episode is important for the whole course of the crisis in
the United Kingdom because it tested and changed the crisis management struc-
ture. Early into the crisis of Northern Rock, the Treasury Select Committee of
the House of Commons started to investigate the bank’s failure and the oversight
and interventions by the FSA, the Bank of England and the Treasury. It published
the report “Run on the Rock” about six months into the crisis, shortly before the
nationalization of the bank (House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2008). It
criticized the Tripartite authorities heavily, in particular the insuﬃcient commu-
nication and coordination among them. The authorities heeded the Committee’s
recommendations. Recapitulating the crisis, the National Audit Oﬃce (2010, 7)
observed that their handling of the upcoming crisis episodes had improved.
On the other side of the Atlantic, in the United States, the investment bank
Bear Stearns struggled and finally was taken over by J.P. Morgan Chase in March
2008with the backing of the Federal Reserve. Bear Stearns had invested heavily in
risky mortgage related assets and financed themmainly with short-term funding.
On Monday, March 10, the rating agency Moody’s downgraded Bear Stearns. Its
lenders panicked and withdrew their funds. On that day, it had $18bn in cash; it
had none left by Friday. On Sunday, J.P. Morgan announced the takeover of Bear
Stearns, the crisis’s first big American casualty.
As the credit conditions tightened during this first phase of the crisis, central
banks started to ease monetary policy and increase their supply of liquidity. On
December 13, 2007, the major global central banks—of the UK, the US, Japan,
Switzerland and the ECB—announced a coordinated action. It included swap
arrangements in order to help European banks meet their funding needs in US
dollars. This announcement marked the beginning of further coordinated eﬀorts
for financial stability by these central banks. Individually, central banks also inter-
vened in support of their national financial systems. For instance, in response to
increasingly strainedmarkets, the Bank of England introduced its Special Liquid-
ity Scheme on April 21, 2008 (House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2009a;
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Winters, 2012). This liquidity program allowed banks to swap mortgage-related
securities against highly liquidTreasury bills. Like the earlier, coordinated, central
bank intervention, this eased the spreads in interbank markets (see Figure 2.2).
The crisis turns systemic
By September 2008, the crisis turned systemic. On September 7, the US regu-
latory authorities took over the mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
These two “Government Sponsored Enterprises” (GSEs) were publicly traded
institutions, but people widely believed that the government would back them if
they came into diﬃculties. This is what the government did after they fell short
of liquidity. In a first attempt to help them, Treasury Secretary Paulson asked
Congress for a “bazooka”—the power to give them lines of credit, buy their as-
sets, and to inject capital (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011, 317). The
mere ability to save the GSEs, however, did not suﬃce. The Treasury needed to
actually rescue them, thereby acquiring $5.3 trillion of mortgages.
That same week, the investment bank Lehman Brothers faced a run. Paulson
tried to broker a takeover similar to the one of Bear Stearns. But he was reluctant
to commit taxpayer money (like the Fed had done for Bear Stearns). Without
government support, Bank of America withdrew its oﬀer. The British bank Bar-
clayswas still interested, but needed awaiver from its regulator to finish the deal in
time. Unwilling to “import [the American] cancer” (Sorkin, 2009, 348), Darling
refused to grant the waiver. On September 15, Lehman filed for bankruptcy. This
news sent shock waves through markets around the world.
One day later, the rating agencies downgraded the huge insurance firm AIG
by multiple notches. The New York Fed had been worried about AIG for some
weeks. The firm had seenmore andmore liquidity flow out of its accounts. It had
issuedmassive amounts of credit default swaps, eﬀectively insuring banks against
losses in the sub-primemarket. The downgrade forced AIG to give banks further
collateral, which it did not have. In contrast to the handling of Lehman, the Trea-
sury and the Fed decided they could not let AIG fail; they stepped in to rescue it.
The turmoil also started a run on money market funds. On Friday, the Treasury
stopped this run by issuing a guarantee using the Exchange Stabilization Fund.
This fund had been established in 1934 to counter exchange rate crises.
After this turbulent week, Secretary Paulson proposed a bill to Congress for a
broad rescue program. TheHouse of Representatives rejected the bill on Septem-
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ber 29, which caused the largest single-day fall of the Dow Jones. Four days later,
the president signed the bill into law after it had been passed by the Senate and
theHouse. It gave the Secretary of the Treasury the authority over $700 billion to
stabilize the financial system.
Paulson intended, at first, to stabilize banks by buying their bad assets. How-
ever, he changed course and used the funds to inject capital directly into banks.
He forced the biggest nine banks to accept state capital. Subsequently, the Trea-
sury developed a capital program for smaller banks. Some additional programs
followed in 2009, for instance the program for Citi.
The financial turmoil also reached London. In the sameweek Lehman failed,
the British government waived its competition rules to allow themerger between
Lloyds TSB and the struggling bank HBOS. On September 28, it transferred the
deposits and branches of Bradford & Bingley and nationalized the remainder of
the bank using the powers granted by the Banking Special Provision Act 2008.
The most comprehensive response by the British government followed on
October 8. GordonBrown announced that his governmentwould guarantee new-
ly issued bank debt up to £250bn and would provide £50bn to recapitalize British
banks. Additionally, the Bank of England extended its Special Liquidity Scheme
to £200bn (House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2009a, 55).
At the same time, the failure of Icelandic banks aﬀected the British financial
system. As a response, the government transferred the deposits of Kaupthing
Singer & Friedlander—the subsidiary of the Icelandic Kaupthing bank—to the
Dutch bank INGandput the rest into administration. Moreover, ChancellorDar-
ling announced that he would protect all British depositors of Icesave, which be-
longed to the Icelandic bank Landsbanki, and froze the bank’s assets using anti-
Terrorism provisions (House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2009b, 22, 33).
As funding diﬃculties persisted, the government introduced a second round
of system-wide interventions. On January 29, 2009, it announced a new set of
measures especially geared towards RBS and Lloyds. Both banks had taken part
in the recapitalization scheme in October the previous year, and the government
had purchased preference shares. To avoid a fixed payment for these shares, the
government agreed to convert them into common shares. Thereby, the govern-
ment increased its shareholdings in RBS from 58 percent to 70 percent. Addition-
ally, the government announced an Asset Protection Scheme: It would guarantee
certain assets against future credit losses. RBS and Lloyds agreed in principle to
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participate in the scheme. In November 2009, Lloyds withdrew from the agree-
ment to take part in the scheme. It paid £2.5bn as an exit fee for the implied pro-
tection since the announcement of its participation in the scheme.
Governments and central banks
In financial crises, central banks are crucial actors because they can provide liq-
uidity to banks. Market conditions easedmarkedly when themajor central banks
announced international swap agreements or launched liquidity programs (see
Figures 2.2 and 2.3). Nevertheless, the focus of this dissertation is not on their in-
terventions but on those by governments. Government interventions diﬀer from
those of central banks in that they can assume losses. Central banks can ease the
fundingof banks, but central bankshaveonly limitedequitywhichprecludes them
from taking losses oﬀ banks’ balance sheets. In otherwords, dealingwith solvency
problems requires actions by the Treasury. And during the recent banking crisis,
the central banks—particularly the Fed and the Bank of England—required the
governments to assume the fiscal risks of solving the crisis (Wessel, 2009;Darling,
2011; Sorkin, 2009). Thus, the following analysis takes as given that central banks
contributed to stabilize financial markets, but that their reach was ultimately lim-
ited.
The assumption that central bank’s eﬀorts were insuﬃcient to resolve the cri-
sis does not imply that their interventions were unimportant. To the contrary,
central banks’ policies were crucial to ease the impact of the crisis, and without
their liquidity programs, more banks would have failed, and governments would
have had to interveneon a larger scale. In otherwords, I assume that inmost coun-
tries, the governments faced a banking crisis with lacking solvency which central
banks alone couldn’t solve. Thus, these governments needed to decide how to
restore solvency in the banking system. And that decision was up to parliaments
and governments. That is the subject of this dissertation. For this focus, I take liq-
uidity programs as given, and leave the analysis of central bank decision making
for further study.
Around the world
The Lehman failure reached beyond the United States and the United Kingdom.
In high-income countries around the world, governments switched from piece-
meal interventions to comprehensive programs to stabilize their financial sectors.
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Inmany countries, they added further interventions until the spring of 2009, after
which the banking crisis abated.
In most countries, the crisis packages comprised debt guarantees, which al-
lowed banks to raise funding using the state’s creditworthiness, and direct gov-
ernment interventions: Governments injected capital into banks or supported
problematic assets. Figure 2.4 provides an overview of the size of these policies
relative to the size of the banking sector (expressed in total banking assets). The
wide variation inmagnitudes of bailouts is striking. The guarantees in Ireland and
Denmark covered the entire size of their banking sectors; the interventions in Italy
are minuscule.
To counter the repercussions of the financial crisis, governments resorted to
Keynesian demand stimuli. Figure 2.5 displays the discretionary fiscal stimuli for
2008-2010 alongside the aggregated financial policies. The American fiscal pack-
age was comparatively large, amounting to 5.6 percent of GDP. European coun-
tries engaged more cautiously in discretionary measures, also because they relied
on their automatic stabilizers. On average within theOECD, governments imple-
mented fiscal stimuli amounting to 1.4 percent of GDP.ƥ. They relied more on tax
cuts than spending increases (OECD, 2009a). This leads Pontusson and Raess
(2012, 21) to characterize the recent crisis management as “liberal Keynesianism”
rather than as the “social Keynesianism” of the 1970s, which had a stronger em-
phasis on spending. However, a few countries, including Iceland and Ireland,
conducted harsh pro-cyclical policies. They faced severe budgetary pressures not
least because of the banking bailouts.
Comparing the two types of responses yields another insight: They follow
a clear geographic pattern. Governments around the world stimulated their real
economy, but only aﬄuent countries hurried to save their banking sectors. In fig-
ure 2.6, I plot the fiscal stimuli (the circles) against the drop in exports (shaded
areas). Contrast this with Figure 2.7, in which I graph the banking support mea-
sures (circles) against non-performing loans (shaded areas). The stimulus circles
cover the world map much more equally than the bailout circles. The latter are
concentrated in Europe, North America and in the aﬄuent countries of Asia and
Oceania. In sum, the recent financial crisis prompted governments around the
world to stabilize their financial sectors. These eﬀorts varied enormously, also
1. The plain average of fiscal stimuli for OECD countries is 1.4 percent of GDP. It is 3.2
percent of GDP when it is weighted by the size of the countries’ economies.
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Note: Guarantees comprise liability and asset guarantees; recapitalizations comprise
capital injections and asset purchases. Source: Laeven and Valencia (2011), own cal-
culations.
Figure 2.4: Financial sector interventions in 2008/09 in selected countries by type
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Note: Banking support is weighted by instrument: 15% for credit guarantees, 100% for
recapitalizations and asset relief. Source: Laeven and Valencia (2011), own calcula-
tions.
Figure 2.5: Announced discretionary fiscal stimuli for 2008-2010 and total financial sec-
tor support in selected countries
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and in particular, in advanced, democratic countries. Although electoral account-
ability in these countries is comparably high, the size of their interventions varied.
Thus, electoral accountability—as crony capitalist accounts have it—cannot ex-
plain the variation in the size of bank bailouts.
Note: Discretionary fiscal stimuli measured as the change in the structural balance
taken fromLaeven andValencia (2011) basedondata from theOECD(OECD, 2009a)
and the IMF Fiscal Monitor (Horton, Kumar andMauro, 2009) which reflect the size
of announced discretionary fiscal stimuli until March 2009 with eﬀects on the fiscal
balances over the period of 2008-2010 (Laeven and Valencia, 2011, 10f).
Figure 2.6: Discretionary fiscal stimuli for 2008-2010 around the world
Note: Banking support is weighted by instrument: 15% for credit guarantees, 100% for
recapitalizations and asset relief. Source: Laeven and Valencia (2011), own calcula-
tions.
Figure 2.7: Financial sector support (weighted) in 2008-09 around the world
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2.5 Conclusion
Like most policies, bailouts are messy. From this chapter’s eﬀorts to make sense
of this mess, three insights stand out. First, banking is inherently fragile. Bank-
ing crises have occurred repeatedly, and they move fast and bear large costs. This
causes the crisis to change the conditions for policymaking. Second, governments
can use various instruments to save banks, but howmuch of the bill ends up with
the taxpayer depends not on the choice of instruments. In Chapter 4, I show
that the burden sharing depends instead on howmuch the government can bring
strong banks to participate. I analyze the bailouts in the United States and in the
UnitedKingdom in depth anddemonstratewhyAmerican banks accepted to bear
bailout costs, while the British government was left with large losses. Third, the
last section showed that some governments intervened little and others a lot. This
variation across developed democracies is at odds with the crony capitalism ac-
count of bailouts. I argue that the people’s vulnerability, including their holding
of pension assets, explains diﬀerent sizes of bailouts. This is the topic of the next
chapter.
Chapter 3
Public money, public profit
As a response to the financial crisis, governments across the world helped their
banks. How they supported themvaried, however, fromcountry to country. Den-
mark and Ireland backed their banking systems with a multiple of their GDP,
while Italy hardly intervened at all. This variation across countries allows an as-
sessment of competing explanations of bailouts. In this chapter, I use this varia-
tion to test the private interest explanations, those that emphasize crony capital-
ism and instrumental power against the argument that bailouts follow the interest
of voters.
Scholarship oﬀers two distinct views of banking bailouts, and they imply vast-
ly diﬀerent drivers of bailouts. The mainstream view holds that bailouts privilege
the interests of a fewover those ofmany. Failing banks receive publicmoney,mak-
ing taxpayers pay the bankers’ speculations. The second view of bailouts is more
benign. It emphasizes that bailouts stabilize the financial system, prevent depres-
sion and generate benefits for society as a whole. Bailouts may impose costs to
taxpayers, but they also benefit them because they keep the economy running. In
otherwords, one viewdismisses bailouts as illegitimate side-payments to bankers,
and the other regards them as public investments to avoid further harm.
These opposing assessments of bailouts invite diﬀerent explanations. Schol-
ars that see the bankers as profiteers explain bailouts with the influence of nar-
row private interests. In their view, the eﬃcient crisis resolution is, as Bagehot
(1873) prescribed long ago, to grant liquidity to the system and to shut down in-
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solvent banks. And it is deleterious to keep failing banks open by guaranteeing
their debt or injecting capital (c.f. Rosas, 2006). Most contributions to the litera-
ture fall onto this side of the debate, although they emphasize diﬀerent aspects of
influence. In one version, bailouts arise because of cronyism. In crony-capitalist
countries, politicians face little accountability, and they profit from embezzling
public money (Rosas, 2006; Keefer, 2007). In another, politicians grant bailouts
because of earlier campaign contributions (e.g. Dorsch, 2011; Blau, Brough and
Thomas, 2013), or because of close ties to bankers (Jabko and Massoc, 2012). All
of these accounts argue that policymakers privilege private interests over those
of voters and the general public. What causes bailouts, according to these argu-
ments, is the influence of special interests and a lack or a distortion of democratic
accountability.
Thebenign viewof bailouts leads to adiﬀerent interpretation. If bankbailouts
benefit the population at large, because they stabilize the economy, democratic
accountability drives policymakers to bail out banks instead of letting them fail.
In this chapter, I take this latter side of the debate and argue that policymakers
rescue banks for their concerns for voters.
Scholars of the recent crisis continue the ongoing discussion in political econ-
omy whether partisanship matters for policy. One side has it that, when times
get tough, there is little room for politicians to respond in a partisan way (Pier-
son, 2001; Mair, 2009). Others argue that crises highlight societal cleavages giv-
ing parties additional incentives to respond to their electorate (Armingeon, 2013).
The evidence from the overall responses to the recent crisis seems to be mixed
(Bermeo and Pontusson, 2012; Pontusson and Raess, 2012). For banking bailouts
specifically, some scholars do detect partisan eﬀects. Ansell (2012) and Smith
(2013, 2014) find that social-democratic governments intervened more heavily to
rescue banks, and Weber and Schmitz’s (2011) observe that they were more gen-
erous. With this chapter, I contribute to this debate arguing that the partisanship
of the governments does not matter for the banking rescues.
Overall, I maintain that the bailout literature overstates the influence of bank-
ers. Governments bail out banks not merely because bankers want them to, but
because letting banks fail creates an economic catastrophe. The threat of a crash-
ing banking sector aligns the interests of voters with those of bankers. Bankers
may want the government to step in and restore financial stability, but so does
the majority of voters. For this reason, bankers’ interests become epiphenome-
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nal. For policymakers, saving the economy and avoiding losses to voters becomes
farmore important than returning favors to bankers. Accordingly, I argue that the
amount of resources they commit depends onhowmuch the crisis harms citizens.
There are two analytical elements of this crisis threat. The first is the severity of
the crisis: How damaged is the banking sector? The second element is how vul-
nerable citizens are to the crisis. A financial crisis loots citizens’ savings and invest-
ments—especially assets in funded pension systems. Thus, banking rescues are
large where the banking system struggles severely and where the pension system
exposes people to financial risks.
3.1 Public money, private profit
There are good reasons that many observers judge bailouts as products of special
interests. When rescuing banks, governments channel large amounts of money
into banks, or they take on huge risks from banks. During the last crisis, gov-
ernments spent on average about 3.5 percent of GDP on recapitalizing banks and
buying bank assets. They further guaranteed bank debt of about 39.5 percent of
GDP.ƥ Some countries went well beyond that. Governments spent and risked
large parts of the public purse in favor of banks. And banks, in turn, paid millions
on bonuses for their senior executives, despite their losses in the wake of the cri-
sis.Ʀ The bailouts thus apparently profited thosemost who caused the crisis—the
bankers.
That bankers profit from public policy comes as no surprise. Banks gave large
amounts of money to political parties. For instance, the American financial sec-
tor gave $514million toRepublicans andDemocrats, equally divided between the
two. These contributions weremore than the parties received from any other sec-
tor.Ƨ Bankers usually have close ties to policymakers, and they can oﬀer lucrative
jobs to politicians for the time after public oﬃce. Hence, politicians have the in-
1. The figures reflect the average interventions by OECDmember countries.
2. Groom, Brian, “Finance workers enjoy growing pay premium helped by taxpayer,” Finan-
cial Times, 7 April 2014; Story, Louise and Eric Dash, “Bankers reaped lavish bonuses during
bailouts,”New York Times, 30 July 2009.
3. The date is taken from OpenSecrets.org, Center for Responsive Politics, accessed on
March 24, 2014.
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centive to favor bankers over other interest groups, which helps banks to get out
on top.
And even where campaign finance is tightly regulated and where it is diﬃcult
for banks to lure politicians with job oﬀers, bankers have an advantageous posi-
tion during times of financial turmoil. Politicians are amateurs in financial mar-
kets; they lack the expertise about the intricacies of markets. And they have little
information about what skeletons may be hiding in banks’ closets. It is, therefore,
diﬃcult for politicians to argue against bankers’ claims about the negative conse-
quences of a bank failure or about the money banks would need to stop the run.
Bankers’ expertise and information helps them to tweak bailouts in their favor,
even in the absence of campaign contributions or lucrative job oﬀers.
Theaftermathofbailoutsoftenmatch theexpectations about influential bank-
ers. In Ireland, for instance, policymakers bankrupted the state by guaranteeing
banks’ debts. And some scholars found that bailouts delay the recovery from the
crisis (Honohan and Klingebiel, 2003). In addition, bailouts are likely to lay the
seeds for the next banking crisis because they motivate banks to gamble: They
keep the profits when they win, and they get bailed out when they lose (Brunner-
meier et al., 2009). In short, bailouts canbe devastating for the state, the economy,
and the prospect for future crises.
Philip Keefer (2007) distills this special interest view of bailouts into a formal
model. I present it here to showwhatmost accounts of bailouts fail to see andwhy
this view is inadequate. Examining themodel helps in identifying the key assump-
tion that leadsmany observers to overemphasize the influence of special interests.
Themodel is also useful for the empirical assessment of bailouts, because itmakes
explicit assumptions and predictions which can be tested.
The most prominent cases Keefer includes in his analysis take place in Latin
Americana and Asia, like the Argentinian crisis in 1980 or the crises in Indonesia,
Malaysia and in other Asian countries in 1997. The scope of his study, however,
is not restricted to these regions or to developing countries. Like Rosas (2006),
Keefermakeshis argumentsonageneral level and sets these crisis episodes against
those in high-income countries. Thus, he—and Rosas—include the American
Savings and Loans crisis and the Nordic banking crises in the late 1980s and early
1990s. Because of this generality, it is possible to apply his analysis to the recent
wave of banking crises.
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Keefer takes the model’s bare bones from Ferejohn (1986), and he considers
three types of actors: policymakers, voters and special interests. It is a model of
economic voting in which politicians can either provide public goods or cater to
special interests, and voters re-elect politicians if the general welfare meets their
expectations.
The government decides on a policy q, which takes on values between zero
and one. Voters prefer the policy to be zero, and anything above zero generates
rents to special interests which voters have to pay (π(q)). The politicians get a
share of those rents (α), which they share among all veto players in government
(n). They also get, if re-elected, the general benefits from staying in oﬃce (R).
Their overall benefit is then (α/n)π(q)+R. Voters pay for the rents that politicians
are giving out. But they suﬀer also when a negative shock hits the economy (δ),
such as a banking crisis. Thus, the costs to voters are π(q − δ).ƨ
Table 3.1: Original (Keefer 2007) and modified model assumptions
Assumptions Keefer (2007) Modification
Policy q ∈ [0; 1]
Voters preferred policy q = 0
Rents π(q)
Economic shock δ, random variable
distributed over [-d,d]
Politicians share of rents α
Benefits from stying in oﬃce R
Number of veto player n
Total benefits for politicians (α/n)π + R
Cost to voters π(q − δ) π ((q + δ)ƿ)
The model has four consecutive steps. Firstly, voters select a performance
threshold, say π, beyond which they will re-elect the incumbent politicians. Sec-
ondly, the economy experiences an external shock, such as a boom or a bust.
Thirdly, politicians make policy, which means they decide how much rent they
extract to share between them and special interests. Lastly, voters vote on the ba-
sis of the performance threshold, not knowinghowmuchpoliticians took as rents.
Voters canonly observe the combined costs of thepolicy and the economic shock.
4. The expression includes the economic shockwith a negative sign, because a positive shock
(δ > 0), such as a boom, reduces the costs to voters. A crisis is represented by a negative value
(δ < 0) and increases the costs to voters.
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The key parameter is how low voters can push down the cost threshold. Their
trade-oﬀ is that a lower threshold reduces the rents politicians can takeout and still
get re-elected, but it also means that politicians forego re-electionmore often and
take the maximum rents instead. Algebraically, one can solve for the equilibrium
threshold with the following condition (Keefer, 2007, 614):
(α/n) π(q) + R = (α/n) π(1)(3.1 a)
for π(q − δ) = π; and π(1) − π ≤ m;
and(α/n) π(q) + R < (α/n) π(1)(3.1 b)
for all q satisfying π(q − δ) = π; δ < δ:
The first part of the condition (indicated by 3.1 a) states that politicians seek re-
election and take a moderate amount of rents if it is relatively easy for voters to
get rid of greedy politicians and if the economic shock is not too severe. That is,
δ >= δ, so that there is a policy q which can fulfill the condition (α/n) π(q) +
R = (α/n) π(1). In this case, politicians will take “moderate rents.” Moderate
rents mean the biggest amount that allows politicians to still win re-election. The
second part of the conditions states that, for a severe shock (δ < δ), politicians
will forgo re-election and take all the rents they can (π(1)). They benefit more
from taking all the rents than from taking some rents and getting re-elected.
For Keefer’s model, the crucial parameter, hidden in these two twisted lines,
is m. It represents how diﬃcult it is for voters to throw the government out of
oﬃce. In the equation it is part of an auxiliary condition: π(1) − π ≤ m. This
condition means that the incumbents will only restrain favors to special interests,
if voters will actually bother to replace a corrupt government. And voters bother
when the costs of getting a new government (m) is lower than the damage from
rent seeking politicians. In other words, when throwing out incumbents is easy
(i.e. m is small), the chances are larger that the government attempts to meet the
re-election threshold and settle for moderate rents. Thus, the model’s main result
is that “a decline in expulsion costs, m (freer elections), reduce rents” (Keefer,
2007, 615).Ʃ
5. The second result Keefer derives from the model is that more veto players reduce rents.
But he argues that the number of veto players has “no observable eﬀect on rents” because they
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The model has an additional implication of the model. It predicts that politi-
cians give out smaller rents when the crisis is more severe.ƪ In other words, larger
crises provoke smaller bailouts. This implication follows from the condition that
politicians adhere to voters’ performance threshold:
π(q − δ) = π(3.2)
q = π−ƾ(π) + δ(3.3)
Solving condition (3.2) for the policy q shows that the economic shock increases
the policy. This result means that a sharper crisis (a more negative δ) results in
a smaller bailout. Keefer doesn’t emphasize this eﬀect, but it is central to model.
The eﬀect springs from the assumption that voters cannot discern between the
costs from the economic shock and politician’s rent seeking. They only find out
about the overall welfare loss. So when the economy contracts, politicians have
less leeway to give rents to banks and still meet the threshold.
Themodel’s empirical implication, andKeefer’s key hypothesis, is that demo-
cratic governments have smaller bailouts. This hypothesis, however, is not borne
out in the evidence from the recent crisis. There is no significant diﬀerence in
the size of bailouts in democratic countries compared to those in autocratic coun-
tries.ƫ
Asdemocracy is itsmain determinant, thismodel fails to explain another kind
ofbailout variation. Thebailout sizes arenot, as onewouldexpect fromthemodel,
similar within the group of democratic countries. Instead, democracies employed
a large variation in the size of bailouts. Figure 3.1 shows the banking interventions
by country and type of instrument (the instruments are weighted to make them
comparable) during the banking crisis of 2008/2009. The interventions range
also delay crisis resolution, which increases costs and cancels out any gains from reduced rents
(Keefer, 2007, 615f).
6. There is a case when the model allows for larger rents as a consequence of severe crisis.
That is if the economic shock goes beyond a certain limit for which the politicians’ incentive
condition cannot be met, i.e. δ > δ. But this is in Keefer’s account an insignificant corner solu-
tion.
7. The weighted sum of banking interventions (recapitalizations, asset relief and guaran-
tees) is 7.09 percent of GDP in autocracies and 7.25 percent in democracies (based on data from
Laeven and Valencia, 2011) . A t-test finds no significant diﬀerence for this comparison, or for a
comparison of the interventions expressed in percent of bank sector size or for the comparison
when the sample is restricted to a minimum crisis shock (such as a fall of bank shares by at least
50 percent).
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from essentially zero in Italy to 20 percent of banking assets in Slovenia and Ire-
land. (When the unit is GDP, and guarantees are taken at full nominal value, the
diﬀerence is even more extreme: zero to above 200 percent in GDP.) This dif-
ference echoes the severity of the crisis. The larger the crisis is, the larger the
bailout. But this relation is the opposite of what the model suggests. In sum, the
model does not fit the evidence from the recent crisis. It emphasizes the distinc-
tion between democracies and autocracies, but the variation of bailouts is as large
within the group of democracies as between democracies and autocracies. And
the severity of the crisis increases the bailouts.
Note: The figures indicate the weighted sum of the used banking support interventions with
the following weights: 15 % for guarantees, 70 % for asset relief and 100 % for recapitalizations.
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2011).
Figure 3.1: Government support for banks in 2008-2009
But if the model’s predictions don’t hold for the recent crisis, what does the
model miss? And more importantly, does this observation call into question not
just the formal model, but the broader account of bailouts as a product of spe-
cial interests? I argue that the mainstream view of bailouts and the model suﬀer
from the same mistaken assumption. Both assume that the crisis management of
banking crisis is a zero sum game between the public and the banks. They take as
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given that bailouts benefit banks and hurt the public. Keefer justifies his choice
of model with the reasoning that “[f]orbearance and fiscal transfers [to banks]
actually do serve private interests at the expense of [the] public” (618).Ƭ And
Keefer’s model assumes plain corruption; politicians and banks share rents from
public policy. Rosas (2006) argues similarly, while other scholars base their argu-
ments onmore subtle forms of favoritism. Some argue that the favors are ensured
through campaign contributions (Dorsch, 2011;Mian, Sufi andTrebbi, 2010; Blau,
Brough and Thomas, 2013), some point to banks’ political connections (Duchin
andSosyura, 2012), and some see favors in exchange for “future, albeit still indeter-
minate counter-gifts” (Jabko andMassoc, 2012, 562). But regardless of the channel
of influence, all of these accounts share the assumption that bailouts benefit banks
at the cost of the public.
3.2 Beyond private profits
The costs for the state, the risks for future crises and bankers’ access to policymak-
ers and their bonuses, all suggest the same explanation: Bankers pushed politi-
cians to bail out banks, and politicians obeyed. But as plausible as this explana-
tion appears, it misses the essence of banking bailouts and exaggerates the links
between politicians and bankers.
Onegoal policymakerspursuewithbailouts is to stabilize thefinancial system.
They want to mitigate the eﬀects for the wider economy. As such, the rescue is
a policy response to the economic shock, and one would expect the response to
be more forceful the larger the initial problem is. This is akin to a government’s
response to a flu pandemic: the number of vaccines the government orders de-
pends on how much the disease spreads. For a banking crisis, the spread of the
flu equates to the losses in the banking system. The amount policymakers spend
on a banking rescue corresponds to how many loans go bad, and how much new
capital it takes to cover the losses.
8. He gives another reason why this model captures bailouts well: “cross-country diﬀer-
ences in responses are not likely to be caused by heterogeneous distributions of interest groups”
(Keefer, 2007, 618). But I show in Chapter 4 that interest group heterogeneity, i.e. their diverg-
ing structural power, actually does explain cross-country diﬀerences in bailouts.
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Another purpose of banking rescues are tomitigate the direct risks to citizens.
During financial crises, people face a number of financial risks. People may lose
the money they hold in savings accounts, in stocks and in their pension funds.
For savings accounts, the risks are usually limited because most countries have
deposit insurance schemes to protect them. But the risks are unfettered for stocks
and pension funds. For this reason, stabilizing the financial systems supports not
only banks, but mitigates risks for citizens. Citizens’ exposure to these risks are
not the same in every country. Some countries have relied heavily on financial
markets to organize their pension systems. When people’s pensions are mostly
held in pension funds, they are particularly vulnerable to the crisis. Accordingly,
a financialized pension system gives more reason for policymakers to stabilize fi-
nancial markets. Continuing the comparison with the flu epidemic, the pension
funds correspond to the people’s vulnerability. If the flu seriously threatens peo-
ple’s long term health—or even their life—a government would invest more in
vaccines and emergency programs than if the flu’s threat is limited to three days of
light fever.
The holdings of pension funds vary across countries, both in terms of size as
well as content. Some pension funds hold a large share of assets in stock markets
which are risky, while others prefer safer assets like deposits and bonds. More
striking is the diﬀering size of pension funds across countries. Some countries
have pension fund assets of less than 10 percent of GDP while others have more
than 50 percent. Figure 3.2 plots the overall amount of assets in pension funds
and the allocation of those asset in terms of asset classes. The figure reveals a
positive relation between the total amount of pension assets and the holdings of
shares. In other words, the countries which use pension funds extensively tend to
invest more of these funds in riskier asset classes. This asset allocation reinforces
the motivation for policymakers in these countries to intervene and support the
market to lessen the impact onpensions assets. At the same time, even thepension
funds with relatively safe assets lost in value during the crisis. For instance the
pension funds in Germany, which are invested mostly in bonds, dropped about 9
percent in value (OECD, 2009c). Thus, supporting pension funds is in principle
a concern even in countries with relatively safe assets. But pension assets pose less
of an electoral threat for policymakers where the pension system relies more on
pay-as-you-go elements rather than on invested funds.
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Note: The graph on the left includes countries with pension asset holdings of 11 percent of GDP
or less (scale from 0 to 12 % of GDP) ; the graph on the right includes countries with more
pension assets (scale from 0 to 130% of GDP). The data for the absolute size of pension fund
assets are taken from the World Bank’s Global Financial Development Database and national
sources. The data on the asset allocation come from the OECD Pension Statistics.
Figure 3.2: Asset allocation in pension funds in 2007
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In general, funded pension systems add incentives for policymakers to rescue
banks. They are not a necessary condition for banking bailouts. Even if a country
has no funded pensions, there are still risks from the crisis, and policymakersmay
support banks to reduce the shock to the economy and employment. But risks
through invested pension assets are an additional reason for supporting banks and
restoring financial stability.
In sum, there are good reasons for policymakers to bail out banks other than
securing campaign contributions or pleasing rich friends. This is not to say that
bankers do not gain from bailouts; they do. Their banks escape bankruptcy, and
they keep their jobs and bonuses. But reducing bailouts to the payoﬀs for bankers
hides a fundamental point. Because the banking system is intimately linked to the
economy, and one falls with the other, voters’ interests and those of bankers go in
the same direction. Both voters and bankers gain from the government’s eﬀorts
to restore financial stability. Only because bankers are the largest beneficiaries
of bailouts is no proof that they write policy. Pharmaceutical companies benefit
whengovernments launcha large-scale fluvaccinationprogram. But governments
don’t do that becausepharmaceutical companies bankroll political campaigns, but
because they want to avoid a flu pandemic.
3.3 Bailouts and voters
In line with the last section, I argue that voters’ interest align with those of spe-
cial interests, and it is this alignment that explains the widespread use of bailouts.
Overlooking this motivation for bailouts leads to the exaggeration of special in-
terests.
I base my argument on the fact that banking crises threaten people’s liveli-
hood and cause the economy to contract (Furceri andMourougane, 2009; Furceri
and Zdzienicka, 2012; Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache andRajan, 2008; Deltuvaitė, 2011;
Reinhart and Rogoﬀ, 2009). Adapting to the downturn, firms fire workers, and at
the same time, people losemoneybecause banks fail and stockmarkets crash. The
risks from banking crises are thus not limited to any specific group of the popula-
tion, but they aﬀect the vast majority. Politicians in government, therefore, have
the incentive to halt the crisis and mitigate its risks. They recognize the threat
the crisis poses to voters, and they quell it in order to prevent electoral defeat.
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Electoral accountability, thus, motivates politicians to restore financial stability
by bailing out banks. Without electoral accountability, leaders may still rescue
banks, to sustain the economy or to cater to the elites. But in contrast to earlier
contributions, I don’t expect that democracy reduces banking bailouts.
The motivation to rescue banks in democracies applies to governments from
the left, right or center. The risks from banking crises do not spare any party’s
constituency. The crisis harms businesses and workers. It harms the well-oﬀ,
who fear for their investments, and workers, who fear for their jobs. And, inmany
countries, the crisis aﬀects most people directly by threatening their retirement
savings. The risks from banking crisis includes the constituencies of both left-
and right-wing parties and, certainly, the median voter. For this reason, I argue
that the partisan aﬃliation of the government makes no diﬀerence for the scope
of the banking rescues.
There are, however, other factors that make a diﬀerence for banking bailouts.
First, the volume of the rescue eﬀorts depend on how big the crisis impact is.
Banks in some countries faced a severe crisis because they had been exposed to
the American subprime market or to their own domestic bubble. In other coun-
tries, banks were much less hurt. Additionally, the importance of the banking
sector varies. A crisis’s repercussions are graver when the economy relies heavily
on banks. The extent of the crisis shock for the economy shapes policymakers’
response; a deeper crisis requires a larger rescue.
Second, the volumeof rescue eﬀorts depends onhowvulnerable people are to
financial risks. The same crisis may have very diﬀerent eﬀects depending on how
much people are exposed to these risks. People are especially exposed if they hold
assets invested in financial markets. This concerns the vast majority of people in
countries where retirement savings are held on financial markets. In the United
States, for instance, those who worried about their 401(k) plans were many.
In short, I argue that governments anticipate the exposure of large parts of the
electorate, including the median voter, to the crisis and determine the size of the
banking rescues accordingly. The exposure depends foremost on the severity of
the crisis, the size of the banking sector and the amount of pension assets.
What Keefer’s model misses is that voters’ interests are aligned with those of
banks in times of crisis. If this alignment is included, which requires only a small
change to the model, the results diﬀer and square much better with the evidence
from the recent crisis.
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The reason for the alignment is that banking failures cause large disruptions
and impose losses on voters. Voters, therefore, want banks to survive an economic
shock, and they tolerate policy that supports banks to the extent it helps them
to overcome the crisis. Naturally, voters object to government support beyond
what is necessary. In particular, they would suﬀer from politicians giving public
money to banks in good times. Accordingly, the cost of public policy for citizen
can be modeled as π ((q + δ)ƿ). This term means that citizens prefer politicians
to compensate any negative shock to the economy: The cost function is minimal
when q = −δ. But any policy beyond that, any q > −δ, creates costs to voters. This
higher cost for voters associated with a larger policy, i.e. bigger rents, corresponds
to Keefer’s original formulation.
This alternative cost function for citizens changes Condition 3.1 to:
(α/n)π(q) + R ≥ (α/n)π(1)(3.4 a)
for π [(q + δ)ƿ] = π; and π(1) − π ≤ m
and(α/n)π(q) + R < (α/n)π(1)(3.4 b)
for all q satisfying π [(q + δ)ƿ] = π; δ > δ:
The first part of the condition applies when politicians adhere to the perfor-
mance threshold. The second part states when it is better for them to take the
maximum amount of rents (q=1). In this version of themodel, politicians seek re-
election when the economy falls into crisis. They chose to conform to the perfor-
mance threshold because both voters and politicians prefer a favorable treatment
of special interests. Voters and politicians achieve a consensus, but their moti-
vations diﬀer. The voters are concerned about avoiding the costs of the banking
crisis. The politicians aremotivated by staying in oﬃce and by the pecuniary ben-
efits they get by favoring special interests.
Accordingly, the crisis has a diﬀerent impact on policy. Politicians in this al-
ternative model set policy q according to:
π [(q + δ)ƿ] = π(3.5)
q =√π−ƾ(π) − δ(3.6)
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The economic shock, δ, aﬀects policy negatively. That is, politicians react to a
negative economic shock with a large policy response. In the model, bailouts are
larger, when the crisis is more severe. And in this case, politicians react this way
not because they collude with special interests and stab voters in their backs, but
because there is an alignment of interests between special interests and voters.
Politicians seek re-election and strive to adhere to voters’ expectations. In this
way, electoral accountability does not prevent politicians from bailing out banks,
but brings them to do so.
A highly stylized model, such as this, is no evidence for an argument, but it
makes the underlying assumptions explicit and shows how altering one assump-
tion aﬀects thedynamics and results. Thekey assumptionofKeefer’smodel is that
crisismanagement is a zero-sumgamewith bailouts benefiting banks at the cost of
the public. Relaxing this assumption and assuming instead that interests of voters
and banks are aligned during times of crisis turns Keefer’s result around. Bailouts
increasewith the severity of crisis, and electoral accountability drives bailouts, not
only special interests.
Importantly, this zero-sumassumption is not only thebasis forKeefer’smodel
but also for the mainstream view of bailouts. Scholars vary on how special inter-
est get politicians to bail out banks—with campaign contributions, promises of
future jobs, crony connections, or other future gifts—but they assume that politi-
cians, were they to act in voters’ interests, would not bail out banks. Analyzing this
model, therefore, has a broader import. It shows that allowing for interest align-
ment between special interests and voters reverts the eﬀect of electoral account-
ability. It also suggests that themainstream account has exaggerated the influence
of special interests.
3.4 Evidence from the recent financial crisis
Distinguishing between the two arguments—whether bailouts were driven by
special interests or by their alignment with voters—faces the methodological ob-
stacle that special interest influence is diﬃcult tomeasure. I address this diﬃculty
by setting the diverging empirical implications of the two approaches against the
evidence from the recent crisis.
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The basis for my argument is that bailouts have benefits for the majority of
voters, not only for special interests. These benefits accrue indirectly by restor-
ing financial stability and avoiding further financial turmoil. That most people
benefit from restoring financial stability is beyond debate. There has been a con-
sensus that banking crises are harmful for financial investment, the economy, and
for employment (Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache and Rajan, 2008; Hutchison andNoy,
2005; Reinhart and Rogoﬀ, 2009). The crucial question is whether there is an al-
ternative to bailouts which stops the crisis and avoids burdens to the public. If
there were an alternative, one could argue that bailouts, in as much as they trans-
fer public money to banks and the alternative doesn’t, generate profits for banks
at the cost of the taxpayer. As both policy responses would stop the crisis, the
benefits from avoiding further damage would fall out of the equation. And this is
indeed what scholars and pundits have argued (Honohan and Klingebiel, 2003;
Rosas, 2006; Keefer, 2007; Woods Jr, 2009). The government does not have to
bail out banks to stop the crisis, so their argument, it can alternatively shut down
failing banks and provide liquidity to the rest. Rosas (2006) puts this alternative
into the concise question, Bagehot or bailout? But this is an illusory choice.
Modern financial systems are tightly interconnected, and letting banks fail
during financial distress escalates the crisis. The Great Depression has exempli-
fied how failing banks ruin the economy. Andmerely providing liquidity is insuf-
ficient because systemic banking crises are rarely confined to liquidity. Systemic
crises involve problems of capital. During these crises, it is not the case that banks
are healthy and only temporarily run out of cash. Instead, many banks incurred
large losses, lack capital and cannot repay their debt. Therefore, economists, as
far as they ever can agree, have found a consensus that financial crises require gov-
ernment interventions to save failing banks (e.g. Borio, Vale and Von Peter, 2010;
Beck et al., 2010). The public debate took this consensus up as “systemic risk”
and “too-big-to-fail,” the notion that banks have grown so big that they cannot
be allowed to fail lest they tear down the economy. In a systemic crisis, in which
banks have inadequate capital, liquidity support is insuﬃcient. And bankruptcy,
in the sense of a pre-set procedure towind down a failing bank, is illusory because
it cannot avoid macro-economic disaster unless it involves a back-door govern-
ment bailout (Levitin, 2011). Solving the crisis without further havoc leaves no
other choice than some form of bailout.
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This dichotomy between Bagehot and bailout policies also implies that all
bailout policies, including asset purchases, recapitalizations, guarantees and for-
bearance (cf. Rosas 2006), are equally bad, in the sense of channeling public
money into private institutions. The experience of the recent crisis has shown,
however, that bailout policies can generate a positive return for the government
and for the wider economy. For the American government, the recapitalizations
generated a profit of about $9bn (Congressional Budget Oﬃce 2014 Chapter 4 of
this dissertation). AndVeronesi andZingales (2010) estimated that this program’s
overall benefit—including the positive externalities for the economy—are about
$100bn. Other governments, however, lost money. Although these governments
used similar “bailout policies,’’ they distributed the burden between the state and
banks quite diﬀerently. This speaks against the assumption that bailouts neces-
sarily profit special interests at the cost of the public.
One justification that scholars give for assuming that bailouts profit special
interests but not the general public is that bailouts have been found to make the
crisis impact on economic output worse (e.g. Honohan and Klingebiel, 2003; De-
tragiache andHo, 2010). And some countries in the recent crisis seem to confirm
this eﬀect. Guaranteeing all of banks debt, the Irish government steered into a
sovereign debt crisis. It received a “bailout” from the European Union, imple-
mented hard austerity measures, and its economy endured a recession. But the
experience in most other countries stands against this relationship. The bailouts
in countries like the United States, Germany, and France stabilized their financial
systems within a few months, and the following recession was mild, considering
the depth of the crisis in these countries. Along this line, Furceri and Zdzienicka
(2012) find that bailout policies, in particular liquidity support, forbearance, re-
capitalizations, and nationalizations, soften the output loss after banking crises.
While it is diﬃcult to assess the long-term growth eﬀects of bailouts, as they need
to be separated them from the eﬀects of the crisis, it is clear that scholars’ initial
assessment was too bleak.
3.5 Analyzing bailouts quantitatively
So far, I addressed the empirical implications of the mainstream view on bailouts
referring to other studies. In this section, I focus on implications that I test ex-
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plicitly in a cross-country analysis. I start by showing where the views of bailouts
produce contradictory empirical implications.
Hypotheses
Asmentionedabove,Keefer andother scholars have argued thatbailouts indemo-
cratic countries are small because electoral accountability restricts politicians to
seek rents and bail out banks (Maxfield, 2003; Keefer, 2007; Rosas, 2006). I ar-
gue that electoral accountability does curb rent seeking, but it also brings politi-
cians—if there is a banking crisis—to bail out banks to restore financial stability.
For this reason, I expect that democracy has little influence on the size of banking
bailouts.
Hypothesis 1: Democracy does not decrease bailouts.
Democracy is not an absolute antidote to cronyism and political rent seeking.
Competitive elections limit what politicians can do, but they do not prevent all
corruption. For this reasons, if bailouts are a product of politicians’ pursuit of per-
sonal gain, corruption may allow governments to bail out banks even in democ-
racies. Rosas (2006), for instance, argues and finds that governments use bailout,
rather than Bagehot policies, where corruption is high. Since I argue, in contrast,
that politicians rescue banks because of electoral reasons and not because they fa-
vor cronies or reciprocate bribes, I expect corruption to have no eﬀect on the size
of bailouts.
Hypothesis 2: Corruption does not increase bailouts.
If banking crises cause the interests of voters and banks to align, cross-country
comparisons should show a number of relationships. First, just as the alternative
model outlined above predicts, the crisis impact should be positively related to
the size of banking bailouts.
Hypothesis 3: Bailouts increase with crisis severity.
Beyond the crisis impact, the important factor for the interest alignment is
how much voters are exposed to financial market risks through pensions. Finan-
cial crises aﬀect people directly, and strongly, when they hold financial assets in
pension funds. If politicians consider the electoral eﬀects of the crisis manage-
ment, they should act more boldly when the pension system relies on financial
markets.
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Hypothesis 4: Bailouts increase with holdings of pension assets.
Losses to pension savings, recession and increasing unemployment lead in all
likelihood to a severe electoral punishment for whoever happens to be in govern-
ment when the crisis hits. The negative impacts of a banking crisis aﬀect the con-
stituencies for both left- and right-wing parties, including the median voter. For
this reason, I argue that the government’s partisanship has no eﬀect on the size
of banking bailouts. This argument stands not necessarily against the crony capi-
talism or special interest literature, but against Ansell’s (2012) application of asset
theoryonbankingbailouts aswell as the findings bySmith (2013, 2014) andWeber
and Schmitz (2011).
Hypothesis 5: As both left- and right-wing governments have incentives to bail
out banks, partisanship has no eﬀect on the size of bailouts.
A usual suspect for an important determinant for any policy is the number
of veto players. Here, I treat veto players only cursorily because my expectation
that additional veto players have little influence on bailouts conforms to previ-
ous arguments, albeit for diﬀerent reasons. I argue that the legislature, the main
veto player for the executive branch, lacks the time and resources during crises
to take positions about bailouts against the executive. The experience of the re-
cent crisis seems to confirm this as most legislatures rubber-stamped the crisis
response. This diﬀers from earlier arguments about veto players and bailouts.
Keefer (2007, 607), for instance, has argued that “checks and balances have no
eﬀect on government responses to financial crises” because the delay they cause
for the crisis management cancel out the benefits from veto players’ curbing ef-
fect on rent-seeking. But despite the diﬀerences, the expectations for a quantita-
tive analysis are the same, both expect veto players to have no eﬀect on the size
of banking bailouts. And testing for veto players using the conventional measures
finds indeed no significant eﬀect.
Variables and data
In response to the recent global crisis, governments around the world intervened
to support their banking sectors. These crisis policies were decidedly domestic.
While there were common trends, compared to earlier crises, the policies varied
in composition and size. Some countries had huge programs, some had none,
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and many something in between. While the big central banks acted in coordi-
nated steps, the governments acted on their own. Even within the EU, which has
themost institutionalized set-up for coordination, the governments pursued their
own, distinctly national policies. There was a vast variety of policies, particularly
in termsof size (Petrovic andTutsch, 2009). This set-up lends itselfwell to a cross-
national quantitative analysis because governments reacted to the same crisis, at
the same time with domestic programs. In this section, I describe the variables
for this analysis. The next section covers the analysis and the results.
Bailouts Governments used a variety of instruments to stabilize banking sys-
tems. They guaranteed debt, bought distressed assets and injected capital. Across
countries, the interventions diﬀered also regarding pricing, bankers’ pay restric-
tions, and requirements for bank lending (see IMF, 2009; Panetta et al., 2009).
Nevertheless, I analyze the sizes of these programs. There are several reasons for
this choice. First, the size captures diﬀerent policies in a single measure. Second,
size is a key element of crisis policies; it captures howmuch money governments
put on the table to stabilize their financial system. This measure is meaningful for
comparisons within and across countries because deciding on fiscal outlays im-
plies trade-oﬀs with other policy areas. The more that is spent on the banking
system, the less can be spent on the best alternative: social policy, tax cuts and
so on. Third, measuring size means measuring policy output and not outcomes.
Outcomes for financial policies are interesting, such as the net cost of bailouts or
the impact on growth. But outcomes depend on a myriad of accompanying fac-
tors, far beyond policy determinants. And this would make any analysis diﬃcult.
Comparing the size of bailouts poses one operational diﬃculty: The nomi-
nal sizes of interventions represent diﬀerent types of obligations. For capital in-
jections and asset purchases, nominal size expresses what governments have to
pay. For guarantees, the nominal amount expresses what governments may have
to pay. In other words, guarantees are not outlays, but contingent liabilities. The
nominal amount of guarantees state themaximum the government is on the hook
for. Thus, equating a million dollars of capital injections with a million dollars of
guarantees exaggerates the importance of the guarantees. Still, guarantees are by
no means free. Guarantees can cost the state dearly if they are called upon. They
also increase the credit riskof the state and thusdriveupborrowing costs. In short,
guarantees impose costs on governments, but not to their full nominal amount. I
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apply, therefore, the approach of the European Commission to evaluate the “state
aid element” of guarantees during the financial crisis (Naess-Schmidt, Harhoﬀ
and Hansen, 2011; European Commission, 2009b). The Commission estimated
the implied subsidy in guarantees to be on average 15 percent of the nominal value.
For recapitalizations, the Commission counted the full nominal amount. And for
asset relief programs, it estimated the state element, on average, to be about 70
percent. This approach facilitates a sensible aggregation of government interven-
tions. It takes account of all the measures and reduces the distortions caused by
guarantees.
The European Commission was faced with a diﬃcult situation in the fall of
2008. Because Article 87 of the ECTreaty on competition law generally ruled out
subsidies bymember states to their industries, the EuropeanCommission needed
to decide whether the support to the banking sector could be seen as one of the
exceptions, in particular as the exemption mentioned in Article 87(3)(b)5 about
“aid…to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of aMember State.” Since
the member states were intent to rescue their banks, the Commission had the
choice between water down its competition rules by granting exemptions or risk
that member states would ignore them altogether (Koenig, 2008, p. 629). The
Commission decided to approve the rescue programs quickly and to ask adjust-
ments in later reviews. It hired new staﬀ and, rapidly, devised rules and guidelines
about banking support (Jaeger, 2009; Doleys, 2012).
For the assessment of the rescue programs, the European Commission first
distinguished between recapitalizations and guarantees. It decided to count the
state aid value of recapitalization as its full amount. The rationale is that the gov-
ernment transfersmoney to the bank upfront and that the risk is high. For guaran-
tees, it counted only parts as state aid, because they require no transfer and the risk
ismore limited. To account for diﬀerences of risks, theCommission estimated the
implied subsidy for well-capitalized banks as 10 percent and for banks in diﬃcul-
ties as 20 percent. Second, the Commission considered asset purchase programs
on a case-by-case basis, depending on the conditions of the program. As the state
receives assets in exchange for the investment money, the subsidy should be less
than the nominal amount. For all asset purchase programs, the average estimated
amount of state aid for these were about 70 percent.ƭ These figures are only esti-
9. Data available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/financial_
economic_crisis_aid_en.html [accessed 30 October 2014.]
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mates, because the actual implied subsidy depends on the risks which varies with
the overall economic situation. Nevertheless, they provide a useful way of com-
paring diﬀerent interventions.
One problem that could arise from using these weights is a bias introduced
by member states trying to game the system. For instance, governments could
move resources from recapitalizations to guarantees because the European Com-
mission counts a smaller part as state aid. Fortunately, the incentive for this type
of gaming was low. The European Commission approved the programs quickly,
and it communicated early on that it would do so—it emphasized “it would be
part of the solution, not part of the problem” (Jaeger, 2009, p.4). Thus, govern-
ments knew that their rescue programs—usingwhichever instrument—would be
approved by the Commission.
Bymeasuring interventions thisway, I introduce a newoperationalization and
depart from those of earlier contributions. Some scholars use the plain sum of
banking interventions (e.g. Weber and Schmitz, 2011; Grossman andWoll, 2014),
and others avoid the aggregation and analyze the instruments individually (e.g.
Ansell, 2012). But both alternatives carry shortcomings for a quantitative analysis:
Adding up the nominal amounts of guarantees to the other instruments inflates
their importance. A dollar guaranteed is not the same as a dollar spent. And ana-
lyzing the instruments separately is misleading, because they are complementary.
In other words, what the government provides in the form of capital, it does not
need to provide in the form of asset purchases, and vice versa. Using the weighted
sumof interventions avoids these shortcomings, and thus constitutes a simple but
informative measure.
There are two common ways to make banking bailouts comparable across
countries. One way is to express the interventions relative to GDP or relative to
the size of the banking sector. I use the second method, because the size of the
banking sector serves as a more meaningful measurement for bailouts. It relates
the bailout directly to relevant quantity. When the banking sector experiences
a given level of problems, a country with a larger sector requires larger interven-
tions. Normalizing the bailouts by banking sector size makes themmore compa-
rable across countries with diﬀering sizes of banking sectors. All regression mod-
els shown in Table 3.4 use therefore bailout size relative to banking sector size.
This way of measuring takes away some the explanatory power of some variables,
such as the crisis impact and pensions, because they correlate positivelywith bank
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sector size, but this normalization relates the interventions to the most appropri-
ate dimension. And if the analysis finds significant eﬀects for these variables, it
strengthens the findings.
Crisis impact Tomeasure the crisis impact, I use the fall in the value of bank-
ing equity from peak to trough between the beginning of 2007 until the first quar-
ter of 2009. This indicator measures the crisis impact specifically in the banking
sector and covers the time period, when governments launched the rescue pro-
grams. As such, it avoids thediﬃculties economists encountered trying tofindkey
indicators for the overall crisis (Aizenman and Pasricha, 2012; Rose and Spiegel,
2010, 2011; Berkmen et al., 2012). Few if any indicators predict well the contrac-
tion of economic activity because there have been many ways in which the crisis
spread. For some countries, the crisis erupted because of losses in the banking
sector, for others, because of the fall in global consumption or the flight of capital.
It is easier to find a predictor for bailouts, because they are the response specifi-
cally to the problems in the banking sector, not to a number of other factors in the
economy. And the fall of bank equity is particularly suited as an indicator because
it captures the sector’s problems regardless of their origin. Banks’ equity falls both
when they are hurt by losing money at home (e.g. in a popping housing bubble)
or abroad (e.g. on the American sub-prime market).
To create this indicator, I take the operationalization formAizenman and Pas-
richa (2012) and the data from Thomson Reuters Datastream. For the countries
Datastream has no bank equity index, I use the financial sector index or the gen-
eral stock index.ƥƤ This indicator captures specifically the problemsof the banking
sector, which prompted governments to respond with banking bailouts.
To test the other hypotheses, I use existing indicators and indices. For in-
stance, I test the hypothesis on people’s vulnerability through pensions using the
assets of pension funds relative to GDP. Therefore, I estimate the eﬀect of parti-
sanship with the share of cabinet seats occupied by social democratic and other
left-wing parties. As an alternative, I estimate the eﬀect with a dummy variable
indicating whether the party of the executive belongs to the left. I list the defi-
nitions and sources for all variables in Table 3.2, and their descriptive statistics in
Table 3.3.
10. Specifically, the variable uses the financial sector index for Iceland andNewZealand, and
the stock index for Jamaica, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania and Nigeria.
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Table 3.2: Variable definitions and sources
Left cabinet (share): Cabinet positions of social-democratic and other left-wing
parties as a percentage of total cabinet posts (gov_left). Sources: Armingeon
et al. (2010), The Statesman’s Year Book
Pension assets: Ratio of assets of pension funds to GDP. Source: Global Finan-
cial Development Database, World Bank
Peak-trough fall in bank equity index: Fall in bank equity index, trough
(2008Q4– 2009Q1) – peak (2007 – 2008), as percent of peak value. Fall in finan-
cial sector index where bank index is not available. See Aizenman and Pasricha
(2012, 351). Source: Datastream, own calculations
Per capitaGDP, log (t-1): Log of per capita GDP on purchasing power parity in
2005 international dollars. Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank
Democracy (UDS): Unified democracy score (posterior mean). Source: Pem-
stein, Meserve andMelton (2010)
Corruption Perceptions Index: Survey based corruption index, ranging be-
tween 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). Source: Transparency Interna-
tional,Teorell et al. (2013)
3.6 Results
In this section, I present the results from a quantitative analysis of crisis manage-
ment. I start outwith a plain, economicmodel and add consecutively the variables
for institutions and politics. This economic model includes the size of bailouts,
the fall of bank equity index during the crisis and per capita GDP. The results of
the economic models are shown in Columns 1 and 2 in Table 3.4.
Crisis impact (Hypothesis 3)
The first independent variable in Table 3.4 is the percentage change of the bank
equity index during the crisis, from the peak in 2007 to the trough in 2008/09,
which measures the crisis severity. To recapitulate, the hypothesis on the crisis
stated that themore severe it is, themore politicianswould spendon saving banks.
The estimate confirms this hypothesis. Since a drop in the bank index is coded as
a negative number (like δ in themodel), a negative coeﬃcient indicates a positive
correlation between the crisis shock and the bailout size. The estimate is statis-
tically significant at one percent in the first model and at ten percent in the other
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Banking interventions in 1.205 1.165 0 3.127 54
% of banking assets, log
Peak-trough fall in -0.697 0.159 -0.992 -0.348 54
bank equity index
Per capita GDP, 9.047 1.32 6.132 10.94 54
USD (t-1), log
Left cabinet (share) 0.348 0.362 0 1 54
Democracy (UDS) 1.09 0.754 -0.781 2.25 54
Pension fund assets 25.125 33.41 0.007 128.763 54
to GDP (t-1)
Population, log 16.957 1.706 12.668 20.986 54
Veto player index 3.722 1.204 1 6 54
(DPI)
Bicameral System 0.778 0.42 0 1 54
Note: The data refer to 2008 for all current variables and to 2007 for the lagged vari-
ables. The sample is based on Laeven and Valencia (2011) and includes OECD coun-
tries and important upper-middle and lower-middle income countries: Argentina,
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, In-
donesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pak-
istan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa,
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom and the
United States.
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Table 3.4: Banking bailouts (I)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Peak-trough -3.724‡ -1.972† -1.964† -2.083† -2.094† -2.294‡
fall in bank (0.757) (0.865) (0.864) (0.853) (0.840) (0.838)
equity index
Per capita 0.430‡ 0.431‡ 0.484‡ 0.358‡ 0.441‡
GDP, USD, (0.0811) (0.0833) (0.140) (0.0808) (0.122)
(t-1), log
Left cabi- 0.0331 0.0191
net (share) (0.343) (0.341)
Democracy -0.136 -0.232
(UDS) (0.279) (0.269)
Pension fund 0.0061* 0.0068*
assets to (0.0032) (0.0035)
GDP (t-1)
Constant -1.391† -4.062‡ -4.075‡ -4.476‡ -3.643‡ -4.306‡
(0.570) (0.604) (0.668) (0.954) (0.664) (0.903)
N 54 54 54 54 54 54
R² 0.258 0.439 0.439 0.442 0.464 0.472
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, † p<0.05, ‡ p<0.01. The sample includes
the countries listed in Table 3.3. The dependent variable is the weighted sum of the used bank-
ing support interventions with the following weights: 15 % for guarantees, 70 % for asset relief
and 100 % for recapitalizations.
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Table 3.5: Banking bailouts (II)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Peak-trough -1.982† -1.896† -1.877† -2.195† -2.160†
fall in bank (0.874) (0.878) (0.866) (0.863) (0.850)
equity index
Per capita 0.370‡ 0.411‡ 0.416‡ -0.0809 -0.123
GDP, USD (0.0993) (0.0849) (0.0887) (0.131) (0.137)
(t-1), log
Corruption 0.323‡ 0.317‡
Perceptions (0.0826) (0.0885)
Index
Population, -0.0908 -0.0587
log (0.0715) (0.0767)
Veto player 0.0999 0.0960
index (DPI) (0.101) (0.0893)
Bicameral -0.199 0.0762
System (0.295) (0.314)
Constant -1.442 -1.989 -4.204‡ -3.709‡ -0.421
(0.875) (1.800) (0.604) (0.856) (1.679)
N 54 54 54 54 54
R² 0.535 0.452 0.449 0.444 0.549
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, † p<0.05, ‡ p<0.01. The sample includes
the countries listed in Table 3.3. The dependent variable is the weighted sum of the used bank-
ing support interventions with the following weights: 15 % for guarantees, 70 % for asset relief
and 100 % for recapitalizations.
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models, and it is important in size. A one standard deviation change in the cri-
sis intensity (such as between Canada and Sweden, or Sweden and the United
States) is associated with a 23 percent increase of the bailout. This result indi-
cates that politicians use bailouts indeed as a problem solving policy; the policy
solution depends on the size of the problem.
The second variable, added to the crisis impact, is per capita income. The
reason for including it is not to test any particular hypothesis, but as an important
control variable. Per capita output represents development, including the avail-
able resources as well as the importance of finance for the economy. It eﬀectively
tests to some degree the crisis impact, because it has been found to be a strong
predictor for the recent crisis impact (Rose and Spiegel, 2011; Aizenman and Pas-
richa, 2012; Frankel and Saravelos, 2012). The data confirm the latter in the sense
that including GDP reduces the estimated eﬀect for the bank equity index. It is
an important control for pension assets in particular. Not controlling for income
could find a spurious eﬀect for pension assets because of its positive correlation
with development. The estimated coeﬃcient for per capita output is positive, in-
dicating that higher income and development are associated with bigger bailouts,
and it is highly significant.
Democracy (Hypothesis 1)
The crucial variable for the crony-capitalism account of bailouts is democracy
(Rosas, 2006; Keefer, 2007). According to this account, bank bailouts should
be smaller in democracies, because competitive elections reduce politicians’ abil-
ity to seek rents and to give out favors. Additionally to the simple t-test between
democratic and autocratic countries presented above, I test for democracy in the
cross-national regression (Column 4). The regression finds no statistically sig-
nificant influence of democracy on bailouts and cannot confirm that electoral ac-
countabilitywoulddiscipline politicians to curbbailouts. (If anything, it is the op-
posite: When the GDP per capita is left out of the regression, democracy shows
a highly significant positive eﬀect, meaning that more consolidated democracies
are associated with larger bailouts.) This result speaks strongly against viewing
bailouts as a phenomenon of crony capitalism. Democracy does not curb bank-
ing bailouts. But bailouts may still be a product of cronyism if it occurs through
corruption.
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Pension assets (Hypothesis 4)
Column 5 in Table 3.4 presents the results for the regression with pension as-
sets which show that there is a positive relationship between them and the size
of bailouts, significant at the 5-percent level. As hypothesized, pensions holdings
correlate positively with the size of bailouts, and this eﬀect is strong. A diﬀerence
of 33 percent of GDP in pension assets is this variable’s standard deviation and
corresponds to the diﬀerence between Germany and Denmark. This diﬀerence
increases bailouts by 26percent. And this findingmatches the view that politicians
consider the voters’ vulnerabilities to financial turmoil. When voters stand to lose
their retirement savings, which would blow chances of re-election, politicians put
more resources into saving banks and restoring financial stability. Electoral ac-
countability prompts bailouts.
Partisanship (Hypothesis 5)
If electoral accountability is important, it could well be that left- and right-wing
governments behave diﬀerently. And some scholars argued that they do (e.g.
Ansell, 2012). On the other hand, as I have laid out above, bank bailouts address
economy-wide damages that reachbeyond anyoneparty’s constituency. Pension-
ers and those old enough to worry about their retirement, alone, are too large a
group that either conservative or leftist parties could aﬀord to ignore them. The
results are in line with this hypothesis. The regression, of which the results are
listed in Column 6, could not detect any influence of government partisanship.
There is no significant diﬀerence in the size of bailouts implemented by parties
from the left or from the right. This result holds for diﬀerent measures of govern-
ment partisanship, whether coded as share of cabinet seats (reported in Column
3 in Table 3.4) or a dummy variable (not reported).
Corruption (Hypothesis 2)
In Model 1 in Table 3.5, I control directly for corruption using Transparency In-
ternational’s index of perceived corruption. This index ranges from zero (“highly
corrupt”) to ten (“highly clean”). Again, the hypothesis would be that higher lev-
els of corruptions increase bailouts. But the regression clearly rejects this hypoth-
esis. The estimated coeﬃcient is highly significant and indicates the opposite
result. Less corrupt countries (with higher scores on the index) are associated
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with larger banking bailouts. And this eﬀect is also economically large. A one
standard deviation—equivalent to the diﬀerence between the Czech Republic
and the United Kingdom, or between France and Sweden—increases the bailout
size by 80 percent. Even when the estimation includes only the eﬀect beyond
per capital GDP, it still accounts for an increase of 26 percent.ƥƥ Contrary to the
crony-capitalism hypothesis, less corrupt countries have larger bailouts. As such,
bailouts spring not from favors frompoliticians to their cronies. Instead they seem
to be legitimate crisis solutions that arise in countries with low corruption.
Controls
In the same table, Table 3.5, I include controls for the absolute size of the country,
institutional and partisan veto players (Models 2 to 5). The absolute size of the
country (measured as the population in Model 2, or as the absolute size of GDP,
results not shown) seems to have no eﬀect on the size of banking bailouts. Simi-
larly, the analysis finds no eﬀect of veto players, whether partisan or institutional.
Model 4 shows the estimation resultswhenusingDPI’s check variable (Beck et al.,
2001; Keefer and Stasavage, 2003), which measures both institutional and parti-
san veto players. The coeﬃcient is not statistically significant at any conventional
level. Model 5 reports the result of a dummy variable indicating that a political
system has at least bicameral system of medium strength without a statistically
significant eﬀect (Lijphart, 1999; Armingeon et al., 2010). The same was found
using other measures of institutional veto players, like coding the bicameralism
dummy for weak or strong forms of bicameralism, or using a dummy variable in-
dicating a unitary political system.
Additionally, I repeated the regression analysis for a wider sample which in-
cludes earlier crisis episodes. Since the bank equity variable is not available for
these cases, I used the peak value of non-performing loans to measure the crisis
impact. The disadvantage of this indicators compared to the fall in the bank eq-
uity index is that non-performing loans may be influence by governments’ rescue
policies. Further, I include a dummy variable for the recent crisis because the de-
pendent variable, theweighted sumof rescuemeasures, is constructed in a slightly
11. I estimate this additional eﬀect by including the residuals of regression the corruption
index on per capita GDP into the regressionmodel (results not shown). In this model specifica-
tion, the estimated coeﬃcients of both per capita GDP and the corruption index are statistically
significant.
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diﬀerent way. They comprise the fiscal costs of the recapitalizations and the blan-
ket guarantees, calculated as covering all bank deposits andweighted at 15 percent
as above (Laeven and Valencia, 2008, 2012). As in Table 3.4, the estimation finds
a significant, positive eﬀect of assets in pension funds on banking bailouts.
The analysis failed to confirm any of the hypotheses from the special interest
view of bailouts (Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3). If bailouts were driven by politician’s
private interest, we would expect bailouts to be larger where there is less electoral
accountability and more corruption. And bailouts don’t decrease with larger cri-
sis shocks as Keefer’s model predicts. Instead, bailouts are larger when the crisis
hits harder and where people are more vulnerable—because they hold financial
pension assets.
3.7 Conclusion
During the economic boom in the 2000s, banks generated large returns for share-
holders and paid extensive bonuses to their bankers (DeYoung 2012). But when
thewind turned, and the crisis hit in 2008, governments spent billions to bail them
out. And bankers still got their bonuses.ƥƦ Given the banker’s excellent access to
policymakers, it seemsnaïvenot to conclude that bankers persuadedpoliticians to
help them out. And this conclusion has built the common narrative of bailouts,
told by scholars, journalists and even former policymakers: Politicians rescued
banks as favors to bankers. For instance, Jabko and Massoc (2012) conclude that
“the [French] bank support plan should be viewed as a gift that members of the
same elite group extended to each other.” Dorsch (2011) suggests that “the votes
to saveWall Street banks were for sale.”
In this chapter, I have argued that this narrative exaggerates the influence of
special interests. The studies that stress gift exchanges, campaign contributions
and crony connections miss a crucial point of bailouts: During banking crises,
bankers’ interests coincide with those of voters. Voters, like bankers, benefit from
the government halting the crisis. Thus, I put forward a diﬀerent narrative for
bailouts: Politicians bail out banks because restoring financial stability is in the
12. See supra note 2 on page 41.
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Table 3.6: Banking bailouts – including earlier banking crises
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Non-perfor- 0.270 0.272 0.266 0.265 0.262
ming loans, log (0.178) (0.177) (0.180) (0.169) (0.170)
Per capita GDP, 0.562‡ 0.523‡ 0.560‡ 0.473‡ 0.471‡
USD (t-1), log (0.0930) (0.156) (0.0935) (0.104) (0.155)
2008/9 crisis -0.962‡ -0.952‡ -0.976‡ -1.052‡ -1.060‡
(dummy) (0.331) (0.335) (0.349) (0.328) (0.348)
Democracy 0.0935 0.0039
(UDS) (0.281) (0.270)
Left cabinet 0.0936 0.0614
(share) (0.388) (0.392)
Pension assets 0.0091† 0.0090†
to GDP (t-1) (0.0035) (0.0036)
Constant -3.308‡ -3.071† -3.296‡ -2.634† -2.620*
(1.145) (1.385) (1.157) (1.174) (1.395)
N 78 78 78 78 78
R² 0.314 0.315 0.315 0.345 0.346
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, † p<0.05, ‡ p<0.01. The sample includes
the 2008-09 crisis in the countries listed in Table 3.3 and the following earlier crises: Argentina,
1989, 1995, 2001; Bulgaria, 1996; Bolivia, 1994; Brazil, 1990, 1994; Colombia, 1982, 1998; Czech
Republic, 1996; Dominican Republic, 2003; Ecuador, 1998; Finland, 1991; Jamaica, 1996; Japan,
1997; Korea, 1997; Sri Lanka, 1989; Nicaragua, 2000; Norway, 1991; Philippines, 1997; Paraguay,
1995; Russia, 1998; Sweden, 1991; Thailand, 1997; Turkey, 2000; Uruguay, 2002. The depen-
dent variable is the weighted sum of the used banking support interventions with the follow-
ing weights: 15 % for guarantees, 70 % for asset relief and 100 % for recapitalizations. Source:
Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2011).
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interest of voters. Electoral accountability, therefore, does not prevent politicians
from bailing out banks, but motivates them to do so.
In this chapter, I have analyzed the policy responses to the recent financial cri-
sis, and the evidence bears out the alternative narrative which emphasizes politi-
cians motivation to rescue banks because of voters. Contrary to the accounts
of crony capitalism, democratic accountability does not reduce banking bailouts.
Governments in democracies intervene as forcefully as do non-democratic gov-
ernments. But within democracies, the size of bailouts varies significantly, and
this variation confirms in multiple ways the positive link between accountability
and bailouts.
First, the diﬀerence across countries indicates that bailouts are indeed a solv-
ing policy that serves the public good. Keefer (2007, 618f) points out that for
bailouts to be in the public interest, they should be bigger the larger the insolvency
problem is. During the recent crisis this is indeed the case. The size of bailouts
correlates with the severity of crisis.
Second, better accountability in terms of lower corruption is associated with
larger bailouts. In contrast to previous findings, politicians do not spend more in
countries with higher corruption; to the contrary, politicians use more money to
support bankswhere corruption is low. This finding contradicts directly the argu-
ment that bailouts are a product of crony capitalism and corroborates the positive
eﬀect of accountability.
Finally, that politicians consider voters’ interests is further supported by the
positive correlation between bailouts and financial pension assets. In countries
where people hold much of their pension savings in financial assets, they are es-
pecially exposed to financial turmoil. There, electoral incentives should motivate
politicians to intervenemore. The analysis confirms this link between citizens’ ex-
posure and politicians’ interventions. Bailouts are larger where pension systems
rely more on financial markets.
Overall, I emphasize the public good character of bailouts and politicians’
considerations for voters. However, there are limits to this benign narrative. I
do not argue that banks have no influence on bailouts. The point is rather that
evenwithout any bank lobbying, politicians rescue a failing banking sector. Thus,
the large instrumental power that banks enjoy is not the decisive factor. Banks
pushed for rescues and surely succeeded inmaking themmore bank friendly. And
this is the target I suggest for further investigation. Once it is acknowledged that
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politicians bail out banks already because of electoral incentives, one can move
the analytical attention to the generosity of bailouts. That is, given that govern-
ments in any democratic country bail out their banks, where do banks obtain an
especially sweet deal, and why? I address this question with the comparison of
the British and the American bailout in Chapter 4.
I focus on bailouts as a response to the financial crisis, which I take as given.
Explaining the occurrence of the financial crisis is beyond the scope of this disser-
tation, but one can argue that the behavior of banks and their lobbying increased
the likelihood of crisis. In that case, banks’ instrumental power determined indi-
rectly the bailouts by causing the crisis. The evidence in this dissertation doesn’t
speak to this possibility, and banks’ influence through instrumental power may
be larger than suggested here if considering the likelihood of crisis. Nevertheless,
the global nature of the recent financial crisis suggests that the occurrence of crisis
was not determined by any one actor or country. And comparing country experi-
ences, like those of the United States and the United Kingdom in Chapter 4, does
suggest that previous lobbying can explain the outcomes of bailouts.
In short, I am not suggesting that bailouts are a magic policy that is immune
to special interest influence. Rather I argue that bailouts are a crisis policy like
others, for instance fiscal stimuli. It is a policy that emerges in response to a severe
crisis. As such, it is drivenbypoliticians concerns for voters and the public at large.
At the same time, special interests try to tweak the policy in their favor. Bailouts,
like fiscal stimuli, are shaped by special interests, but bailouts per-se are not the
giveaway to cronies as they are often made out to be.
Chapter 4
Structural power of banks and the state1
This chapter compares the bailouts in the United States and in the United King-
dom. The diﬀerence—theUS government came out on top, the UK government
did not—emerged because of the structural power of its banks. The chapter starts
out pointing to existing theoretical debates, before showingwhy the British banks
could block the government’s preferred policy, while the American banks could
not.
Moments of political crisis throw into relief the underlying power conflicts in
society. The vast transfer of risks from big banks to American and British taxpay-
ers in 2008, in the service of preventing a financial meltdown, is perhaps the best
recent example of this phenomenon. Scholars and former oﬃcials have pointed
to the American bailout as a case of crony capitalism run amok (Bair, 2012; Barof-
sky, 2012; Johnson andKwak, 2010). A RepublicanTreasury Secretary and former
head of Goldman Sachs gave the largest nine banks $125 billion to keep the sys-
tem of credit from freezing up. The banks got the money, none of their CEOs
was fired, and attempts to channel some of the aid toward mortgage relief for the
broader economy were in vain. Meanwhile, in the United Kingdom, a Labour
government injected $111 billion into two of its largest banks. That help came at a
steep price, as the government fired the CEOs of these banks, while ensuring that
healthier British banks shored up their balance sheets independently of govern-
1. This chapter is a collaboration with Pepper D. Culpepper and appears as Culpepper and
Reinke (2014), “Structural Power and Bank Bailouts in the United Kingdom and the United
States” in Politics & Society.
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ment funding. The UK government seemed more punitive than the US govern-
ment while being more conservative with taxpayer money, a result that presump-
tively reflects the greater power of American banks in the US political system.
This, at least, is the conventional story of the American and British bailouts
(Woll, 2014; Grossman andWoll, 2014; Bell and Hindmoor, 2014a).Ʀ It is wrong,
both in its claims that theUK government drove a better bargain for the taxpayers
with its large banks and that the US bank bailout reflects the domination of the
US government by large financial institutions. In fact, the US government got a
better deal from its banks than did the British government, and it did so because
American banks wielded less power than their British counterparts. Why has the
conventionalwisdomsomisunderstood the character of theAmerican andBritish
bank bailouts? Observers have focused on the generosity of bailout terms, in-
cluding the firing of the chief executives, of weak banks: those on the brink of in-
solvency. However, the important diﬀerence between the British and American
bailouts lies in the terms imposed on healthy (clearly solvent) large banks. Finan-
cially strapped banks could not challenge the government in either country. They
had to accept whatever policy the government oﬀered, because only with govern-
ment aid could they have survived. But healthy banks were not dependent on
state aid. Healthy banks in Britain were in a better position to resist the state, and
they drove a better deal for themselves, than did American banks. As a result, the
British government absorbedmore risk than theUSgovernment and lost taxpayer
money, while eﬀectively providing a costless subsidy to its healthy banks, which
benefited from the stabilization provided by the bailouts. In contrast, the United
Statesmade a profit from its bank bailout, because it was able to bully healthy large
banks such as JPMorgan andWells Fargo into a collective recapitalization plan.
Theoretically, we return to a fundamental debate about the role of business
in politics(Hacker and Pierson, 2002; Smith, 2000; Lindblom, 1977). The bank
bailouts illustrate how social scientists have focused on the instrumental power of
banks while ignoring their structural power. Instrumental power includes firms’
lobbying capacity and their campaign donations; on these measures, the United
States looks like an especially captured system (Hacker and Pierson, 2010). But
2. Bell andHindmoor (2014a) argue thatUK government policymakers have becomemore
skeptical of bank threats to exit, post-crisis, which has convinced them to move away from the
pre-crisis “light touch” regulation. This may well be true, but our concern in this chapter is only
with the character of the bailout policies themselves, not post-bailout regulatory reforms.
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when looking at the structural power of banks—which we operationalize as their
ability to defy national regulators because of the internationalization of their mar-
kets—the situation of American and British banks changes dramatically. Because
all the large banks in the United States rely on the American market for their fu-
ture revenues, they enjoy less structural power vis-à-vis theAmerican government
than do their counterparts in other countries, such as the United Kingdom, that
do not depend heavily on a given domestic market.
In the next section we discuss the distinction between structural and instru-
mental power of business, arguing that recent scholarship has neglected structural
power because it has not conceptualized the ways in which structural power can
be used strategically. Section 4.2 explicates our methodological approach, which
employs evidence from the structure of the banking sectors in the United States
and the United Kingdom and from process-tracing, in which we use interviews
with senior policymakers to evaluate our claims about the power of American and
British banks in negotiatingwith their governments. Section 4.3 evaluates the pol-
icy design of the two bailouts, and Section 4.4 tests hypotheses of structural and
instrumental power of banks against the evidence of policy development in the
two cases. A penultimate section extends the argument comparatively to bailouts
in France and Germany. A final section concludes with directions for future re-
search.
4.1 Two dimensions of business power
To understand the character of business influence on important policy outcomes
such as the bank bailouts of 2008, we revisit the conceptual distinction between
the structural and instrumental power of business. Instrumental power comprises
the various means, unrelated to the core functions of the firm, through which
business influences politics: donations for campaigns, privileged access to policy-
makers, and lobbyists and organizations that defend business interests (Miliband,
1969; Culpepper, 2013; Fairfield, forthcoming). Structural power, by contrast, in-
heres in the fact that firms are agents of economic activity in capitalist democ-
racies. Because the state relies on firm investment to generate growth, the abil-
ity of companies not to invest can cause damage to the economy and thereby to
the politicians governing it. Since a negative policy, or even the anticipation of
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one, may lead firms to reduce their rate of investment, scholars have characterized
the democratic state as being structurally dependent on capital (Przeworski and
Wallerstein, 1988; Swank, 1992). Governments are predisposed to adopt policies
that promote firm investment, even without business leaders necessarily having
to do anything (Lindblom, 1977; Block, 1980).
Scholarship from the 1970s and 1980s recognized the fact that this structural
power, for example, in the form of coordinated “capital strikes,” could be exer-
cised strategically by business as part of a campaign to change government poli-
cies (Block, 1977; Vogel, 1987;Ward, 1987; Bowles and Gintis, 1986). Yet a strange
thing happened to the literature on business power: as the influence of neoliberal
ideaswaxed in the advanced capitalist countries, analytical attention to theways in
whichbusiness exercises influenceon the statewaned. In this process, the concept
of structural power as a resource that could be used strategically by business dis-
appeared from the literature, to be replaced by a version of structural power that
operated only as an automatic adjustment of the level of investment, whichwould
punishpoliticianswhoadoptedpolicies towhichbusiness is averse, andwhose an-
ticipation therefore would deter adoption of the policy in the first place. Charles
Lindblommay in this sense have been a victim of his own rhetorical success in de-
scribing business disinvestment as the “automatic punishing recoil” mechanism
through which business disciplines government (Lindblom, 1982, 324-336). By
the 1990s, the relatively scarce political science scholarship that used the term
structural power conceptualized it exclusively in the sense of the automatic re-
action of policymakers to the investment decisions of companies (Swank, 1992).
When current scholars of business write about “capital strikes” that involve any
deliberate action, they now classify them as instrumental power—erroneously, in
our view (Fairfield, 2011, forthcoming). Where capital strikes involve coordinated
political action among companies, the power exercised by business flows directly
from the role of the capital holder in the economyand its growth and employment
capacities, not from the investment in lobbying oﬃces or trade associations.
For political scientists, this means that structural power as a causal variable is
now only conceptualized as a background condition against which politics plays
out, not as an active resource employed by business in the political arena. Thus,
when JacobHacker and Paul Pierson attempted to revive analytical interest in the
concept of structural power in an influential 2002 article, they argued that federal
political systems increased the structural power of business by giving companies
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easy exit options (Hacker and Pierson, 2002). However, even Pierson andHacker
bought into the prevailing definition of structural power, arguing that this “power
is structural because the pressure to protect business interests is generated auto-
matically and apolitically” (Hacker and Pierson, 2002, 281). Thus, for them, “the
extent towhich business influences specific policy choiceswill be a function of in-
strumental rather than structural power” because the possibility of disinvestment
“can set the agenda for governments and help to define (or rule out) alternatives,
but this signal cannot tell governments what to do” (Hacker and Pierson, 2002,
282). In this now typical formulation, structural power sits in the background of
agenda-setting, while instrumental power does the hard causal work on specific
pieces of legislation.
Following this line of thinking, scholars, journalists, and former regulators ex-
amining the American bank bailout have converged on a similar diagnosis: the
government bailed out the banks because they enjoyed privileged access toWash-
ington’s policymakers (Bell and Hindmoor, 2015). American banks have consol-
idated this Washington-Wall Street axis by donating so much money to Republi-
cans and Democrats that both parties work in the interest of large financial insti-
tutions(Hacker and Pierson, 2010; Duchin and Sosyura, 2012; Igan, Mishra and
Tressel, 2012). Their special influence is reinforced by the infamous revolving
door, which circulates policymakers into lucrative jobs in banks and bankers into
public oﬃce(Braun and Raddatz, 2010).
We argue that the outcome of the bank bailouts can only be understood by
reference to the structural power of big banks vis-à-vis governments. Much of
the contemporary research is blind to this fact because many scholars have col-
lapsed structural power into themuch narrower category of “structural power that
works automatically through the anticipation of policymakers.” Although struc-
tural power can certainly work automatically, it can also be deployed deliberately,
with strategic intent. In fact, both structural and instrumental power have auto-
matic aspects, in that they require no conscious activation in order to function.
Disinvestment and the possibility of exit are the most prominent features of the
structural power of business; both work automatically, through the anticipation
of policymakers. But the instrumental power of business in capitalist democra-
cies includes the presence of decision-makers who, by virtue of their background,
are friendly to business (Miliband, 1969). This is a resource that helps business,
whether companies take any action or not. A similar sort of instrumental power
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arises from career ladders that involve a “revolving door” between senior posi-
tions in government and the private sector (Braun and Raddatz, 2010). These
operate automatically in the individual calculus of decision-makers. Such consid-
erations are correctly classified as elements of instrumental power, just like lob-
bying organizations and campaign contributions, because they involve influence
on decision-makers that is based on something other than the function of private
firms in a capitalist economy.
As this discussion suggests, there are in fact twodimensionsofbusinesspower,
which previous work has combined into the single dichotomy between structural
and instrumental power. The first refers to the source of power: structural power
flows from the economic position of the firm in an economy, whereas instrumen-
tal power flows from resources extrinsic to the firm’s core economic activity. If we
imagine business as a poker player, structural power refers to the cards she holds
in her hand. Instrumental power refers to everything beyond the cards—from the
quality of her poker face to the incentives of her poker companions to let her win
because she might be able to oﬀer them a job in the future.
The second dimension of business power, which the past twenty-five years
of scholarship has ignored, refers to the way in which these resources are mobi-
lized by business: automatically or strategically (through deliberate choice). Au-
tomatic capacities require no action on the part of business. They work through
the anticipation of the object of possible action: in this case, policymakers, who
fear the possibility of disinvestment and change policy spontaneously. Strategic
capacities, by contrast, do have to be deliberately exercised in order to be eﬀec-
tive. Lobbying organizations and campaign contributions are intentional eﬀorts
by business to get something from policymakers; but so too is the bargaining po-
sition adopted by large firmswhen negotiating with policymakers. Whether busi-
ness leaders have bought access or not is a past product of their strategic instru-
mental capacities. But, in any given negotiation, their bargaining position itself
is a product of the structural position of their firms. If the poker play is hold-
ing a straight flush, it doesn’t matter whether or not she has a good poker face.
She is likely to win the hand. Those who would require structural power to work
through the automatic adjustment of policymaker preferences assume that she
will win the hand as a result of the other players automatically folding. We argue
that the act of putting one’s cards on the table is a deliberate use of the cards, one
that requires the exercise of some agency on the part of the winning poker player.
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Table 4.1 shows the intersection of these two dimensions. The columns dis-
tinguish strategic from automatic aspects of business power, while the rows sepa-
rate instrumental from structural power. The diﬀerence between automatic and
strategic structural power lies in the way in which the structural role of a company
in the economy has an eﬀect on policy. Is power exercised through the policy-
maker’s anticipation of a business logic (i.e., “it is not worth it for us as a company
to producewidgets at tax rate x”)? Or does it instead result from the deliberate use
of economic power (i.e., “we as a company refuse to dowhat the government asks
us to do, and we cannot by forced by the government to do it”)? Disinvestment
(or exit), which works through its anticipation by policymakers, is an automatic
resource. Strategic structural power is a bargaining resource, one that has to be
invoked if a bank wants to deter a government’s preferred policy.
Table 4.1: Two Dimensions of Business Power
Strategic Automatic
Instrumental Organizational Lobbying Pro-Business Policymakers
Campaign Contributions Public-Private Revolving
Door
Structural Outside Option Disinvestment
Investment Strike
Borrowing the language of game theory, we describe this resource as an out-
side option: the payoﬀ the bank gets if it refuses the deal on oﬀer from the state.
The outside option is not necessarily a threat to exit; it is to have enough alter-
native business revenue to be able to ignore the threat of regulatory sanctions in
one jurisdiction.Ƨ The outside option of large banks depends on howmuch state
policymakers can credibly threaten to influence their future income stream. The
existence of a plausible outside option confers on large companies a degree of reg-
ulatory impunity.
Regulatory authorities in profitable jurisdictions have their own power over
banks, one little remarked on in the current literature: the ability to impose future
costs. From a legal perspective, it is very easy for banks to leave the United King-
dom or theUnited States. Exiting those countries, however, means sacrificing the
3. The existence of a viable outside option does imply that a firm can exit a jurisdiction if
the cost of sanctions imposed by a regulator become too high.
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profits to bemade there. And there are substantial gains to bemade for banks op-
erating out of London andNew York. Banks dependent primarily on their profits
from these markets lack a viable outside option in bargaining with the state, be-
cause the costs a regulator can impose in the future dramatically lower the bank’s
payoﬀ if it refuses to accept the state’s deal. Themoremoneybanks expect tomake
in these jurisdictions, the higher the cost of crossing regulatory authorities. The
strategic structural power individual banks can use vis-à-vis the state is therefore
a function of the dependence of a bank on the domestic market (Marsh, 1983).
Structurally powerful banks—those with an outside option—are those that earn
a large share of their revenue abroad.
4.2 Financial crisis as a test case of strategic structural power
Unusual events provide the opportunity to test the empirical implications of ri-
val theories, which are often rather close in practice. A famous example comes
from the fact that most of the predictions of Einstein’s theory of relativity resem-
ble those ofNewtonian physics. One key distinction—the extent towhich gravity
wouldbend light—couldonly beobservedduring a total solar eclipse, as occurred
in 1919. Einstein’s theory predicted that astronomerswould be able to observe dis-
tant stars located behind the sun, because the sun’s gravity would bend the light
around the sun. And thus the theory of relativity received empirical support that
was diﬃcult to find in a lab.
Financial crises oﬀer similar methodological advantages for purposes of em-
pirical testing. Just as the brightness of the sun washed out the ability to observe
stars located behind it, so too does the glaring flow of money into politics—the
most visible weapon of strategic instrumental power—wash out the observable
eﬀects of structural power. It is onlywhen a crisis of substantialmagnitude throws
into clear relief the contending play of diﬀerent sorts of business power, by chan-
neling government action into a discrete number of negotiations between banks
and the government over a few days, that we can evaluate the relative strength of
various sorts of business power in politics.
A hypothesis derived from strategic structural power predicts variation be-
tween countries if some have large banks that are highly internationalized and
thus capable of resisting regulatory pressure. We do not assume that governments
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automatically make the policy that banks prefer. The leaders of banks have to ex-
ercise this power in negotiation—they have to lay their cards on the table. This
is an exercise of strategic structural power, and it is a prediction made only by
our theory. In contrast, a hypothesis of strategic instrumental power predicts
that variation should occur between countries on the basis of where businesses
have contributed the most to politicians (Johnson and Kwak, 2010); where they
have developed the best lobbying apparatus (Bernhagen and Bräuninger, 2005);
or where they are most likely to find politicians who by partisan disposition are
more sympathetic to the interests of business (Fairfield, forthcoming). If these
diﬀerent sources of strategic instrumental powermapped diﬀerently onto our two
cases, that would pose a problemof untangling diﬀerent causal strands of strategic
instrumental power. Fortunately, from a methodological point of view, all three
types of strategic instrumental power produce the same prediction for our core
comparison: the United States, with its powerful lobbying groups and oceans of
money from finance allowed to flow into politics, should unambiguously yield an
outcome more friendly to healthy banks than should the United Kingdom, if in-
strumental power is the primary determinant of bank bailout policy.ƨ
Several considerationsmotivate our primary comparison between theUnited
States and the United Kingdom. The two countries are both liberal market econ-
omieswith large andglobally important banks (Hall andSoskice, 2001). This sim-
ilarityholds constant an importantpotential sourceof variation in thebailout poli-
cies adopted. London and Wall Street are the world’s two leading financial cen-
ters, and the bailouts in these two countries were among the most substantively
important in the international economy. The diﬀerent policy options adopted
in the United States and the United Kingdom will orient future policy discus-
sions around the design of bank bailouts. A further objective is to incorporate
the United States into a comparative political analysis of how banks exercise po-
litical power. The United States has been the subject of the most recent scholar-
ship dealingwith the political power of financial institutions (Hacker andPierson,
4. There is another alternative explanation, not so much about instrumental, but about a
more general structural power of banks: British banks could prevail over the government be-
cause the City of London is more important for Britain than Wall Street for the United States.
If this importance to the domestic economy were the driver behind bailout policies, one would
expect favorable deals for either all British banks or those that are particularly important for the
British economy. The British experience doesn’t meet these expectations. The bank with the
largest market share, RBS, had to accept tough conditions, and HSBC, which blocked govern-
ment policy, is a large bank, but smaller than RBS and Barclays.
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2010; Johnson and Kwak, 2010; Duchin and Sosyura, 2012). Yet this work fails to
compare outcomes in theUnited States to those in other capitalist countries. The
political power of large banks is not unique to the United States; it is a feature of
capitalism. Thus, the appropriate empirical question is not “how well did Amer-
ican banks do in the financial crisis?,” but instead, “how well did American banks
do compared to banks elsewhere?”
4.3 The British and the American bailouts
Lehman Brothers’ failure on September 15, 2008 sent shock waves through the
international financial system. Other financial institutions failed or were near fail-
ure within days, catalyzing a chain reaction in the American and British banking
sectors. Bank of America took over the investment bankMerrill Lynch. The Fed-
eral Reserve and the Treasury bailed out the insurance giant AIG, and regulators
closed downWashingtonMutual. This in turn, put pressure onWachovia, which
was eventually taken over by Wells Fargo. A week after the Lehman failure, the
two remaining American investment banks—Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stan-
ley—sought legal conversion into conventional bank holding companies.
In Britain, Lehman’s demise similarly brought two British banks close to col-
lapse, Bradford&Bingley (B&B) andHBOS. The government nationalized B&B
and transferred its deposits to another bank. HBOS agreed to merge with Lloyds
after the government granted a waiver of competition rules. TheUKbanking sec-
tor had been marked by a relatively low number of independent banks, even be-
fore the crisis (IndependentCommissiononBanking, 2011, 166f). Therehadbeen
nine independent banks in the index of the largest 100 companies traded in Lon-
don. In the wake of the Lehman bankruptcy, only five were left: Barclays, Royal
Bank of Scotland (RBS), HSBC, Standard Chartered, and Lloyds/HBOS.
Facing an existential crisis of their banking systems, the American and British
governments both intervened on a sector-wide scale and provided liquidity, debt
guarantees and recapitalizations. In many ways, these policies were alike. How-
ever, the US plan contained a number of design features that made it better, from
the perspective of the government and the taxpayer, than the British plan. Crit-
ics of the American plan have downplayed or ignored these crucial elements of
the policy (Grossman and Woll, 2014). The American Treasury Secretary, Hank
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Paulson, managed to include all major banks actively in the plan; all of them took
state capital, whether they needed it or not. This allowedPaulson to avoid putting
public money exclusively in the weakest banks and to finance the bailout through
cross-subsidies among the banks.
In the repertoire of bailout options, there are two diﬀerent sorts of measures;
banks want one, but not the other. There are policies that help banks get access
to funding, which the government can grant through central bank liquidity or
through guaranteeing banks’ debt. The latter allows troubled banks to get loans
in the market, because the government stands behind these loans and will pay
creditors were the bank to fail. This is what every bank wants. The other type
of measure is injecting capital; that is, the government gives money to the bank
in exchange for shares in the bank. Banks loathe this policy, because the govern-
ment becomes their shareholder. Existing shareholders take a hit in the value of
their shares, and the government is likely to interfere with themanagement of the
bank. It also marks them with a scarlet “B” for bailout, putting them at a disad-
vantage in future policy debates. For this reason, banks try to get around state
recapitalizations when they can.
The only banks that can avoid a state bailout are the financially sound banks.
If healthy banks achieve their preferred outcomeof avoiding state recapitalization,
the result is a poor outcome for the government: it puts state money in the worst
banks only. When banks are left to choose whether to raise capital privately or to
take it from the government, all the banks that can raise private money will do so.
The ones that will take state capital are those with the weakest financial outlook.
Banks asked for more liquidity on both sides of the Atlantic, but they did not
want recapitalizations (Sorkin, 2009; Darling, 2011). Jamie Dimon, CEO of JP
Morgan, told his board that accepting the government’s money “is asymmetri-
cally bad for JP Morgan”(Sorkin, 2009). In the United Kingdom, Fred Goodwin
fromRBS continuously denied that his bank had solvency problems, and insisted
itmerely had problems of liquidity (Darling, 2011, 156). RBS agreed, eventually, to
capital injections, because, as one observer told us, “they were wholly dependent
on the Bank of England for cash. And they weren’t in a position to argue about
the terms, which is why Fred Goodwin said, it was like a drive-by shooting, not a
negotiation.”Ʃ
5. John Gieve, in interview with the authors, London, UK, June 20, 2012.
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In the United Kingdom, the choice between private and public recapitaliza-
tion clearly singled out the sickly banks. Standard Chartered, HSBC and Barclays
could raise private capital, whereas Lloyds/HBOS andRBS took state capital and
donned the scarlet B. The latter two banks had to write down large sums; the gov-
ernment’s book loss a year later was £18 billion and rose to £32 billion in 2012 2012;
2009a.
The second reason the American intervention was better for the government
is that it requiredhealthybanks to share someof thefiscal burden,while theBritish
program did not. Whether the burden is shared depends also on how the gov-
ernment tries to get its money back. One way is to charge proportionally to the
amount of help. This approach counters “moral hazard” by punishing those banks
that erred and encourages prudent behavior in the future. In practice this means
asking a highdividend in exchange for state capital and a risk-adjusted fee for guar-
antees. Risk-adjusted fees compensate the government for taking more risk guar-
anteeing debt for a risky bank than guaranteeing the debt of a solid bank. The
eﬀect, however, is to leave the government and taxpayers worse oﬀ. The reason is
that the owner of the sickly banks is the government itself; through recapitaliza-
tions it invested heavily in those banks. Charging sick banks heavily for interven-
tions just means that the government charges itself.
Exactly such an outcome took place in the British case. The government
started out demanding a 12 percent dividend fromRBS and Lloyds/HBOS. Only
four months later, the government put more capital into the banks through its
Asset Protection Scheme, and as of this writing it is still in the red from its invest-
ments in these two banks.
The US government chose another way to get is money back. It included all
large banks and charged all of them—regardless of how risky they were—a low,
standard fee for debt guarantees and capital injections. At the same time, how-
ever, the government demanded warrants, which allowed it during the next ten
years to buy more shares at the price they had at the end of September 2008. In
other words, the government could get its money back when the banks recovered
from crisis. This provided help for sickly banks and obliged the healthy ones to
reimburse the government for the interventions. Because of this structure, theUS
government’sTARP investmentsmademoney for the taxpayer, even though it de-
veloped a generous rescue plan. The government implemented a systemic rescue
package, including guarantees and Fed liquidity, which supported the whole sec-
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tor. According to some calculations, the interventions generated a net benefit to
the American economy of between $86 and $109 billion (Veronesi and Zingales,
2010). With its payment structure—capital injections andwarrants—theUS gov-
ernment could recoup its money. It allowed the government to internalize some
of the positive external eﬀect of its rescue program. Getting the warrants in the
ninemajor banks generated over $4 billion, and $3 billion of that sumwas paid by
banks that did not need capital injections: Wells Fargo, JPMorgan and Goldman
Sachs (US Treasury, 2012).
Table 4.2: Design Features of the American and British Bailout Plans
United States United Kingdom
Participation in Design Required participa- Voluntary participa-
state recapital- tion of major banks tion of major banks
izations: Self- Eﬀect All nine major banks Self-selection of
selection or participate (incl. sickest banks only
not? healthyWells Fargo, (Lloyds/HBOS,
JPMorgan) RBS)
Funding of re- Design Low, flat upfront Steep upfront fees
capitalizations fees paired with without warrants;
and guarantees: long-term risk-based fees for
Government warrants guarantees
subsidy or Eﬀect Generous help for High nominal
cross-subsidy sick banks; tough charges for rescued,
from banks? terms for healthy mostly state-
and lucky banks owned banks
Gains/ $9bn gain from €10bn ($14bn) cur-
losses TARP’s bank part rently estimated
(excl. auto bailout losses; current book
mortgage relief) of loss of £15.6bn
which $4bn come ($20bn) from RBS,
from sales of Lloyds/HBOS
warrants from
JPMorgan,
Wells Fargo and
Goldman Sachs
Table 4.2 summarizes the diﬀerences in policy design between the two coun-
tries. It is worth underlining that, despite these dissimilar policy designs, both
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governments have publicly acknowledged that they had exactly the same objec-
tive: to prevent the implosion of the banking system and to have all banks in
the program. Alistair Darling, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, explained
the goal of his government frankly: “The key was to get capital into the banks
that needed it—primarily RBS and HBOS, which was now part of the Lloyd’s
group—but at the same time to persuade a bank like HSBC, which had no obvi-
ous need for more capital, to join the scheme” (Darling, 2011, 140). US Treasury
Secretary Paulson was similarly concerned with getting all large banks to partici-
pate in the plan, so as to avoid the bailout as being stigmatizing. ƪ
4.4 Bank power: Structural and strategic?
Both the United Kingdom and the United States had banks that were too big to
fail, and there were recalcitrant healthy banks in both countries that preferred not
to receive equity injections from the state: Wells Fargo and JP Morgan in the
United States, and HSBC in the United Kingdom. Why were the British banks,
and in particular HSBC, able to keep policymakers from imposing their preferred
solution, while the American banks were not? In this section we show that their
financial health was necessary to resist the government, but not suﬃcient to ex-
plain this outcome. Instead, we show that even healthy banks will not defy their
regulator, if a large proportion of their business lies within the jurisdiction of that
regulator. Their structural dependence on the regulator is a weakness, one that
the state can exploit in negotiation with healthy banks.
HSBC, JP Morgan, and Wells Fargo were all financially sound banks during
the financial crisis. Figure 4.1 displays HSBC’s monthly market capitalization rel-
ative to the British banking sector for the thirty months from the beginning of
2007. The crisis left the stocks of most banks battered. Compared to the market
capitalization in January 2007, banks had lost on average about 45 percent of their
market value in October 2008. HSBC saw its capitalization drop by only 14 per-
cent. HSBC profited from a broad deposit base, which provided stable liquidity
during the crisis, and from its business in Asia.
6. Barney Frank, in interview with the authors, Washington, DC, November 16, 2012.
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Note: Included are Alliance & Leicester, Barclays, Bardford & Bingley, HSBC, Lloyds/HBOS,
RBS and Standard Chartered. Source: Orbis – Bureau Van Dijk.
Figure 4.1: Monthly Market Capitalization of British Banks
Note: Included are Bank of America, Citi Group, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase, Merril
Lynch, NYBMellon, State Street andWells Fargo. Source: Orbis – Bureau Van Dijk.
Figure 4.2: Monthly Market Capitalization of Major American banks
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Wells Fargo and JP Morgan, like HSBC, were healthier than other big banks.
Unlike most of its peers, which got into trouble in the mortgage market, Wells
Fargo had been strict in its lending standards and had kept toxic housing assets of
its balance sheet. Figure 4.2 illustrates the capitalization ofWells Fargo in compar-
ison to the major banks still in business by the end of September. Wells Fargo’s
market value was down only 7 percent from its pre-crisis level and JPMorgan was
down 13 percent; the rest of the large banks had dropped by 47 percent.
There was no diﬀerence between the financial health of HSBC, JP Morgan
and Wells Fargo. All three banks had stable sources of liquidity. However, they
drew on diﬀerent markets. In 2005-2007, HSBC generated only about 20 percent
of its profits at home in Britain, even though it was a dominant player in the con-
centrated British banking market. Only the much smaller bank Standard Char-
tered makes a lower proportion of its money from outside the United Kingdom
(Figure 4.3). Even though HSBC operates out of London, the bank doesn’t de-
pendon theBritishmarket. Itmakesmore profit inHongKong than in theUnited
Kingdom (HSBC, 2007).
In contrast, as Figure 4.4 illustrates, Wells Fargo operated solely in the Amer-
ican market. Even after Wells Fargo acquired additional international business
through the purchase of Wachovia in 2008, 95 percent of its loans were to Ameri-
candebtors (Wells Fargo, 2012). JPMorgan’s business looks similar in this respect,
with 75 percent coming from the United States. Figure 4.4 shows howmuch rev-
enue these and other major banksmake in their domestic markets, and highlights
how—compared to HSBC—Wells Fargo and JP Morgan depend more on their
domestic market.
This structural situation meant American regulators could makeWells Fargo
and JP Morgan an oﬀer they could not refuse. In the decisive meeting between
the CEOs of the ninemajor banks and senior US government oﬃcials—Paulson,
Bernanke,TimGeithnerof theNewYorkFed, SheilaBair of theFDIC, andComp-
trol-ler of the Currency John Dugan—this regulatory threat was explicit, and it
was repeated. In the talking points prepared for the meeting on October 13, 2008,
recalcitrant banks got this message: “If a capital infusion is not appealing, you
should be aware that your regulator will require it in any circumstance” (USTrea-
sury, 2008). After Paulson’s presentation of the plan, which reiterated the unpleas-
ant consequences of not accepting the aid, theCEOofWells Fargo complained to
the other CEOs “why am I in this room, talking about bailing you out?” Paulson’s
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Note: Data refer to domestic revenue in 2005-2007: for Barclays, HBOS, HSBC and Standard
Chartered, they refer to domestic income. Source: Banks’ annual reports.
Figure 4.3: UK Bank Revenues from the Domestic Market
Note: Data refer to domestic revenue in 2005-2007. Source: Banks’ annual reports.
Figure 4.4: US Bank Revenues from the Domestic Market
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response was a threat of regulatory consequences: “Your regulator is sitting right
there [pointing to the head of the FDIC and the comptroller of the currency].
And you’re going to get a call tomorrow telling you you’re undercapitalized and
that you won’t be able to raise money in the private markets” (Sorkin, 2009, 542).
This is an explicit threat from a regulator against a financially healthy bank. The
regulator could make trouble for the bank in unsettled markets—the regulator
knew it, and the bank’s CEO knew it.
In contrast, UK oﬃcials could not make this threat. The UK government
wanted to include HSBC in the recapitalization plan, but HSBC refused. Mul-
tiple figures associated with the bailout repeated that the UK government had no
tools to forceHSBC to take state capital, even though it was the government’s first
preference. A senior government minister said, “the British government does not
have the power simply to acquire capital in somebody else’s bank…. You can’t in-
sist, on an innocent third party, where [the state] is going to take a great wadge of
your bank oﬀ you.” Another senior UK government advisor said the same thing.
“We couldn’t force HSBC…. They made clear that we had no power, and if we
tried it theywould take us to court.” TheUnited States has a court system too, and
banks have never been averse to using it to protect their interests. Banks can only
fight the government, however, when they do not view a hostile relationship with
bank regulators as too costly. HSBC’s threat to take the government to court was
the sort of threat that only a bank unconcerned with its future relationship with
national regulators could aﬀord to make.
HSBC’s refusal was a deliberate act. British policymakers had not foreseen
these objections and automatically designed a recapitalization program that ex-
cluded HSBC, which is how automatic structural power would work. Yet neither
wasHSBC’s calculatedmovedependent on lobbying or influence boughtwith the
executive. As the phone logs and memoirs of Hank Paulson and Alistair Darling
made clear, US banks had much more frequent access to the top of the Treasury
than did UK banks (Woll, 2014). The conventional story, according to which
large American banks have developed strong instrumental lobbying ties to oﬃ-
cials, is borne out in our research. Moreover, though we cannot with any reliabil-
ity observe automatic instrumental power, the US Treasury Secretary was a peer
of the CEOs of the large American banks, as his former job was CEOof Goldman
Sachs. US banks had substantial instrumental power. But they lacked structural
Structural power of banks and the state 91
power that would have given them the credibility to stand up to Paulson’s regula-
tory threat.
HSBC’s action was intentional, but it was a product of its structural position
in the market, not the result of its lobbying access. HSBC made clear to the UK
government that it neither wanted nor needed state recapitalization, and that it
would sue the government if challenged. Thebank then reinforced that case by re-
fusing to cooperate with the government. The former Deputy Governor Sir John
Gieve of the Bank of England characterized their response to the government this
way: “HSBC said eﬀectively: ‘We’ve got no problem in financing our business.
We’ve got this massive deposit collection business in the Far East; we may have
made massive losses in the US… but actually we are perfectly solvent; the world
believes we’re solvent; we don’t need any money.’ They also resisted the implica-
tion that the whole their whole group was dependent on the UK authorities and
made a point of sending their UKman,… not their chief executive or chairman -
to meetings with the Chancellor.”ƫ This behavior contrasts with the alacrity with
which theCEOs of the nine largest American banks showed up for theOctober 13
meeting when Paulson summoned them only the Sunday night before the Mon-
day meeting.
HSBC was not the only large bank to avoid state capitalizations. Barclays
raised private capital from Qatar and Abu Dhabi. Unlike HSBC, Barclays relied
substantially on the British domestic market (see Figure 4.3). The actions of Bar-
clays do not contradict our argument, as can be observed from the sequence of
its actions. Barclays was financially weak and therefore lacked the capacity to
block a government plan for mandatory recapitalizations (see Figure 4.1). Bar-
clays never wanted state capital, but when the government negotiated the plan,
it was unsure it could raise capital privately. Once HSBC quickly announced it
would not take state capital,Ƭ Barclays made clear it would go to extraordinary
lengths to refinance itself through its shareholders rather than taking statemoney.ƭ
Barclays kept the option of state capital open until, a few days later, it succeeded
in raising the required capital. By then, the government had announced its debt
guarantee programs, which eased funding for Barclays and helped the bank to
7. Gieve, in interview with the authors, London, UK, 20 June 2013.
8. Peter Thal Larsen and George Parker, “Banks Search for Ways to Avoid Government
Help,” Financial Times, 10 October 2008.
9. “UK Bank Bail-Out.” Financial Times, 9 October 2008.
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convince investors to provide capital. Reflecting on Barclays’ negotiation, John
Gieve from the Bank of England said: “[Barclays] played us very cleverly, in that
they managed to negotiate a sum of capital, which they had to raise and that they
could raise—from their friends in Singapore and theMiddle East and so on. And
thereby pass our test, while still getting the benefit of the overall government guar-
antee.” Barclays avoided state recapitalizations, butwithoutHSBC’s lead, it would
have had to accept capital from the government.
The case of Barclays is also instructive about the government’s pricing of state
capital. The steep nominal pricing of 12 percent by the British government may
give rise to the objection that rejection of the deal by healthy British banks was
endogenous. That is, British banks may have only refused to cooperate because
the government—mistakenly—demanded too high a price. Had Darling asked
for a coupon of only 5 percent as did Paulson, would the British banks have par-
ticipated in the recapitalization program? The available evidence suggests not.
First, the banks as well as the government found pricing to be a secondary issue.
Barclays eschewed state capital but accepted even costlier private capital. Barclays
sold its shares at a higher discount than the government had demanded and gave
additional warrants to its investors.ƥƤ On the other side of the negotiation table,
pricing seemed not to be the top issue for policymakers either. For Darling it was
important to implement a recapitalization program, not how much banks would
have to pay (Darling, 2011). Second, the nominal pricing of coupons diﬀered, but
the overall pricing of capital for healthy banks was actually similar. In contrast to
the British plan, the American plan included warrants. These increased the costs
of state capital, especially for the healthier banks that would recover quickly from
the crisis. For this reason, the pricing was comparable and the rescue plans did
not giveHSBC any stronger reason to resist the program than JPMorgan orWells
Fargo.
This examination of policymaking during the crisis of 2008 shows that strate-
gic instrumental power cannot explain the variation in policy design between the
United States and the United Kingdom. Instead the diﬀerent policies resulted
from the outside option open toHSBC, in its negotiations with its regulators, be-
cause of its structural position as a global bank with a deep deposit base in exter-
10. Robert Peston, “Barclays Protects Its Bankers’ Pay,” BBC Blog, 31 October 2008, available
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/robertpeston/2008/10/barclays_protects_its_
bankers.html, accessed 04 April 2013.
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nal markets. This is an exercise of what we have called strategic structural power.
However, we also want to consider the possibility that the diﬀerence in bailout
policies might have been a product of lobbying during a prior time period. That
is, that the policy adopted at time t was only possible because of the exercise of
strategic instrumental power at time t-1 (Hindmoor andMcGeechan, 2012).
It would be foolish to deny the abundant evidence that American and British
banks used their growing economic resources to advocate politically for financial
deregulation—and that this financial deregulation played some role in creating
banks that were “too big to fail” (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal, 2013; Bell and
Hindmoor, 2015). However, this general finding holds for both the United King-
dom and the United States. And of the two, the United States is widely regarded
as the more captured system with respect to financial regulation (?Woll, 2014).
An alternative hypothesis based on the exercise of strategic instrumental power at
time t-1 to account for the variation we observe at time t would have to show how
past lobbying in Britain allowedHSBC to frustrate government attempts to adopt
forced recapitalizations, while foreclosing that possibility to American banks. We
can think of no such plausible account. A lobbying account for an outcome in
which US healthy banks do worse than UK healthy banks is diﬃcult to square
with the strong evidence that the instrumental power of US financial institutions
has exceeded that of their British counterparts since the late 1990s.
There is a “revolving door” alternative hypothesis that we should also con-
sider. The fluid labormarket between regulators inWashington and banks inWall
Street might have given US policymakers greater expertise about the sector, and
thus accounted for their ability to adopt their preferred policy. The British civil
service prioritizes the recruitment of generalists rather than specialists with either
PhDs in economics or private experience in finance (Fourcade, 2009). This could
handicap the government in bargainingwith banks. British banks, in this account,
would be able to play on their expertise to drive a better deal from Treasury man-
darins with limited experience of the actual functioning of banking than in the
United States. Indeed, this lack of experience in finance was reinforced in the po-
litical sphere, where Hank Paulson, the ex-CEO of Goldman Sachs, clearly had a
large informational advantage over his counterpart in the United Kingdom.
Her Majesty’s Treasury assuredly lacked some of the bank-specific expertise
enjoyed by the US Treasury. However, the Labour government recognized this
shortcoming and elevated Paul Myners, a finance veteran, to the House of Lords
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so that he could be appointed Financial Services Secretary. It was his job to ne-
gotiate directly with the banks. Darling (2011, 156) noted that Myners’ “expertise
and experience were invaluable.” PrimeMinister Gordon Brown relied heavily on
Shriti Vadera, a former investment banker at UBSWarburg. The government also
brought private sector consultants into its negotiating teamwhen devising policy.
One of them told us in an interview that Vadera’s economic and political expertise
was instrumental in helping the government get the size of the bailout right so as
to satisfy both political and economic constraints: “this is why we were lucky we
had Shriti Vadera, because we had someone who was able to have the credibility
to say, ‘This is the number.’ And people rallied behind it.” We find no evidence
that a lack of expertise on either the British or American side had anything to do
with the policies chosen.
4.5 Further comparative evidence
Theories basedon theuseof instrumental power farepoorly in explaining the vari-
ation between theAmerican andBritish policies, either at the time or bailout or as
a prior cause that allowed the bailouts to take the form they did. We have shown
that an account centered on the structural power exercised byHSBCprovides the
best explanation of these outcomes. In this section we consider comparative evi-
dence from France andGermany, to see if the same dynamic holds in other cases.
In addition to expanding our number of observations, France and Germany
provide useful empirical leverage on bank bailouts, because their inclusion allows
us to consider two additional alternative hypotheses. The first is the economic
concentration of the banking sector. A smaller number of banks (as in the con-
centrated UK sector) might coordinate more easily to resist state pressure than
a larger number of banks (as involved in the US case). France has a highly con-
centrated bank sector, like the United Kingdom, with six banks accounting for 80
percent of bank lending. Germany has a less concentrated and more heteroge-
neous banking sector that includes private banks, cooperative banks, and public
savings banks, much like the American banking sector. If banking concentration
were important, we would expect to observe similar outcomes in the French and
British cases and in the American and German cases.
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We are also interested in considering another alternative hypothesis: the gov-
ernment of amedium-sized economymight face harder spending constraints than
its counterpart in a large economy. The United States and the United Kingdom
have independent central banks, and they can both print their ownmoney. Inter-
view subjects in Britain told us they were aware that they could create the money
to fund a big bailout if they had to. But what if there is a logic under which the
UnitedKingdom, amedium-sized economy, feltmorepressure to keep thebailout
small—so as to avoid being labeled a sovereign debt risk by international bond
markets? We cannot test this hypothesis directly, but we can compare the dy-
namics of bank-state interaction in the United Kingdom with that in two other
European states of similar size: France and Germany. These two latter countries,
as part of the Eurozone, lack the capacity to print their ownmoney, and so should
theoretically bemore constrained thanBritain. The data in Figure 4.5 suggest that
whatever motivated British bailout policy, it was not fiscal restraint: the United
Kingdom spent far more on the bailouts, as a proportion of GDP, than did gov-
ernments in the similarly sized French and German economies.
Figure 4.5: Banking Support across Countries in 2008-2009
Note: Following the accountingmethodologyof theEuropeanCommission,
total banking support is weighted by the use of diﬀerent instruments, 15 per-
cent for credit guarantees, 70 percent for asset relief, and 100 percent for re-
capitalizations (for both schemes and ad hocmeasures). Source: Laeven and
Valencia (2011).
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France andGermany shared a similar crisis experience as theUnitedKingdom
and the United States. The Lehman collapse aﬀected the whole banking sector,
and governments respondedwith big rescue packages in earlyOctober 2008. The
French government injected capital in all major banks and avoided a loss of tax-
payer money, as in the American case. The German government supported the
banks with a voluntary program, which funneled state capital to the few worst-
oﬀ banks, and much like the British bailout, this plan generated large losses for
the state. Neither the size of the economy nor the concentration of the banking
sector can explain this diﬀerence. These economies are similar: the two banking
sectors are of equal size, and they contribute to the same degree to the economy
(financial service value added is 31 percent in Germany, 34 percent in France).
Instead, the diﬀerential dependence of banks on the state explains the diﬀerence.
In Germany, the government’s eﬀorts to implement industry-wide recapital-
izations ran into the resistance of Deutsche Bank. Deutsche is Germany’s biggest
bank, and it has moved away from only supporting German business, branching
out internationally. In 2007, it generated only 27 percent of its income in Ger-
many. Its financial health and the implicit threat to leave killed the possibility of
an industry-wide initiative. Like his counterpart at HSBC, Deutsche Bank CEO
Josef Ackermann publicly torpedoed a collective solution by excluding Deutsche
Bank from it, saying he would feel ashamed if Deutsche had to admit it needed
money from the taxpayer.ƥƥ Since accepting state capital meant admitting failure
and entailed a number of restrictions, only the weakest banks participated in the
program, namely Hypo Real Estate, West LB and Commerzbank. And the inter-
ventions in those banks left the Germany taxpayers with large losses.
The French government faced no resistance from a large, international bank.
The major French banks are solidly based in the domestic market. The strongest
opposition came from a healthy bank, CréditMutuel, which didn’t need any extra
capital. But Crédit Mutuel is decidedly a domestic bank: 94 percent its income
comes from France. Crédit Mutuel found itself in exactly the same position as
Wells Fargo in the United States, as summarized in an interview reported by Cor-
nelia Woll (2014, 125): “The four banks had roughly the same interest, the four
11. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Ackermann: Wir Sind Stark Genug,” Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 November 2008, available at http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/
deutsche-bank-winkt-wieder-ab-ackermann-wir-sind-stark-genug-1727586.html, accessed 2
October 2013.
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biggest in fact. And the fifth, which was also the smallest, was really in perfect
health, but it got its arm twisted.” The French government brought the banks
together to establish the SFEF, a common fund for liquidity support, and all six
major banks accepted state capital. This plan stabilized the banking sector and
created a small profit for the French government.
There is no doubt that banks in France enjoy a close relationship with the
state. Indeed, even more than the United States, scholars of French finance argue
that the automatic instrumental power of French banks—the identity of interests
betweenbankCEOs and the senior policymakers—is uniquely high. In thewords
of Jabko and Massoc (2012), What sets France apart [from the United States and
United Kingdom] is that this privileged access rests on a sociologically stable and
homogeneous elite of public and private actors. The social circles and career tra-
jectories of private bankers and high-ranking state oﬃcials do not just intersect on
occasion, but are almost indistinguishable from each other. These bankers were
intimately involved with the drafting of the legislation bailing out French banks.
But because the only healthy bank, Crédit Mutuel, was dependent on the domes-
tic market, it did not have the structural power of HSBC in the United Kingdom
to exclude itself from the collective French solution.
German banks have substantial instrumental influence on the German gov-
ernment. But the instrumental power of German banks is weaker than those of
banks in France or in theUnited States: there is not the same uniformity of educa-
tional background that unites banks and the state in France, nor doGerman banks
have preferential access to government oﬃcials provided by campaign contribu-
tions, as in the United States. Lobbying organizations of German banks follow
the banking sector’s division of cooperative, savings and commercial banks. And
the association of German commercial banks often struggles over internal ten-
sions (Busch, 2009). The empirical record of the German bailout policy shows
that banks were divided, and in the face of these divisions the German govern-
ment eventually developed a bank support programwithoutmuch input from the
banks (Woll, 2014). Thus, in comparative terms, we classify the use of strategic
instrumental power by German banks as lower than in the other three cases. It
would contradict the available evidence to say that the strong lobbying capacity
of German banks accounted for the costly German bailout program.
Table 4.3 arrays the outcomes observed across the four cases. In all four coun-
tries the fall of LehmanBrothers led to substantial contact between senior bankers
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Table 4.3: Bank Power and Taxpayer Profits
Intentional Intentional Industry Profit
Structural Instrumental wide to tax-
Power Power Plan? payer
Large Banks Large Banks
US Low High Yes $9 bn
(JPMorgan,
Wells Fargo)
France Low High Yes $1.5 bn
(BNP Paris-
bas, Crédit
Mutuél)
UK High High No -$14 bn
(HSBC)
Germany High Medium No -$55 bn
(Deutsche
Bank)
Note: The classification of structural power of healthy large banks is based on share of
income from domestic business: JPMorgan (75%),Wells Fargo (100%), BNP Paribas
(47%), Deutsche Bank (27%), HSBC (22%). Income shares are taken from banks’
annual reports; taxpayer profit are taken from (Congressional Budget Oﬃce, 2013),
and Eurostat, Supplementary table for the financial crisis, October 2014. The Eurostat
figures denote the accumulated profit to the general government from 2007-2013 and
represent a preliminary estimate of the total costs, which ultimately depend on the
final selling price of assets (and converted with the average exchange rate of the past 12
months, Nov. 2013–Nov. 2014, of 1.35 €/$). The USCBO figures include the outcome
for the overall financial intervention of the TARP, excluding the auto industry bailout
and mortgage relief (Congressional Budget Oﬃce, 2013, p.5). The Eurostat figures for
theUnitedKingdom correspond to the latest national estimates. TheOﬃce of Budget
Responsibility lists an implied loss from the interventions in RBS and Lloyds of about
£15.6 bn. Considering the gains realized through the guarantee and special liquidity
programs, the direct overall loss of £ 0.6 bn, implying an overall financing costs of £
18.4 bn (Oﬃce for Budget Responsibility, 2014, p. 154).
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and senior policymakers. The German banking sector had the most heteroge-
neous interests, which compromised its lobbying capacity, so we classify it has
having medium instrumental power. As is clear from the table, though, instru-
mental power is irrelevant to the outcomes observed. Where large banks exer-
cised strategic structural power in negotiations with the government—because
most of their revenue came from other jurisdictions—those banks were able to
prevent governments from imposing an industry-wide solution. That HSBC and
Deutsche Bank were able to overpower their respective governments was costly
to British and German taxpayers, as the final column of Table 4.3 makes clear. In
all four cases large banks were bailed out. This is an indicator of the central place
that finance occupies in these economies. But our interest as social scientists lies
in explaining consequential variations in policy design across countries. To do so
requires putting analytical attention on the way in which the structural power of
banks can be used strategically, not merely automatically.
4.6 Conclusion
Large banks are central to the functioning of financial systems, and when their
failure risks bringing down the entire financial edifice, the structural position of
these banks makes a bailout the most likely outcome. That is a feature of capital-
ism generally, not just American capitalism. We observe these bailouts in coun-
tries across the industrializedworld. Our analysis of bailouts in four of the world’s
six largest economies demonstrates that the strategic exercise of structural power
was a root cause of variation in the form of the bailouts chosen. After the fall of
Lehman Brothers, the United Kingdom and Germany, like the United States and
France, had to prevent their vulnerable banks from imploding. Yet the United
Kingdom and Germany failed to force their preferred terms on the largest banks,
because HSBC and Deutsche Bank were insuﬃciently dependent on domestic
markets. Neither British nor German policymakers could pursue their optimal
policy. Governments in the United States and France were in a stronger struc-
tural position, vis-à-vis their large banks, than were governments in the United
Kingdom and Germany. American and French governments got a better policy
deal from their large banks, in that they were able to capture more of the upside
of healthy banks for taxpayers.
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Our analysis runs counter to virtually all accounts of the American political
economy, post-crisis. There are two reasons this literature has provided an in-
complete account of the role of bank power in explaining bailout policies. First,
most analysis of the American political economy does not situate the US case in a
comparative framework. Without embedding arguments about political power of
capitalists in the United States in a comparative analysis of the political power of
capitalists in democratic capitalism, it is impossible to sort out the eﬀects of cap-
italism, in which bankers are almost always privileged, from those of the specific
privileges aﬀorded to bankers in the US political economy.
Secondly, the existing literature has focused almost entirely on the way in
which American financiers “buy” influence—or in other words, on the strategic
exercise of instrumental power (Johnson and Kwak, 2010; Hacker and Pierson,
2010). We have shown that structural power can fruitfully be reincorporated into
political analysis not only as a resource that acts automatically in the heads of
politicians, but also as a resource on which banks draw deliberately in bargain-
ing with governments. It is diﬀerent from lobbying power. Lobbying power is
about the access of banks to policymakers and the expertise their lobbying appa-
ratus can mobilize. These features were irrelevant to the course of the bailouts in
these four cases. Moreover, the ability to defy regulators, which was crucial to the
strategy pursued by HSBC but foreclosed to JP Morgan and Wells Fargo, was a
product of their strategic structural power. That is, of their deliberate use of their
role in the economy as a resource in bargaining with the government.
Our theoretical innovation in this chapter is to reanimate the study of struc-
tural power by showing how it can be used as a strategic resource of business, not
merely as an automatic threat of disinvestment that requires no agency on the part
of business firms. This innovation, as remarked earlier, represents a return to ear-
lier notions of the concept, which did not confine structural power to an ontology
in which it is all structure and no agency (Bell, 2012).
We anticipate three sorts of challenges to our proposed conceptualization of
structural power as a strategic resource. The first is that, if this power is really obvi-
ous and structural, why does it need to be used strategically at all? Why do politi-
cians simply not adjust their expectations accordingly and automaticallymake the
best oﬀer they know they can get their banks to accept? Such an objection can
only come from a scholar who stood at great distance from the uncertainty that
surrounded the bank bailouts of 2008. Policymakers and bankers were highly un-
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certain about each other’s intentions and resources. TheBritish government tried
to achieve its best solution, which involved including all banks in the recapitaliza-
tion agreement, but only thendidpolicymakers discover thatHSBCwould refuse,
and that policymakers could not credibly threaten the bank. Likewise, American
policymakers were not certain, going into themeeting with the nine leading bank
CEOs, that all banks would accept the deal. So they marshaled their regulatory
might andpersonnel to remind theAmericanbanksof their dependenceonAmer-
ican regulators. To insist that structural power has to take place only in the heads
of politicians, as automatic adjustment, is to claim that structural power cannot be
invoked in negotiations. This is an untenable theoretical proposition. Structural
power is entirely consistent with deliberate political action.
We are not the only scholars to argue that structural power can require the use
of agency. And it is from this theoretical position, largely occupied by construc-
tivist scholars, thatwe anticipate twoother potential objections. First, if structural
power canbe strategically deployed, and if instrumental power canhave automatic
features, then is there any useful distinction between structural and instrumen-
tal power? “Being instrumentally powerful canmake business appear structurally
powerful,” as Hindmoor and McGeechan put it, calling into question the analyt-
ical utility of the distinction (Hindmoor and McGeechan, 2012). Secondly, as
Stephen Bell (2012) has observed, theories of structural power require greater at-
tention to the way in which politicians interpret that power, and how the percep-
tions of politicians and the public can change over time, thus changing the struc-
tural power that automatically accrues to business. Thus, potentially all structural
power involves the use of strategic action.
The original distinction between business power as a resource acquired by
lobbying, on the one hand, and business power as a resource that accrues to firms
because of their position in the economy, on the other, remains a theoretical dif-
ference with real world policy implications. Political scientists need to put more
attention on this distinction, not less, because it involves two diﬀerent views of
how power is consequential in politics. According to the lobbying view, banks are
powerful because they canbuy thebest lawyers and lobbyists to defend their inter-
ests (Hacker andPierson, 2010). Political debates animated by this perspective fo-
cus, for example, on the laws regulating spending in politics. The structural view,
by contrast, focuses attention on questions regulating the size of banks, which can
make them too big to fail. It also highlights the importance of international coop-
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eration, through which governments can try to build international rules that limit
the ability of large banks to escape regulatory scrutiny anywhere (Singer, 2004).
As for the argument that even the automatic structural power of business is
always in part constructed by agents in the world: we agree. What goes on in the
mindsof politicians, andwhat they take as given in assumingbusiness responses to
tax policy, is certainly aquestionof interpretation, not simply anobjective fact that
is givenunambiguously by economic structure (Bell, 2012). Our concernwith this
approach is largelymethodological, because it involves empirically assessingwhat
is going on inside the heads of policymakers. Automatic structural power changes
when conditions change, as politicians alter their evaluation of the credibility of
a threat of business disinvestment in the wake of diﬀerent economic events. But
even so, its short-term function is largely automatic andunobservable empirically;
only its policy consequences can be observed.
The strategic use of structural power is conceptually distinct from the auto-
matic use of business power. Strategic structural power can observed through
its eﬀect in negotiations, of which there is an empirical record. It can be readily
demonstrated through process-tracing that is embedded in an analysis of market
position and of bank-government interaction. As such, it is a distinction that will
allow other scholars to test our propositions about the dependence of companies
on national regulatory authority in a globalized economy. This analytical inno-
vation does not exclude that other scholars can productively explore the way in
which the possibility of disinvestment is constructed through public discourse.
But our approach may be easier to observe in practice.
Substantively, our analysis implies that large firms are empowered not only by
the possibility of moving capital from one jurisdiction to another (the legal exit
option), but also by the ability to absorb regulatory sanctioning costs in a given
economy (the viable outside option). Where companies make much of their rev-
enue in one country, those potential profits represent power in the hands of na-
tional regulatory authorities. The giants of American finance were well aware
of the cost of not playing ball with a national regulator. Political scientists have
paid extensive attention to the way in which the exit option makes mobile capital
more powerful in political negotiations, and this has been the source of impor-
tant insights (Marsh, 1983; Winters, 1994; Mosley, 2000). Yet the possibility of
mobility may be illusory when the costs of leaving are high. For example, an in-
creasing number of economies—the European Union and Switzerland are only
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the most recent examples—have passed laws or initiatives that seek to regulate
executive compensation. Large financial institutions routinely invoke the threat
of exit from these jurisdictions in response, just as they did in the United States
after the passage of new financial legislation adopting shareholder rights to vote
on pay packages. The threatened exodus has yet to appear; moreover, it appears
to have had little eﬀect on lawmakers. When the United States and the European
Union and Switzerland all adopt tough new regulations on executive pay, it is an
open question whether financiers in these jurisdictions will be willing to follow
up their threats to move to Asia.
Episodes such as the financial crisis of 2008 are rare political events. Because
they open the possibility for such potential long-term damage, they reveal how
state policymakers and powerful private interests bargain under time pressure and
over high stakes. The instrumental power of financial institutions in these con-
ditions is less important than their structural power. Large banks are privileged
actors in all capitalist countries, but even privileged actors in an open economy
must still contend with the costs that regulators can impose on them.

Chapter 5
Not ruled by legislature
The previous chapter showed that the American bailout made banks pay dearly,
while the British bailout left the government holding the bag. It argued that the
varying degree of structural power of banks caused this diﬀerence. But rather
than banks’ structural power, the explanation for this diﬀerence could be that
the American government needed Congress to pass a rescue package, while the
British government did not. Thus the crucial place for the bailout may not be
the interaction between banks and the executive, but within Congress. Keefer
(2007), for instance, argues that legislative veto players curb rent seeking. Others
see the legislature as important because banks could lobby lawmakers to vote for
the bailout (Blau, Brough and Thomas, 2013; Mian, Sufi and Trebbi, 2010).
There are good reasons that scholars of bailouts emphasize the role of legis-
latures, especially of the US Congress. Judging from the literature on executive-
legislative relations, Congress should have been in a strong position to determine
policy. Compared to other legislatures, both in presidential and especially in par-
liamentary systems, Congress has large legislative powers vis-à-vis the president.
And that should have been true especially for the bank bailout in the fall of 2008.
Bailouts are highly salient and concern domestic policy (not aloof foreign policy).
At the time of the crisis, government was divided; GeorgeW. Bush, a Republican,
faced Democrat majorities in both houses of Congress. And the president was
not only in the last months of his second term, but he also had abysmal public ap-
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proval (around 20 percent). All of these factors shift the balance of power in favor
of Congress.
Despite all of these factors, Congress deferred to the Treasury. The Treasury
proposed a plan and within two weeks, it received $700bn to prop up banks. It
wasn’t Congress that made the bailout strict. Congress didn’t specify which in-
struments should be used. The Treasury decided to recapitalize banks, and it
decided to include all major banks. Congress was thus not the disciplining veto
player forcing the executive to curb rents. For this policy, the power balance was
reversed. At a time when the administration should not have been able to get any
major legislation passed, Congress deferred, and the Treasury came to vast new
powers.
This raises the question why did the power shift to the administration? The
reason for Congressional deference lies in the crisis. The crisis is what scholars
of the presidency refer to as a “real world event.” In this chapter, I argue that the
financial crisis is just such an event that changes the power balance between the
legislative and executive branches of government. Financial crises force policy-
makers to defuse an economic bomb within very little time. Given the threat and
urgency, legislators defer to the executive.
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, I argue that Congress is
inconsequential for the American banking bailout. My findings suggest that the
explanation for the crisis response should focus on the executive instead. Second,
I argue that financial crises are a class of events that change the circumstances of
decision-making which shift authority from the legislature to the executive.
5.1 Focusing on Congress
In line with the overall thesis, this chapter uses a comparative perspective. It also
aims to explain bailouts across countries and, in particular, the diﬀerences be-
tween the United Kingdom and the United States. One reason to look at the role
of the legislature is to counter the argument that the bailout in the United States
was tougher than in theUnitedKingdombecause of its strong legislature. For this
reason, however, the focus shifts to theUnited States and towhat extent Congress
determined the bailout. As the British institutional rules grant only few powers
to Parliament, we expect it to have no say. But the focus on the American case
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grants insights beyond this comparison. If any legislaturematters for themanage-
ment of banking crises, it is the USCongress. Legislatures in presidential systems
are generally stronger than those in parliamentary systems. But even among leg-
islatures in presidential systems, the US Congress inhabits a strong position. The
US Congress has strong control over legislation (Haggard andMcCubbins, 2001;
Shugart and Carey, 1992), and the president has little possibilities to act unilater-
ally (Carey and Shugart, 1998): Congress controls the legislative agenda, and the
president has merely a package veto and very limited decree powers. For these
reasons, analyzing the American case constitutes a crucial case that is of wider
importance.
5.2 The argument
Banking crisis set the legislature against the executive. To stop financial panic,
governments need deep pockets. The average bailout program during the recent
crisis amounted to 10 percent of GDP, which is equivalent to what governments
spend on education, defense, public order and housing combined.ƥ Large sums of
money like these stir rivalries and imply trade-oﬀs. Any policymaker surely knows
some alternative area onwhich he or shewould rather spend thatmoney. Bailouts
therefore pitch those planning to spend the money on banks against those grant-
ing it. This sets the executive against the legislative branch.
The legislature figures prominently in the bailout scholarship. Keefer (2007)
argues that a legislaturewith veto power acts as a check on the executive and curbs
rent-seeking. At the same time, he argues, veto players increase the crisis costs
because they delay solving the crisis. So he finds, like others, no quantitative eﬀect
of vetoplayers onbailout costs (Rosas, 2006;Weber andSchmitz, 2011). This view
invites the explanation that the American bailout was tougher on banks because
Congress forced the government to use the bailout funds eﬃciently rather than to
hand out favors to friends and family.
1. In 2006,OECDmember states spent on average 5.6 percent ofGDPon education, 1.4 per-
cent public order and safety, and 0.8 percent on Housing and community amenities. The total
spending amounted to 43.5 percent of GDP, with the single largest item being social protection
with 15.2 percent (OECD, 2009b)
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Specifically on the recent crisis in theUnited States, some scholars emphasize
the role ofCongress in a diﬀerentway (Dorsch, 2011;Mian, Sufi andTrebbi, 2010).
They argue that financial firms lobbiedCongress topass the emergency legislation
to rescue banks. Both Dorsch (2011) and Mian, Sufi and Trebbi (2010) find that
banks’ campaign donations increased the likelihood that lawmakers voted in favor
of bailing out banks. In their view, Congress is crucial because it oﬀered banks a
channel to lobby for their interests and get the bailout. This view suggests that
legislatures as veto players are advantageous to banks, and that Congress made
the bailout more lenient (and Woll [2014] argues that the American bailout was
indeedmore lenient). Either account attributes substantial influence to Congress
over the design of the banking bailout. This is no surprise given the scholarship
on legislatures, Congress, and the American presidency. They all view the US
Congress as a powerful actor. I argue in contrast that Congress abdicated its au-
thority and deferred to the executive.
This chapter thus addresses also broader debates on the power balance be-
tweenCongress and thepresident inAmericanpolitics. This balance is not locked
tight, but often shifts fromone side to the other, and scholars have distilled a num-
ber of factors that give more weight to either Congress or the presidency. For the
banking rescues, however, all these factors indicated that the power balance was
strongly tilted towards Congress.
This institutional conflict takes place against the backgroundof a broadpower
shift fromCongress to the presidency (Fisher, 1972; Schlesinger, Jr, 1973; Rudale-
vige, 2005). The most crucial increase of presidential power came with Franklin
D. Roosevelt. He vastly expanded his powers as president, and thereby created
the “modern” presidency, which has become the centerpiece of American poli-
tics (Greenstein, 1988).
Within the modern, more powerful presidency, there are numerous factors
aﬀecting the relative power of the presidency, and they fall into three broad cat-
egories. First, there a number of outside factors that condition the influence the
president has over lawmaking. His influence is greater when his party enjoys a
majority in Congress (Coleman and Parker, 2009), when his public approval is
high (Edwards III, 2009), or when he finds himself in the honeymoon period at
the beginning of his term (and especially not at the end of his second term).
Second, presidential leeway also depends on the policy field. The American
president has greater autonomy with foreign policy than with domestic policy
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(Canes-Wrone, Howell and Lewis, 2008). The president is better informed on
foreign aﬀairs, anddomestic issuesweighmoreheavily inCongressional elections.
Lawmakers have therefore fewer incentives to secure their influence over foreign
policy.
Third, there can be “real world events” that aﬀect legislative-executive rela-
tions. Typically, scholars acknowledge that events can strengthen or weaken the
power of the president, but eschew further elaboration by pointing out that they
occur randomly and therefore have no systemic eﬀect (e.g. Beckmann, 2010). One
class of events, war, has stirred a vibrant debate about whether and to what extent
war enlarges the powers of the presidency (Howell, 2011). Anecdotal evidence,
like Abraham Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus, has long created the belief
that presidents amass various powers during wartime. Howell, Jackman and Ro-
gowski (2013) argue that this is true not only for certain well known anecdotes,
but that lawmakers defer to the executive systematically during times of war. And
some scholars have argued that more attention should be paid to the causal role
of events (Mayhew, 2005).
In this chapter, I take up the events as a neglected factor of presidential power.
I argue that financial crises are class of events that change the conditions of poli-
cymaking and shift the powers from legislatures to the executive. The reason for
this shift derives from the inherent diﬀerences between the two branches of gov-
ernment. Legislators need time to devise adequate policy, and time is a resource
they lack during crisis. The executive’s capacity to devise policy swiftly gives it an
advantage which results in an eﬀective power shift from the legislature.
Before elaboratingon crucial diﬀerences between the twobranchesof govern-
ment, I identify the two key properties of financial crises for policymaking. When
the financial system freezes, as in the fall of 2008, banks can fall like dominoes.
The insurance giant AIG failed only one day after Lehman Brothers, prompting
the US government inject $85bn after it had just refused to use public money to
rescue Lehman. From that moment on, financial markets continued to deterio-
rate causing runs onmoneymarket funds later that week and, eventually, on other
banks. Hence, one defining characteristic of financial crises is the speed of events
which translates for policymakers into an urgency to act.
The second property of crises is that they pose a large economic threat. Fail-
ing banks put the economy at risk and jeopardize people’s savings and investments
(see also Chapter 2). Restoring confidence in financial markets is a diﬃcult and
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delicate task. Decisive action may turn the crisis around, but policymakers may
also fail and cause instead a financial heart attack. For instance, the debt guar-
antees by the Irish government seemed to calm markets at first, but they soon
flopped and wrecked the state alongside banks. Thus, the second key feature of
bank crises is their threat to the economy. There is the risk that banking crisis
entail not merely a downturn, but a depression.
These features of financial crises, threat and urgency, privilege the executive
over the legislature. The executive diﬀers by design from the legislature. To exe-
cute the laws passedby the legislature, the executive has a large expert civil service.
The executive controls the state bureaucracy and employs specialized staﬀ which
provides expertise and up-to-date information. And its expertise proves insuﬃ-
cient, it has the necessary resources to recruit outside advisors. As Gailmard and
Patty (2013, 1) put it, “information is the lifeblood of executive branch action.”
Legislatures have their ways, too, to cope with complex issues. Lawmakers
can produce detailed policies that solve intricate problems. But for that, they need
time. They must assign reports, consult interest groups, and hear experts. With
this work done, they force the executive’s hand. During financial crises, however,
there is not enough time for this process. For legislatures, time is always in short
supply (Döring, 1995), but days or a few weeks exceed legislative capacity to de-
cipher the crisis and fabricate a response. Thus, the crisis accentuates the relative
advantage of the executive vis-à-vis the legislature. This advantage depends gen-
erally, as Laver and Shepsle (1996, 280) put it in their study of parliamentary sys-
tems, on “the ability of parliament to bring independent judgment to bear upon
the government’s proposal.” And the crisis curbs its ability tomake that judgment.
The decisive factor, however, is the crisis threat. With the chance that wrong
decisions wipe out savings and devastate the economy, expertise and informa-
tion become paramount. Market expertise and information help to get it right.
If policymaking were a guessing game, banking crisis would turn it into Russian
Roulette. Normally, getting itwrong is nobig deal. During banking crisis, itmakes
all the diﬀerence.
The executive with a large civil service at its disposal can make up for lacking
knowledge, but legislators do not have this option. The urgency and threat of
banking crises pose a dilemma for legislators. The stakes are high, but they don’t
have the time to gather information and develop expertise. Therefore, legislators
have to chose between devising new policy anyway—playing Russian Roulette—
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or deferring to the executive. Given the appeal of Russian Roulette, legislators
prefer to delegate the crisis management to the executive.
There is no aromaticity that lawmakers defer during banking crises. Devising
new policy to counter large risks is unattractive in little time, but lawmakers may
have an adequate policy ready. When they trust a policy to work, they face no
dilemma, and they can specify policy against the preferences of the executive. But
the limits for this case are narrow. Lawmakers trust policy when they have used it
with success in comparable circumstance before, but they are unlikely to put faith
in a policy only because it worked elsewhere.
In short, I argue that the urgency of banking crises prevents lawmakers from
collecting information and developing expertise, and that the threat dissuades
them frommaking policy without the conviction that it will work. So unless law-
makers have tried-and-tested policies available, they defer to the executive. Defer-
ring to the executive means here letting the executive decide on policy. One way
for the legislature to do this is implement the executive’s suggestions. Another
way is to leave policy open and let the executive decide later. Either way implies
that the legislature abstains from specifying its own policies. Banking crises es-
sentially eﬀace the legislature as a veto player, and level the diﬀerence between
the gridlocked American political system and the British unitary one. Laver and
Shepsle (1996, 280) pointedly conclude that “parliamentary democracy is not rule
by legislature.” During banking crises, no democracy is rule by legislature.
In this way, policymaking during banking crises exhibits a shift of power to
the presidency similar to a time of war. However, the mechanisms of this shift
diﬀer. Howell, Jackman and Rogowski (2013), for instance, argue that lawmakers
defer to the executive in times ofwar because they becomemore concerned about
national interests over which the executive has an informational advantage. Thus,
they pass over their parochial considerations because they place a higher value on
national outcomes and acknowledge that the president can better discern what is
best for the country.
The authors emphasize the crucial role of informational advantage of the ex-
ecutive. The diﬀerence in the argument here is that the authors assume that this
advantage remains constant. I assume merely that lawmakers are slower than the
executive to gather information and to develop expertise. Accordingly, I argue
that, with time, lawmakers can catch up. Thus, if another banking crisis erupted
in the next few years, lawmakers would be less likely to defer.
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Another diﬀerence between the two arguments is their scope. Howell, Jack-
man and Rogowski (2013)) try to explain a shift of power to the president across
all policy areas, but that their “nationalization of politics” is likely to be limited to
large-scale wars. Banking crises don’t have the broad eﬀects of war. For that they
pose too narrow a threat. Just because the executive is in a better position to solve
the banking crisis, lawmakers will not yield power to the executive in other areas,
like security, tax or social policy.
5.3 Urgency and threat
In the remainder of the chapter, I support the argument with evidence from the
passage of the American banking bailout. I start by recapitulating the adoption of
thebailout bill and show that thebanking crisis did indeed create the conditions of
urgency and threat. Next, I identify the preferences of legislators and present evi-
dence from various sources, including polls, actors’ public statements and policy
proposals. Using actors’ preferences, I develop the argument’s predictions about
policy outputs and compare these with the final policies.
Devising and enacting the banking rescue plan passed swiftly. It took less than
two weeks from Paulson proposing TARP to the president signing it into law. Be-
cause of the financial turmoil after Lehman collapsed, Secretary of the Treasury
Paulson wanted to intervene broadly to restore financial stability. To that end, he
presented a three-page proposal to Congress on September 20, only five days af-
ter Lehman’s failure. In this proposal, he asked Congress for $700bn to purchase
“troubled” assets. This intervention was intended to restore confidence because
it would take uncertainty oﬀ banks’ balance sheets.
After Paulson submitted his proposal, the two chairmen of the relevant com-
mittees in the House and the Senate, Barney Frank and Chris Dodd, devised and
agreed upon a counter-proposal.Ʀ A week later, on Monday, September 29, the
House voted on the bill and let it fail. It passed the bill in its second vote that same
week, on Friday, October 3, after the Senate had already adopted the bill. The
president signed it into law later that day (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission,
2011, 372f). And another week later, on Monday, October 13, Secretary Paulson
2. Herszenhort, David M. “Stocks Fall as Rescue Plan Is Negotiated,” New York Times, 22
September 2008.
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summoned the chief executives of the nine major banks toWashington, DC, and
compelled them to accept $125bn of state capital (Financial Crisis Inquiry Com-
mission, 2011, 373f). The Treasury announced a broad and voluntary recapitaliza-
tion program for smaller banks the next day, on October 14.Ƨ Thus, he reversed
course and did not purchase troubled assets, as he had proposed to Congress, but
recapitalized banks directly with government money.
The final bill diﬀered from Paulson’s initial draft, but these changes did not
include the recapitalization of all major banks. This plan emerged solely in the
Treasury. The diﬀerences covered instead four main issues: oversight, relief for
homeowners, restrictions onpay for rescuedbankers andwarrants in exchange for
government aid. The bill also includes a lengthy section with various tax provi-
sions, including tax incentives for renewable energy.ƨ But the bailout provisions
themselves remained, contrary to some accounts, rather short. The parts of the
bill that concern the bailout and its oversight cover merely 38 pages.
5.4 Lawmakers facing depression
Congress passed the bill only two weeks after Paulson proposed his plan. Dur-
ing this time, lawmakers met with Paulson and Bernanke several times, but it was
too little time to hold the usual hearings with experts and aﬀected interest groups.
This hurry alone does not prove that it was the crisis that created this urgency for
lawmakers. It could also have been that the executive imposed time pressure on
lawmakers as a strategy to get its proposal passed. However, there are two reasons
why the urgency was not mere strategy. First, the American president does not
have the formal powers to impose a tight schedule on Congress, and he fails at
other times to elbow lawmakers to pass legislation quickly. During the Bush pres-
idency, the average time it tookCongress to pass a lawwas sevenmonths, and only
six percent of all laws were signed into law within 14 days.Ʃ
3. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Press Release: Treasury Announces
TARP Capital Purchase Program Description,” 14 October 2008. Available online:
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1207.aspx. Accessed: 5
March 2014.
4. Siegel Bernard, Tara andKateGalbraith, “Bailout bringsWith it Diverse Perks,”NewYork
Times, 4 October 2008.
5. The bailout bill passed after 14 days, but the oﬃcial time stamp for this bill is 574 days
because the House used a procedural trick to speed up the date of the vote; it put the bailout
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Second, the crisis in the fall of 2008 occurred in a rapid pace that lay beyond
the control of the administration. Lehman Brothers failed one day, AIG came
down the next, and money market funds “broke the buck” that same week. In
general, funding markets dried up quickly (see Chapter 2). To avoid panic, the
Treasury prevented the failure of both AIG and money market funds.
This rapid deterioration of banks is typical for banking crises. For a bank,
bankruptcy in timesof crisis arriveswithindays; its deposits drain, its interest rates
spike, and its shares drop. The case of Northern Rock has shown that even ordi-
nary savers, worried about their savings, can push a bank into illiquidity within
days. Thus, the events supported the claims by the executive that it needed the
authority for a bailout quickly. The time pressure that determined the passage of
TARP was not merely strategy from the executive’s toolbox, but stemmed from
the crisis itself.
I argue that banking crises change policymaking not only by imposing ur-
gency, but also by creating a sense of threat. Since “threat” implies the “possibility
of trouble, danger, or ruin” (Oxford Dictionary, emphasis added) it is necessarily
subjective. The history of banking crises demonstrates clearly that failing banks
cause severe recessions (Cassis, 2011; Reinhart and Rogoﬀ, 2009), but what the
specific damage will be is unclear. With little time at hand, lawmakers are left to
trust the assessments of the executive and other experts. Among them, the Fed
Chairman Ben Bernankewas themost important. His evaluationwas particularly
credible for two reasons. First, Bernanke and the Fed have a lot of economic ex-
pertise and very good access to market information. Thus, it’s likely that he can
observe the relevant events and interpret them correctly. The second reason is
that the Fed is independent and non-partisan. Bernanke has thus little incentive
to add a partisan bias. For sure, Bernanke as Fed Chairman has his own institu-
tionalmotivations, but they arenot systematically against eitherDemocrats orRe-
publicans. For legislators, the Fed is as close to a disinterested expert as they can
find. And Chairman Ben Bernanke pronounced a dire assessment of the looming
threat.
Bernanke supported Paulson to demand thatCongress pass a bill granting the
administration the authority to stabilize markets. He told Congressional leaders,
into an amendment to a proposal that was introduced 19 months before. These data are taken
from the Policy Agendas Project, available at http://www.policyagendas.org/.
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“If we don’t get this, it will be nothing short of a disaster for our markets.”ƪ Later,
when the proposedbill failed in theHouse, Bernanke phrasedhis assessment even
clearer, “I spent a lot of time as an academic studying the Great Depression. If we
don’t act in a very huge way, you can expect another Great Depression, and this is
going to be worse,” (Wessel, 2009, 203) and “If we don’t do this, we may not have
an economy onMonday.”ƫ
The sense of urgency was transferred to legislators. Briefed by Paulson and
Bernanke onThursday, 19 September 2008, theHouse SpeakerNancy Pelosi said,
“Wehope tomove very quickly. Time is of the essence.”Ƭ The extraordinary speed
to pass the bailout caused some reluctant representatives to complain. Represen-
tativeMikePence, theChairmanof theHouseRepublicanConference said, “This
is going way too fast. The American people don’t want Congress to make haste
with the financial recovery legislation; they want us to make sense.”ƭ
The legislators also adopted the sense of threat. Some focused on poten-
tial unemployment, others worried about people’s retirement security and sav-
ings. Senator Kent Conrad said in a Senate debate, “It’s not just going to be Wall
Street. The chairman of the Federal Reserve has told us if the credit lockup con-
tinues, three million to four million Americans will lose their jobs in the next six
months.”ƥƤ AndRepublicanHouseMinority Leader JohnA.Boehner stated, “No-
body wants to do this; nobody wants to be involved in this. But I am going to
argue that if we do nothing, we are jeopardizing our economy, jobs, people’s re-
tirement security. Congress has to act andwe have to act quickly.”ƥƥ TheNewYork
Times accurately predicted the behavior of legislators: “Given the circumstances
and dire warnings of economic doom, the expectation remained that enough law-
makers would grit their teeth, hold their noses, screw up their courage and back
6. Carl Hulse and David M. Herszenhorn, “Behind Closed Doors, Warnings of Calamity.”
New York Times, 20 September 2008.
7. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Diana B. Henriques, Edmund L. Andrews and Joe Nocera, “36
Hours of Alarm and Action as Crisis Spiraled.” New York Times, 2 October 2008.
8. JeannineAversa and JulieHirschfeldDavis, “Congress PromisesQuickAction onBailout
Package.” Associated Press, 19 September 2008.
9. David M. Herszenhorn, “Talks on Bailout Plan Advance; Congress is Angry and Skepti-
cal.” New York Times, 24 September 2008.
10. Carl Hulse and David M. Herszenhorn, “Breakthrough Reached in Negotiations on
Bailout”New York Times, 27 September 2008.
11. Carl Hulse, “Faced With Financial Upset and an Election, Lawmakers Lash Out.” New
York Times, 24 September 2008.
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some variation of the administration plan”ƥƦ (Representative John Shadegg, R-
Arizona, later said “I’m inclined to holdmy nose and vote yes.”ƥƧ). Legislators rec-
ognized the dire state of the financial system and the need for government action,
and so the need to pass a bailout bill.
5.5 Preferences
In the last section, I outlined the quick journey from bailout proposal to law. In
this section, I focus on what the administration and lawmakers wanted. Identify-
ing their preferences allows assessing towhich extent either side attained its goals.
What the Treasury wanted after Lehman collapsed is straightforward and is
well reflected inPaulson’s initial proposal. TheTreasurywantedCongress to grant
extensive authority to restore financial stability. It wanted $700bn, and it wanted
no strings attached. The law shouldn’t specify a course of action, earmark money
to homeowners, restrict executive pay, or put the Treasury under the close watch
of oversight committees. Paulson’s proposal specified this large sum, but assigned
further decisions to the Secretary’s discretion. Importantly, it stipulated that he
would not be accountable to any oversight. Because Lehman had demonstrated
that letting banks fail caused financial havoc, Paulson wanted to avoid further fail-
ures and put the faith of theUnited States government behind banks. And for this
guarantee, he wanted broad authority without hassle. As he put it succinctly in a
Senate hearing, “We need flexibility.”
Establishing lawmakers’ preferences is harder, because they are many and are
usually not of one mind. But the debates among lawmakers point towards a few
common issues. Lawmakers repeatedly emphasized restricting bankers’ pay, help-
ing struggling homeowners, and establishing oversight for the bailout program.
Members of Congress had a strong incentive to reflect the preferences of voters,
in particular when facing elections in the comingweeks. In general, they aremore
populist and responsive to voters. For this reason, public opinion polls speak to
which issues lawmakers should care about. And as I show below, polls support
12. Carl Hulse, “Those Selling a Bailout Find a Skeptical Audience in Lawmakers.” New York
Times, 24 September 2008.
13. JonathanWeisman, “Obama, McCain Stand United In Pressing Hard for Rescue.” Wash-
ington Post, 2 October 2008.
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these three issues. The polls also show that people were skeptical about Paulson’s
plan. They had the impression that it privileged bankers and rewarded them for
failure. Lawmakers also shared this worry and questioned Paulson’s plan to buy
up bad assets.
In normal times, Americans want the government to stay out of banks and let
them run privately. Even after the first clear signs of the crisis the public remained
skeptical. After the failure of Bear Stearns in March 2008, 60 percent of respon-
dents to a Gallup poll said they opposed government steps to preventWall Street
firms from failing. Figure 5.1 shows that Americans agreed on this reluctance for
government action, regardless of their income or their partisan aﬃliation.
Figure 5.1: Public opinion on government intervention inMarch 2008
This attitude changed when the crisis became systemic and put people’s sav-
ings and jobs at risk. After the failure of Lehman Brothers, the financial turmoil
began to occupy theminds of the general public. The news reported failing banks,
jittery investors, and fickle stock markets. Even though modern finance hides
successfully behind technical language and complex creations—think of CDOs,
MBS, or SPVs—the public saw the impending crisis and the potential downsides.
Besides the fear of a financial meltdown, people worried about the economy and
their savings. Figure 5.2 plots the percentage of Americans that viewed the state
of the economy as poor, and the percentage that worried about their personal fi-
nances. Both lines jumpmarkedly between the week of the Lehman collapse and
the week Congress passed TARP (represented by the two vertical lines). By then,
almost 60 percent said that the state of the economy was poor, and about 45 per-
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cent of Americans worried about their finances. And by October 12, two-thirds
said that ”their financial situation has been harmed.”ƥƨ
Figure 5.2: Concerns about personal finance and the economy
People not only recognized the crisis, but they also acknowledged that solving
the crisis needed government intervention. Consider Figures 5.3 and 5.4. Three
out of four Americans said that if Congress didn’t intervene, the economy would
getworse over the next few years (Figure 5.3). And four out of five said theywould
like to seeCongresspass a rescueplan(Figure 5.4). Withinhalf a year (fromMarch
to September), people reversed their opinion on government aid to the banking
sector. After the failure of Bear Stearns, a majority opposed government action;
after the failureofLehmanBrothers, almost everybody—80percent—wanted the
government to step in.
Figure 5.4 shows that most Americans wanted Congress to take action, but it
also shows that the majority (56 percent) was against the TARP proposal. Con-
gressmen and -women heard that opinion loud and clear. The New York Times
reported on the broad opposition to the TARP bill, and cited figures of calls and
emails to Senator Barbara Boxer, a Democrat Senator from California: She “re-
ceived nearly 17,000 e-mail messages, nearly all opposed to the bailout.” In a sin-
gle day, on Tuesday, 23 September 2008, “[m]ore than 2,000 constituents called
14. Jacobe, Dennis, “Two-Thirds of Americans Financially Hurt by Crisis.” Gallup, 15 Octo-
ber 2008.
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Figure 5.3: Perceived consequences of Congressional inaction, 24 September 2008
Figure 5.4: Public opinion on Congressional action, 24 September 2008
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Ms. Boxer’s California oﬃce on Tuesday alone; just 40 favored the bailout. Her
Washington oﬃce received 918 calls. Just one supported the rescue plan.”ƥƩ
The overwhelming opposition against the specific policy is astonishing con-
sidering the overwhelming support for Congressional action. At the heart of this
contrast lies the dilemma of banking bailouts: To solve the banking crisis means
to rescue those that caused the crisis, the banks. It appears that crisismanagement
rewards bankers for messing up. Thus, everybody likes to solve the crisis, but no-
body likes to save bankers. Economists justify this dislike with “moral hazard,”
the notion that saving failing banks eliminates market discipline and encourages
risk-taking in the future. The dislike by the general public is spurred by bankers’
enormous pay, despite their apparent inability to manage their banks. Save the
banking system without savings banks (and bankers) is a dilemma which is hard
to resolve. In this light it is easy to see that the people’s most common emotional
response to the crisismanagement at the endof Septemberwas not fear, but anger.
A Gallup poll found that 53 percent of respondents said they felt anger, and only
41 percent felt fear.ƥƪ
One way to overcome this dilemma is to save banks, but punish the bankers
by limiting their pay. Executive pay has been a hot topic in theUnited States since
the accounting scandal of Enron in 2001 (Culpepper, 2013). Demanding to cut
bankers’ bonuses—especially of those that caused their firms to fail—fit right into
the general debate. The term“fat cat”was entrenched in this discussion; commen-
tators (and cartoonists) now depicted the fat cats (in boats) as being bailed out.
AsFigure 5.5 shows, 63 percent ofAmericans said theyfind it “very important” that
the government should limit compensation for the executives of rescued banks.
Another way of trying to crack the conundrum of restoring financial stability
without rewarding bankers is for the government to help struggling homeowners.
Advocates succinctly described this as “saving Main Street, not Wall Street” (e.g.
Bair, 2012; Barofsky, 2012). The aim of such a program is to help restructure the
mortgage contracts to allow people to stay in their homes. The same poll that
asked Americans about the importance of limits on compensation, asked about
mortgage relief: Half of the respondents said they find it “very important” that a
15. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Lawmakers’ Constituents Make Their Bailout Views Loud and
Clear,”New York Times, 25 September 2008.
16. JeﬀreyM. Jones, ”Majority of Americans Angry About Financial Crisis”, 2 October 2008,
Gallup.
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government plan help homeowners who cannot pay their mortgages (see Figure
5.6). Another 30 percent found this help “somewhat important.” Overall, people
preferred to help struggling homeowners, but some voiced the criticism that this,
too, rewarded irresponsible behavior by people who bought houses they could
not aﬀord.
The crisis not only changed the preferences of the public, but also those of
lawmakers. As lawmakers depend on their constituents for reelection, they react
to the changed preferences of their constituents. The starting point for the legisla-
tors, as for the general public, was the irritation that banks needed a bailout. Like
Senator Sherrod Brown said, “The sentiment from Ohioans about this proposal
is universally negative. I count myself among the Ohioans who are angry.”ƥƫ But
eventually, lawmakers want to solve the crisis and to defuse its threat to the jobs
and to the savings of their constituents. EllenTauscher, Democrat Representative
from California, said “The tide has changed. While this was initially unpopular,
events are overtaking us.”ƥƬ
As shown above, the public wants to cut bankers’ pay and help homeown-
ers. Again, this should motivate lawmakers in their eﬀorts to pass a bill—in par-
ticular for those whose constituents find them particularly important. The con-
stituencies diﬀer on these two issues, on mortgage relief in particular. Democrat
voters overwhelmingly favor mortgage relief, whereas Republican voters oppose
it. Figure 5.7 reports polling data showing that 71 percent of Democrats wanted
the government “to help prevent people from losing their homes because they
can’t pay their mortgage,” while only 40 percent of Republicans wanted this, and
58 percent opposed it. Limiting pay was more important for Democrats, but it
was less partisan because it also found a majority among Republicans. For in-
stance, voters of both parties wanted to block the bonuses of AIG executives (83
percent of Democrats, 67 percent of Republicans, see Figure 5.8). Thus we could
expect these elements—preferred policy instrument, restrictions on bankers’ pay
and mortgage relief—to be part of bailout legislation.
Debating TARP, members of Congress brought up these topics. The Demo-
crats demanded restricting executive pay and supporting homeowners. These
17. Carl Hulse, “Faced With Financial Upset and an Election, Lawmakers Lash Out.” New
York Times, 24 September 2008.
18. Jim Puzzanghera, Tom Hamburger and Richard Simon, “Financial Crisis: Capital Hill;
11th-hour scramble for votes on bailout.” Los Angeles Times, 3 October 2008.
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Figure 5.5: Public opinion on limiting executive compensation
Figure 5.6: Public opinion on mortgage relief
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Figure 5.7: Public opinion on mortgage relief by party aﬃliation
Figure 5.8: Public opinion on AIG bonus by party aﬃliation
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were the two most important topics for Democrats to add to the bailout plan.
For instance, Senator Christopher Dodd argued for a proposal that bankruptcy
court judges could change loan contracts to allow bankrupt borrowers to keep
their homes.ƥƭ Speaker Nancy Pelosi followed the public’s call for limits to execu-
tive compensation: “The party is over for this compensation forC.E.O.’s who take
golden parachutes as they drive their companies into the ground.”ƦƤ But this was
not limited to Democrats. Both presidential candidates, Senators John McCain
and BarackObama, said they endorsed support for homeowners, strict oversight,
and restrictions on pay for executives whose firms were bailed out.Ʀƥ
Members of Congress debated two further topics. The first was on oversight
over the implementation of TARP. Secretary Paulson preferred no oversight, but
by categorically barring any type of accountability in his initial proposal, he inad-
vertently piqued Congress to demand more. Accordingly, lawmakers demanded
strict oversight and brought it up repeatedly. In the hearing of Paulson and Bern-
anke, Senator Dodd raised oversight as a major topic in the hearing’s opening re-
marks, and after extensive back and forth, concluded: “ I think there’s general con-
sensus here about oversight, accountability.”
Another important topicwas the return for taxpayers andhow to best support
banks. Before TARP passed inCongress, Paulson argued that the best way to help
banks was to buy up bad assets. For that, he suggested using a “reverse auction,” in
which banks compete for the lowest price to sell these assets to theTreasury. Law-
makers doubted the auction’s eﬀectiveness and worried that it would give large
subsidies to banks without strings attached and no possibility for the taxpayer to
make up the costs. For this reason, lawmakers suggested diﬀerent mechanisms,
like directly injecting capital. To this end, Harry Reid asked in the hearing with
Bernanke and Paulson: “Whywouldn’t equity participation rights work in this ar-
rangement to protect the taxpayers and reimburse the taxpayers, particularly with
the diﬃcult problems of pricing these securities…?” In the same hearing, Reid
also argued for the use of warrants. The warrants would allow the state to buy
shares later at a fixed price and to reap some gains when the banks recovered.
19. YlanQ.Mui andDina El Boghdady, “The Crisis and Your Pocketbook.” Washington Post,
23 September 2008.
20. Mark Landler and David M. Herszenhort, “Lawmakers Challenge Lack of Help Aimed
At U.S. Homeowners.” New York Times, 24 September 2008.
21. Michael Cooper and Patrick Healy, “McCain, More Critical of Bailout Plan, Faults Over-
sight.” New York Times, 23 September 2008.
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Overall, Congress cared about several issues. Following public opinion, law-
makers wanted to restrict pay of bailed-out bankers, and they wanted to help not
only banks but also struggling homeowners. This broadening of the plan to in-
clude homeowners was particularly important to Democrats. But both Demo-
crats and Republicans wanted to lace close scrutiny on the Treasury. How to best
intervene was too intricate for the public to have a clear opinion about. However,
lawmakers still questioned Paulson’s plan and suggested alternatives, in particular
injecting capital directly into banks and obtaining warrants from rescued banks.
These issues, helping homeowners, curbing pay for rescued bankers, and the
design of the policy and oversight, were important to lawmakers and one could,
in general, expect lawmakers to include them in the bailout bill. I argue, however,
that during the banking crisis lawmakers lack the time to develop the expertise to
devise new policy. They fear an economic collapse, so they shy away from con-
straining the executive with clumsy policy prescriptions. Lawmakers essentially
defer to the executive. This argument, however, points to two instances that allow
lawmakers to still specify their preferences in the law. The first instance is when
lawmakers trust in the success of a policy element. And the second is when they
can specify policy that does not constrain the flexibility of the executive to solve
the crisis. Both instances occurred in the American crisis management and led to
strict constraints set by Congress. Congress trusted warrants because it had used
them in the past. And Congress enforced oversight because it would limit abuse
of executive power, but would not constrain the flexibility of the administration
to solve the crisis. Regarding the other parts of the bailout, including its design,
Congress delegated policymaking to the executive. In the next section, I examine
policies and their characteristics as well as towhat extentCongress specified them
in the law.
Policy design
The most important question about the bailout was how to rescue banks and on
which scale. Secretary Paulson wanted $700bn to buy up toxic assets in an auc-
tion. Congress didn’t meddle with this plan. First, it adopted the proposed size
of the bailout. This is remarkable because Paulson gave little justification for this
amount, and lawmakers usually don’t hesitate to haggle over the cost of govern-
ment programs. Paulson maintains that he arrived at the figure by considering
how much would instill market confidence, given that the residential mortgage
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market amounted to $11 trillion (Paulson, 2010, 265), and how much the public
and Congress would accept. Essentially, as Sorkin (2009) puts it, “the numbers
were, at best, guesstimates.” Yet, it was a massive program. It amounted to almost
a quarter of the federal budget and was more than the annual costs of Medicare
and Medicaid or Social Security. Even though only a small share of the program
would have funded many local pet projects, lawmakers refrained from bargain-
ing about the overall figure. The only restriction that lawmakers required was a
sequential payout. Enacting the bill granted the administration the initial $350
billion. For the second tranche, another $350 billion, the president would have
to submit a report to Congress on the necessity of the additional funds. But he
would be granted the second tranche unless both Houses of Congress passed a
joint resolution to withhold the money—and overrode the president’s possible
veto (EESA, Sect. 115). This put the bar for limiting the funds very high, and the
president obtained them without further ado in January 2009.
Second, legislators were not convinced with the treasury’s plan, but they still
agreed to it. They supposed the plan would be expensive and fragile. A Senate
staﬀer involved in the negotiations confirmed this, saying, “I think themajority of
the Democratic Caucus, and a lot of the Republican Caucus never got that auc-
tions would work. We never saw the path for it to work,” but at the same time,
stating “I certainly didn’t want to preclude Treasury from doing their auctions.”ƦƦ
Asked whether Senators agreed to this, even though they didn’t think auctions
would work, he summed up lawmakers’ ultimate response to the Treasury’s pro-
posal: “we finally said: ‘Listen, you guys [i.e. the Treasury], we are giving you the
check. We are going to put a lot of oversight, we’re going to put a lot of strings
attached here and there, but ultimately, we are giving you the flexibility to decide
what system works best.’ ”ƦƧ
Not only did Congress grant the Treasury flexibility to act, but the Treasury
used it. How the Treasury intervened diﬀered starkly from what it had proposed
to Congress and from the main intention of the law. The Treasury had stated it
wanted to buy up assets, as the name Troubled Asset Relief Program implied. It
ended up, however, injecting capital into banks, which provided money to banks
in return for an equity stake. Importantly, the decision to include all major banks
in this program, to essentially force relatively healthy banks to accept the govern-
22. Interview, Washington, DC, 14 November 2012.
23. Interview, Washington, DC, 14 November 2012.
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ment as a shareholder is nowhere in the law. That was entirely at the discretion of
the Treasury. Asked about the mandatory participation, Barney Frank confirmed
the Treasury’s authorship: “That was Hank Paulson’s decision …So he did call
them [the bankers] in and say, ‘you’re doing this, you’re taking it.’ …‘you’re going
to do this.’ And that was it.”Ʀƨ
Whydid theTreasury change its course and inject capital rather thanbuy toxic
assets? One reason might be that the Treasury wanted to inject capital in banks
all along, but thought that an intervention at arms length would stand a better
chance to find approval in Congress than a program that would make the state a
partial owner of banks. Hank Paulson and Treasury staﬀ maintain, however, that
they planned to buy assets, but changed course because the crisis deteriorated
(Paulson, 2010; Swagel, 2009). Capital injections would be faster to implement
and would have a larger impact than an asset program (Swagel, 2009, p. 39). An
additionalmotivationmight have been that the British government launched a re-
capitalization program, andmarkets reacted positively. However, injecting capital
is a standard way to support banks, and the Treasury had debated about this op-
tion before Brown and Darling announced their program. Crucially, the British
program did not include all major banks, indicating that it was not the blueprint
for the American bailout.
Bankers’ pay andmortgage relief
In terms of substance, the bailout’s design is the key part of the program, but for
lawmakers, who have to stand for re-election, restricting bankers’ pay and helping
homeowners may have been more important. Bankers’ bonuses and mortgage
relief were salient, and the public was in favor of cutting down bankers’ bonuses
and of supporting homeowners. As banks were a major contributor to the crisis,
it was the common sentiment that the bailout should not finance big bonuses for
those that ran down their banks. Instead, the government should help those that
suﬀer from the crisis, in particular households who struggle to pay their mort-
gage. EESA, the TARP law, includes these issues. Sections 109 and 110 aim at
helping homeowners (“Foreclosure mitigation eﬀorts,” “Assistance to homeown-
ers”); Section 111 covers executive compensation (“Executive compensation and
corporate governance”). These provisions, however, were vague and did little to
24. Barney Frank, interview, Washington, DC, 16 November 2012.
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bind the executive to enforce strict limits on pay or to substantially help home-
owners.
For theTreasury, it was important thatTARPprovided theTreasurywith a lot
of latitude for crisis management. It feared being too constrained to adapt tomar-
ket developments. Strict rules on mortgage relief and executive pay would have,
in the Treasury’s view, significantly constrained its latitude to act. Restrictions on
executive pay could deter banks from participating in a bailout program. Paulson
stated this when he proposed his program, “Pay should be for performance, not
for failure,” he said. “Butwe need the system towork, so the reforms need to come
afterward.”ƦƩ. Andmortgage relief would tie up large sums ofmoney which would
not be available to bail out banks. Thus, the Treasury resisted strict rules for both
aims, andCongress, aiming to provide theTreasurywith the tools it wanted, shied
away from overriding the Treasury’s objections.
Lawmakers acknowledged that they wanted restrictions, but given the crisis,
preferred to defer to the executive. For instance, Senator Mitch McConnell of
Kentucky, the Republican leader, stated this rationale clearly on the Senate floor
when debating TARP:
When there’s a fire in your kitchen threatening to burn down your
home, you don’t want someone stopping the firefighters on the way
and demanding they hand out smoke detectors first or lecturing you
about the hazards of keeping paint in the basement, you want them
to put out the fire before it burns down your home and everything
you’ve saved for your whole life. The same is true of our current
economic situation. We know that there is a serious threat to our
economy, and we know that we must take action to try and head oﬀ
a serious blow toMain Street.Ʀƪ
On bankers’ pay, Barney Frank wanted restrictions, but ultimately settled for
loose rules because Paulson resisted. Barney Frank pointed this out when re-
counting his interaction with Paulson on executive compensation: “ ‘Hank, what
are you telling me about these people? That they will be so upset at any restric-
tions on their enormous compensation that they will let the country fail?’ And
25. Brian Knowlton and David M. Herszenhorn, “Bipartisan Support for Wall St. Rescue
Plan Emerges.” New York Times, 21 September 2008.
26. David M. Herszenhorn, “Talks on Bailout Plan Advance; Congress is Angry and Skepti-
cal.” New York Times, 24 September 2008.
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he said, ‘yes.’ He was afraid if we had any compensation restrictions, they would
walk away. But we insisted on writing some in.”Ʀƫ These restrictions, however,
merely prohibited golden parachutes. They did not prevent Merrill Lynch, for
instance, from paying more than $3.6bn in bonuses, even though they incurred
$15bn in losses in the fourth quarter of 2008 (CongressionalOversight Panel, 2011,
7). Congress tightened these restrictions, but only later, in 2009, when the sys-
temic banking crisis had passed.
Much in the same vein, Frank described the lack of eﬀective rules on mort-
gage relief: “There are people who have mortgage applications they cannot pay.
To avoid them being foreclosed on, either the banks take a hit by reducing what
they are owed, or the taxpayers bail them out. Or, where does the money come
from? The only source of the money would have been the TARP funds. And
that’s how we lost it.”ƦƬ In other words, mortgage relief would have required sub-
stantial funds, which the Treasury wanted for banking support, and Congress did
not want to deny the Treasury these means.
Democrats, who had the majority in the House made sure to include what
they cared about, restrictions on executive compensation and mortgage relief,
clearly in the hope of nudging the Treasury towards their preferences. Compared
with the main goal of the program, stopping the financial crisis, the Democrats
found their preferences less important and refrained from hardwiring them into
the law. In other words, they waived the issues legislators cared deeply about in
favor of granting the Treasury the authority it wanted.
Oversight
In two respects, Congress held its line. It demanded strict oversights and it re-
quested that banks that gained from the asset purchases needed to provide the
government with warrants. That was intended to ensure that the government
would participate in the up-side risk when the banks fared better after the crisis.
Neither element stands against the fact that Congress deferred to the executive
both on the essential policy design (e.g. capital injections or asset purchases)
and what it cared most about (executive compensation and mortgage relief). It
does, however, shed light on the conditions of Congress’s deferral to the execu-
tive. Congress could demand strict rules on oversight because they would not
27. Barney Frank, interview, Washington, DC, 16 November 2012
28. Barney Frank, interview, Washington, DC, 16 November 2012
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restrain the executive in its crisis management. Oversight merely ensures that the
executive adheres to the rules.
Congress charged three institutions with overseeing the implementation of
the TARP programs. First, Congress stipulated that the Government Account-
ability Oﬃce (GAO) oversee TARP; second, it established the Congressional
Oversight Panel (COP); and third, it created the Special InspectorGeneral for the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP). TheGAO shouldmonitor the Trea-
sury for the duration of the authority (EESA, Sect. 116). The COPwas to oversee
the program sixmonths after the rescue authority expired (EESA, Sect. 125). And
SIGTARPwas to continue oversight until theTreasury sold the last troubled asset
or ended the last guarantee (EESA, Sect. 121). Thus, Congress demanded heavy
oversight, above and beyond of the norm.
Since the TARP oversight started during the life of the program, it was more
thanmere ex-post oversight. The oversight reports prompted the Treasury to im-
plement changes during the life of the program. For instance, SIGTARP and the
Congressional Oversight Panel criticized how the Treasury sold the warrants it
had received from banks, and the Treasury subsequently changed its procedure
(Congressional Oversight Panel, 2011, 11). But this hardly limited the Treasury’s
flexibility. The Treasury itself made the policy decisions. It did not have to con-
sult with its overseers about how to implement policy. Only after the Treasury
decided on a course of action and implemented the policy could the oversight
bodies form an opinion and suggest changes. Overall, the oversight was tight, and
the oversight bodies have made a convincing case that they improved implemen-
tation of TARP, even if the Treasury did not heed all of their recommendations
(Congressional Oversight Panel, 2011; Barofsky, 2012).
Warrants
Congress was tough not only on oversight, but also on warrants. It required the
Treasury to demand warrants in exchange for support (EESA, Sect. 113). This
requirement is very specific and diﬀers in this respect with the rest of the law. It
emphasizes the mechanism of when and why Congress defers to the executive.
The starting point for deferment is the need to decide quickly. The available time
during crisis is insuﬃcient for lawmakers to develop the expertise to formulate
specific policies (e.g. with its usual hearings). Between specifying a certain policy
that is in line with their preferences and risking the failure of the crisis manage-
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ment (because the policy is too clumsy), lawmakers prefer to defer to the execu-
tive and not specify the policy. Lawmakers, however, may be already have exper-
tise on a policy element, because they have used it in the past. In this case, they
are confident that the specified policy element works and will not cause a finan-
cial meltdown. Thus, there is no either-or choice between specifying a policy and
risking stability.
Congress had requiredwarrants before, and they had been successful. In 1979,
the government bailed out Chrysler and received warrants in return for guaran-
teeing a loan to the auto company. Three years later, the government auctioned
oﬀ the warrants and received $311 million ($622 million today). And just before
Lehman’s failed, the government received warrants in the bailout of Fannie Mae
and FreddieMac. Thus, lawmakers, in particularHarry Reid, whowas the strong-
est advocate forwarrants, was confident that requiringwarrantswas anaptmethod
for bank bailouts. They very likely increased the return for taxpayers, as war-
rants imply a cross-subsidy across time, in which the bailout today is financed by
the companies in the future once they recover (see Chapter 2). In other words,
warrants oﬀered a specific policy element which would further the preferences
of Congress, namely limit costs to taxpayers, but not add uncertainty about the
success of government crisis management. This allowed lawmakers to be firm on
their request about warrants, while it put the rest of the bailout decisions in the
hands of the executive.
The case of warrants shows that financial crises do not shift power automat-
ically and absolutely from the legislature to the executive. It is not the case that
lawmakers hand everything over once banks fail. Rather, financial crises change
the conditions of policymaking, and these determine the choices lawmakers face.
Crisis reduces the available time, and therefore impede lawmakers to obtain ex-
pertise and develop new policies. But if they have working policies at hand, they
can use them and set the course for the crisis management.
By selling the warrants, the governments recouped its investments and gen-
erated profits. That Congress required these warrants begs the question, whether
Congress was ultimately the reason why the crisis management was successful?
The answer is similar to one concerning oversight. Warrants improved TARP’s
success for the taxpayer. However, warrants by themselves would not have suf-
ficed. Warrants were successful because the Treasury got the strong banks to par-
ticipate in the program. The large gains from the warrants did not come from
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the banks that needed government support, like Citi. They cam from those that
were relatively healthy, like Wells Fargo and JP Morgan. And Congress was not
part of the decision to include these healthy banks. To illustrate this point fur-
ther, had the British government added warrants in their bailout, it would have
fared hardly any better. The two banks that received government capital, RBS and
Lloyds/HBOS, are still struggling, and the government owns most of the shares
(especially in RBS). Warrants would not have limited the losses. As with over-
sight, that Congress demanded warrants helped limit losses to the taxpayer, but
it alone (or both in combination) cannot explain the success of the bailout. That
comes from the interaction between the Treasury and the banks.
5.6 Nationalized politics
Although the evidence supports the proposed argument of crisis politics, critics
may argue that bailouts conform to presidential politics as usual. In his model of
presidential power, Beckmann (2010) explains the legislative success of presidents
using the location of the status quo, the preferences of supporting and opposing
congressional leaders, the pivotal voters and the broader political context. In that
perspective, the crisis creates a gap between the status quo and preferences of the
president and the lawmakers. Doing nothing isn’t an option for anybody. If con-
gressional leaders have diﬀerent preferences, the negotiation turns to pivotal vot-
ers in Congress who can be accommodated by policy adjustments. These adjust-
ments also apply to TARP. Legislators added a number of provisions, including
oversight, warrants and the various tax breaks. There are two objections to this
account. First, Beckmann (2010) also stresses that the context plays a role, like
the president’s political capital. As pointed out above, the presidents capital was
exhausted by the time of the crisis. His approval rating was at a historic low, and
he was at the end of his second term. Second, Beckmann’s account is vague. The
status-quo gap predicts legislative action, but it does not suggest that Congress
defers to the executive and grants these broad powers to the president. Overall,
Beckmann’s model explains well the strategies presidents employ to nudge law-
makers into passing bills. But as he concedes, “real worlds events” may trump
influencing the power balance betweenCongress and the president, and these are
outside of his account.
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There is another account of presidential power that predicts a shiftof power to
the president during crises. Howell, Jackman and Rogowski (2013) argue that na-
tional crises—especially war, but potentially banking crises as well—“nationalize
politics” and shift power to the president. In this account, the banking crises shift
lawmakers’ focus onnational interests. Lawmakers defer to him, because the pres-
ident is better informed aboutwhat is best for the country as awhole. The authors
argue that for war, lawmakers give more leeway in all policy fields. But they sug-
gest that for other types of crises, the eﬀect may be more localized. Thus, they
argue that banking crises shift power only in the area connected to crisis manage-
ment. This conforms well to the experience of 2008. Although Congress passed
the bailout, it stifled other presidential initiatives. This account, however, implies
that the shift occurs equally within the policy field. Thus, it cannot explain why
lawmakers insisted on warrants and oversight.
5.7 Conclusion
Strong legislatures, like the US Congress, are veto players that can shape or stifle
the executive’s initiatives. Bailouts, too, depend on their approval. Legislatures,
thus, can place tough checks on the way governments bail out banks (Keefer,
2007). In this chapter I have argued that banking crises essentially eliminate the
legislature as a veto point. Lawmakers fear that awrong policy choice leads to eco-
nomic disaster, and they don’t have the time to develop expertise and devise new
policy. Lawmakers, therefore, recognize the executive’s advantages in expertise
and information and grant broad authority to let the executive manage the crisis.
Lawmakers can only enforce their own preferences for policies that either don’t
reduce the executive’s flexibility or for policies which they have used before and
trust to work.
In the United States, lawmakers approved the administration’s plan to buy up
assets for $700 billion. They didn’t enforce their preferred bailout plan and they
shied away fromenforcinghighly popularmeasures: cuttingbankers’ pay andded-
icating parts of the bailout to struggling homeowners. They only required the
Treasury to demand warrants from banks in return for government support and
put heavy oversight in place. The American bailout, which stabilizedmarkets and
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generated a return for the government, was not designed by Congress, but by the
Treasury. And the Treasury had extraordinary latitude to resolve the crisis.
Restricting executive pay would have been painful for top bankers, so the ab-
sence of these restrictions raises the question whether the business power of US
banks was strong (against the argument in Chapter 4): The bankers got the res-
cue on their terms, without cuts in their compensation (c.f. Woll, 2014, ch. 5).
Undoubtedly, letting the banks determine the pay of executives was in their in-
terest, and this outcome points to their privileged position in general, in line with
broader privilege of being rescued. But does this attest the superior position of
American banks compared to British banks which had to accept pay restrictions?
I argue not. For the British and the American governments, it was more impor-
tant to get banks to accept state capital. That would bolster their balance sheets
and restore stability. Restricting the pay of “fat cats” which wrecked the economy
had popular appeal and suggested electoral gains, but it wouldn’t solve the cri-
sis. Both governments ranked restricting pay lower in their preferences. That the
American government didn’t enforce pay restrictions does therefore not indicate
that American banks won the day, while the British banks lost against their gov-
ernment. American banks, even the healthy ones, had to pay dearly by accepting
state capital and provide valuable warrants.
That the authorship of the bailout lies with the Treasury puts the studies on
Congressional voting onTARP in a new light. These studies found that members
of Congress, who received financial contributions from banks, are more likely to
vote for the bailout. The insights from this chapter do not contest this finding.
But I still maintain that these findings have little import. Congress hardly shaped
the bailout. Explaining the vote in Congress says nothing about how the govern-
ment bailed out banks. And the starkly diﬀerent bailout programs in the United
Kingdom and the United States show that this variation counts for the outcome
of the bailout.
Criticsmay retort that without the approval byCongress, the bailoutmay not
have occurred in the first place, and for this reason, banks’ financial contributions
are crucial. The flaw in this response is that the studies of congressional voting
on TARP do not speak to this point. These studies merely show that a repre-
sentative with the banks’ support was more likely to vote for the bailout than a
representative without. But this is no surprise, given the widespread criticism of
TARP. Voting “aye” put every member of Congress into the uncomfortable po-
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sition of justifying to voters why (s)he gave their tax-dollars to bankers. Endur-
ing this encounter may be easier for those representatives who received money
from banks. Still, these studies do not show that lawmakers would have derailed
the bailout bill without banks’ campaign contributions. And given the experts’
predictions about impeding collapse of the economy, it is hard to conceive that
lawmakers would have prohibited the executive from supporting banks. In other
words, banks’ financial contributions probably nudged some representatives to
vote for the bailout, but its highly unlikely that they were the decisive factor for
Congress as a whole to pass the bailout bill.

Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this thesis, I have shown that governments bail out banks because banks are
critical to capitalist democracies. Banks enjoy a public safety net. Governments,
however, can make banks pay for this protection. Two of this dissertation’s con-
clusions stand out. The first is that the influence of business through lobbying and
other channels of instrumental power is exaggerated. Banks cannot secure sweet-
heart deals by pointing to their track record of campaign contributions. Bailouts
are not for sale. During crises, governments canuse banks’ dependence on the do-
mestic market to force them to bear the bailout costs. Only highly international
banks, can parry this threat by using their structural power strategically.
The second conclusion is that financial crises remove vetopoints. They create
a large threat and leave little time for deliberation, which prompts lawmakers defer
to the executive branch. Thus, financial crises shiftpower from legislatures—even
strong ones, like the US Congress—to the head of government. In this chapter, I
elaborate on these conclusions, summarize the findings and discuss my contribu-
tions to the literature.
6.1 The crisis aftermath
The financial crisis that started with the suspension of a few French investment
funds in 2007 became the largest crisis since the Great Depression. A number
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of banks failed, and governments around the world intervened forcefully to save
their banking sectors. Nevertheless, the crisis has derailed growth in Europe and
the United States (?, 20). In the OECD, the economy contracted by 3.5 percent
and has since grown annually by merely 1.8 percent. Thus, the economy has not
yet recovered from the crisis, and it is doubtful it will make up for the crisis set-
back.
Unemployment mirrors this dreary picture. In the member countries of the
OECD, unemployment rose from 5.6 percent before the crisis to 8.4 in 2010 and
has stubbornly remained at this high level (7.9 percent in 2013). Americanworkers
suﬀered even more. In the United States, unemployment jumped from 3.6 to 9.6
percent in 2010 (and recovered somewhat to 7.4 percent in 2013). This has greatly
aﬀected the poor. In the last few years, the income of the bottom ten percent has
stagnated in the OECD and has fallen in the United States.
Pension investments, too, still suﬀer from the crisis shock. The crisis reduced
pension wealth in themember states of theOECDby 23 percent. The impact was
even stronger in the United States. There, pension wealth dropped by 27 percent
(OECD, 2009c). Since then, pension assets have recovered somewhat, but the
returns are—as of 2011—still negative.ƥ Despite the government’s interventions,
the crisis tore a hole in people’s retirement savings, and the economy is still ailing.
But how have banks fared since the crisis?
Banks’ profitability has recovered. As a share of their assets, American banks
made annual profits of 1.7 percent before the crisis. From 2008 to 2012, this fig-
ure dropped to 0.53. In 2013, profitability increased to 1.24 (OECD). Many banks
have fired staﬀ to reduce costs. The number of employees has declined since the
heyday in themid-2000s. But bankers’ pay has bounced back for those that stayed
on. The average chief-executive pay at the “15 leading US and European banks”
dropped from $14m in 2008 to $6m in 2009 but has steadily increased—$9.7m,
$12.8m,$11.5m—to $13m in 2013.Ʀ This pattern is the same for bank employees. In
1. The annual real net investment return of pension funds in theOECD (weighted avearge)
is -1.6 since the crisis (December 2007 to June 2011) and 0.1 for the decade (December 2001 to
December 2010). For the United States these figures are still lower, -1.7 and -1.3 (OECD, 2012,
21)
2. Megan Murphy, “Bonuses furore hits banking chiefs’ pay.” Financial Times, 22 August
2010; Megan Murphy and Sharlene Goﬀ, “Bank chiefs’ pay rises by 36%.” Financial Times, 14
June 2011; Daniel Schäfer, “No stop to bankers’ pay rises, data reveal.” Financial Times, 24 June
2012; Daniel Schäfer, “Average pay of top bankers drops 10%.” Financial Times, 23 June 2013;
Daniel Schäfer, “Pay rises for senior bankers hit 10%.” Financial Times, 2 June 2014.
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2010, the average remuneration at large American banks—Citi, Bank of America,
Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase—was back to the levels of 2004-05 (but not
quite to record highs in 2007).Ƨ.
This rebound of bankers’ pay as well as a series of bank scandals have fueled
the debate on bank regulation and restricting bonuses. Policymakers have started
to tighten regulation, and the banks’ own safety nets—their equity levels—have
strengthened. But some observers liken these instances of success towinning bat-
tles while losing the war and conclude that the next crisis is already in the making
(Bell andHindmoor, 2014b). Overall, the consequences of the crisis appearmuch
lighter for banks than for workers.
6.2 Business power and bailouts across countries
Whenbanks slid into trouble in the fall of 2008, politicians ran to save them. Their
eﬀorts put billions of taxpayers’ money at risk, in some countries even the sol-
vency of the state. But what is particular about this instance of policymaking?
Bailouts diﬀer from other policies because they are a response to a crisis. And
crises change politics. Financial crises pose a large economic threat. They prop-
agate within weeks and erupt in sudden bursts, spreading the troubles from one
moment to the next. This fast pace creates a sense of urgency. Threat and ur-
gency is an unpleasant combination. Disarming the threat requires developing
good and decisive policy, but for that, there is little time. Gathering information,
building expertise, deliberating options and consequences all have to take place
within weeks—or before Asian markets open on Monday morning. Policymak-
ers in this situation extend their working time by getting less sleep, but this, too,
has its limits. Financial crises leave not enough time.
Policymaking on the fast track is diﬀerent. It narrows policymakers, limits
the number of people involved and excludes those with fewer resources. Most
importantly, it sidelines the legislature. Lawmakers lack a bureaucratic apparatus
that supplies them with the latest information and expertise. Unless, lawmakers
have a tried and tested policy ready, they defer to the executive to solve the crisis.
3. Financial Times, “Banks’ earnings: How pay relates to performance.” Available at http:
//www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4ce7a094-1c9e-11df-8456-00144feab49a.html, accessed 14 July
2014
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The time pressure precludes them from developing policies they trust will work,
and the large potential damage prevents them from experimenting andmuddling
through. Thus, the crisis shifts power to the executive branch, even in systems
with strong legislatures.
During crises, decision-makingmoves up the hierarchy. The terms of bailouts
often emerge from the negotiations of bank CEOs and the top regulators and the
finance minister. This seems like an open invitation for politicians to embezzle
funds and to collect favors frombankers. But cronyism is notwhat drives bailouts.
That governments bail out banks is not because banks lobbied for it or because
they have a standing line to the finance ministry. Rather they do so because let-
ting banks fail wrecks the economy with devastating eﬀects for ordinary people.
Financial turmoil threatens their jobs, savings and pensions.
And banks’ instrumental power—like earlier campaign contributions or lob-
bying eﬀorts—grants them few advantages. The stakes in bailouts are too high
for politicians to sell out to bankers. Themanagement of the crisis is important to
people, and politicians know they are facing high scrutiny. The topic is on news-
papers’ front pages, and lawmakers follow up with oversight investigations. The
negotiations between the government and the banks bears little resemblance to
the back-room dealings of the arcane issue of regulating banks. There is another
circumstance that plays into policymakers’ hands. In a banking crisis, everybody
stands to lose a lot, but banks, too, have to fear for their existence. The banks that
run out of liquidity have no other resort than the state. Struggling banks depend
on the state and cannot make demands. The government can dictate the terms.
However, banks arenot entirely at themercyof the government. Although the
usual influence through instrumental power is stalled, banks’ structural power can
thwart the government’s plans. In bailout negotiations, much is at stake for both
banks and the government. The best option for the government is to shift the
bailout costs to healthy banks. Those banks, however, prefer not to pay. The res-
olution depends on banks’ outside options. Banks that depend on the domestic
market are vulnerable to regulatory sanctions. If they don’t acquiesce, they face
steep costs after the crisis. Thus their outside option is grim. But for highly inter-
national banks, regulatory threats from the domestic regulator may be unpleas-
ant but they are surmountable. No profits from that country does not threaten
their overall business. International banks thus have a possible outside option
which they can use strategically in the negotiations with the government. With
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this strategic structural power, banks can foil governments eﬀorts to distribute
the costs of restoring stability.
How does this situation translate into policy? If there is a large bank that is
both healthy and does not depend on the domestic market, it can thwart gov-
ernment eﬀorts and refuse to share bearing the bailout costs. In that case, the
government has to rescue the failing banks without help from the healthier ones.
But either way, governments resort to bailouts. The disruptions that bank failures
would cause governments to rescue banks. Policymakers also want to restore fi-
nancial stability because steering the country into a full-blown crisis is a sure way
to lose elections.
The findings of this thesis contribute to a number of debates. The thesis
speaks to the debate on banking bailouts, but it also has implications for the study
of business power, executive-legislative relations and the relative power of the
American presidency. In the remainder of the chapter, I point to the contribu-
tions made in this thesis, starting with the discussion on banking bailouts.
6.3 Bailouts between cronyism and collective action
Scholars have theorizedwhich factorsdeterminehowgovernmentsmanage crises.
The recent bailouts prompted several new contributions to this debate, and this
thesis responds to this emerging literature. I argue against the view that bailouts
stem from “crony capitalism” (Maxfield, 2003; Rosas, 2006; Keefer, 2007), banks’
campaign contributions or gifts to politicians (Blau, Brough and Thomas, 2013;
Jabko andMassoc, 2012). In Chapter 3, I have shown that electoral accountability
does not explain the varying sizes of bailouts, as the crony capitalism view claims.
Instead, this variation can be explained by the crisis impact and people’s holdings
of pension assets. These results indicate that bailouts are not gifts to politicians’
friends, but the response to the median voter. The analysis in Chapter 4 shows
that instrumental power fails to explain the bailout designs and costs. Addition-
ally, I have demonstrated inChapter 5 that banks’ influence due to donating to leg-
islators is limited because Congress itself hardly shaped the bailout. These results
mirror Grossman and Woll’s conclusion that “ ‘crony capitalism’ accounts over-
state the role of bank lobbying” (Grossman andWoll, 2014, 574).
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Cornelia Woll (2014) and Emiliano Grossman (2014) also greatly advanced
the discussions onbailouts in otherways. They show that not all bailouts are alike,
as others had argued, but that their risks and costs vary. Woll (2014) argues that
financial crisis management resembles a game of chicken. The party that doesn’t
act wins. She turns Olson’s logic of collective action around and argues that busi-
ness power stems from the unwillingness or incapacity to act collectively. In coun-
tries where banks are used to coordinate amongst each other, they also cooperate
in times of crisis and bear some of the crisis costs. Where banks fail to cooper-
ate, the government has to act and shoulder the costs alone. My findings support
one aspect of this argument, namely that the highest costs “arose where the finan-
cial industry was capable of refusing to participate” (Woll, 2014, p.•14, loc. 208).ƨ
HSBC’s ability to stay out of Darling’s rescue plan forced the government to only
save the weakest banks, and this restriction created large losses for the taxpayer.
Nevertheless,CorneliaWoll’s “powerof in-action”misreads the sourceof busi-
ness power. Non-cooperation is important to explain the failure of the govern-
ment, but it doesn’t follow from banks’ in-action. Non-cooperation is the result
of individual banks’ deliberate action. HSBC and Deutsche Bank intentionally
obstructed their governments’ eﬀorts. Thus, business power doesn’t flow from
banks collectively, but from individual banks.
Woll argues that when banks are well-organized, they agree to chip in. This
argument prompts the question of why a well-organized banking sector would
agree to an unfavorable policy outcome? Why is it better for banks to be at odds
with each other than to be of one mind? Woll’s answer is that no reasonable ac-
tor—not even banks—would risk a financial meltdown. Because banks know the
danger, they agree to cooperate. But this argument assumes that bailouts are only
all-or-nothing. Her metaphor allows only two options: to yield or not to yield.
And this stark choice implies a simplification that stands in contrast to the diﬀer-
ent options open to banks. If the metaphor were true, HSBC and other British
banks would either have had the choice to accept the governments proposal to a
collective arrangement (yield) or to obstruct the bailout and risk economic disas-
ter (not yield). But in fact, HSBC never obstructed the overall bailout; it wanted
the government to restore stability. It only rejected the government’s proposal to
accept state capital.
4. The citations for Woll (2014) refer to the e-book edition (location reference), the page
numbers for print edition are approximate.
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If financial crises oﬀer banks not only two bad options (pay for the bailout or
catastrophe) but also a good one (let the government pay for the bailout), why
would a well-organized banking sector pick the bad option and pay? The answer
that emerges from this dissertation is that banks don’t have this choice. In a finan-
cial crisis, banks depend on the state to restore stability. They are also subject to
regulatory costs. If the government proposes a rescue program, banks must play
along and accept the government’s terms. Only if a bank is financially healthy and
can cope with potential regulatory costs, can it refuse to participate.
This distribution of power stands against Woll’s power of inaction. Woll ar-
gues that the source of power is the heterogeneity of the banking sector. In her
view, the structure of the collective determines whether banks chicken out and
lose. Thereby, she underestimates the power of both the government and indi-
vidual banks. In her account, the government is passive and merely responds to
banks’ decisions. However, the government has its own power over banks, rooted
in its role as regulator and lender of last resort. It can withhold support and im-
pose regulatory costs. Weak banks must accept; large and healthy banks with an
international footing may escape the government’s control. Rather than a game
of chicken, bank bailouts resemble a game of poker. That banks win does not de-
pend onwhether they decide to stay in the game or throw in the cards. It depends
on whether a bank holds a better hand.
How can we know which account better captures the bailouts of 2008? This
question warrants a close look at Woll’s main argument:
When the banking sector is capable of organizing collectively and
contributing to its own rescue, this helps to contain costs and man-
age banking crises in a manner least painful to the public budget.
However, the inverse is not true: a banking sector refusing or failing
to organize collectively can lead to high costs for the public budget,
but the government can also get out of the situation rather well. In
fact, when the banking sector relies on the government for its own
rescue, the final fiscal costs are a gamble: they can be rather low, as
will probably be the case in the United States, dramatically high, as
was the case in Ireland, or somewhere in the middle, as in Germany
and the United Kingdom.” (Woll, 2014, p. 65, loc. 1418)
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The first part corresponds to the argumentmade in this thesis: When healthy
banks participate in the rescue scheme, they share the bailout costs (see Chapter
4). One smaller diﬀerence is the motivation for banks to participate. In Woll’s
account, banks cooperate because of their “collective action capacity.” I argue in
contrast that the banks had little structural power and had no choice but to con-
form to the government’s push for a collective solution. The more important dif-
ference between the two accounts comes from the second part. She states that the
failure of collective action allows any type of outcome. Collective inactionmay be
cheap as in the Unites States or costly as in Ireland or the United Kingdom.
The comparison of the United States and the United Kingdom shows, how-
ever, that “voluntary” participation (i.e. capacity for collective action) is not the
crucial determinant for the distributions of costs. What counts is insteadwhether
all banks participate in the scheme. In the United States, all the major banks took
part in the government’s program and accepted state capital. This broad solution
distributed costs onto healthy banks. This had nothing to do with banks being
“incapable” of collective action.
Woll does talk about coercion by the government. She adds to her first main
argument “a second, more normative argument: When a collective commitment
from the financial industry is lacking, it is best to act unilaterally and impose a gov-
ernment solution” (Woll, 2014, p.•66, 1436). But in this sense, coercion doesn’t
refer to mandatory programs like the one in the United States. Woll means more
generally a punitive bailout in which the government demands high fees and re-
stricts bonuses to limit “moral hazard” (Woll, 2014, p.•66, 1436). Thus, the “more
normative” aspect of her argument speaks to the fact that these punitive features
supposedly limit dangerous risk-taking in the future. It does not relate to the im-
mediate burden-sharing of the bailout between banks and the state. And it does
not predict that the American government would win against banks.
6.4 Business power
This thesis speaks to the power of banks during bailouts, but it contributes to
the wider debates on business power. It emphasizes the importance of structural
power relative ot instrumental power, and it recasts the boundaries between these
two types of business power. This emphasis on structural power changes the ex-
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pectation that business power shrivels when voters care and pay attention. Finally,
the argument addresses recent accounts of business power that emphasize ideas.
Does capital determine public policy? This is the crucial question for the le-
gitimacy of capitalist democracies. Many scholars have concluded that business
skews policy in its favor because of its superior resources. Business can extract
concessions from the democratic process because it occupies a central position in
the economy and because it can spend tons of money to cajole politicians. In the
last two decades, scholars have increasingly emphasized instrumental over struc-
tural business power. They have criticized that markets don’t imprison the state
all the time. Business sometimes loses (Smith, 2000; Baumgartner et al., 2009;
Culpepper, 2013). And although Hacker and Pierson (2002) have pointed out
that structural power varies, they too relegate structural power to a secondary role:
“The prospect or actuality of disinvestment can set the agenda for governments
and help to define (or rule out) alternatives, but this signal cannot tell govern-
ments what do. The extent to which business influences specific policy choices
will be a function of instrumental rather than structural power.” Explaining the
variations of policies would then rely on business’s instrumental power. But the
diﬀerent banking bailouts show that structural power does not merely sit in the
background. If firms invoke their structural power strategically, it can determine
specific policy outcomes.
The recent crisis prompted a rediscovery of structural power (Bell, 2012; Bell
andHindmoor, 2014b,c; Marsh and Lewis, 2013). One reason for this rediscovery
is that banks being “too-big-to-fail” is clearly a form of structural power. Instru-
mental power may have helped make banks grow before the crisis, but in the mo-
ment of crisis, it is not instrumental power that made banks too big to fail (Hind-
moor and McGeechan, 2012). But the structural power in these accounts is gen-
eral and does not vary across countries. It is thus insuﬃcient to explain the diﬀer-
ences among countries.
This thesis addresses the recent and the earlier debates on instrumental and
structural power. It stresses structural power, but notmerely the general and auto-
matic kind that has received widespread criticism. Chapter 4 provides a diﬀerent
way of classifying business power. The recent classification understood business
power to be structural if it worked “apolitically and automatically” (Hacker and
Pierson, 2002, 281). Yet this distinction neglects the forms of power that the firm
can invoke intentionally and flow from the structural position of the firm. A bet-
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ter criterion to separate instrumental from structural power is thus its source. It
is structural power if it stems from the firm’s position in the economy, that is, if it
is innate to the function of the firm. On the other hand, it is instrumental power
when it springs from activities beyond producing and investing. This definition
builds on the understanding of business power before Lindblom’s “privileged po-
sition” came to dominate the debate (Block, 1977;Ward, 1987; Bowles andGintis,
1986). Whether either form works automatically or not is a fruitful, but diﬀerent
question.
This alternative classificationof business power is notmerely a semantic quib-
ble. It provides anumberof advantages. First, it opensupnewperspectives. There
are two typical forms of business power that have been subject to many studies.
One is structural power that works automatically. This kind of power is Lind-
blom’s privileged position. The other is instrumental power that firms use inten-
tionally. This category includes firms’ lobbying eﬀorts and their contributions to
political campaigns. A new perspective of business power emerges for two fur-
ther types of business power. These are structural power that firms invoke strate-
gically and instrumental power that functions automatically. For instance, this
classification suggests a reevaluation of instances when firms use their capacity to
invest (or withhold investment) strategically (Fairfield, 2011, forthcoming). Sec-
ond, the view on these less common types of business power guards against exag-
gerations. In this thesis, I have argued that scholars overstatedbanks’ instrumental
power. The ties between banks and governments via personnel or financial con-
tributions fail to explain the variation in banking bailouts. Other policy fieldsmay
suﬀer from a similarly skewed perspective. Another advantage is methodological.
Strategic structural power requires action by firms. For this reason, researches can
observe the use of structural power; it does not merely take place in the heads of
policymakers. Finally, re-classifying business power changes the implications of
other theories of business power, for instance the eﬀect of salience.
High salience curbs the influence of business (Culpepper, 2013). When voters
care and pay close attention, politicians get punished for giving way to business.
And in the fall of 2008, the banking crisis was the hottest topic in politics and the
news. This high scrutiny should have expunged business’ influence. But in coun-
tries like the United Kingdom, banks determined the crisis response. They suc-
ceeded in thwarting the government’s plan to make them bear the bailout costs.
Considering thediﬀerent kinds of business power resolves this puzzle. What fades
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in the glare of media attention is instrumental power. Voters punish politicians in
polls when they see that politicians favor business in connection with campaign
contributions or lucrative job oﬀers. This electoral threat makes politicians less
responsive to business demands when salience is high. They choose votes over
kickbacks. But with structural power, politicians don’t have this choice. In the
poker game of bailouts, politicians with a poor hand lose. They can’t trump banks
just because they would like to please voters. The same mechanism works for
business’s privileged position. When a proposal threatens investment and em-
ployment, high salience does not reduce the structural power of business. If any-
thing, it strengthens business position because it ensures that voters understand
politicians are putting jobs at risk.
Critics may doubt the value of separating strategic instrumental power from
strategic structural power. Why is invoking structural power not the same as plain
lobbying? Both require business to take action and address policymakers. The
diﬀerence is that instrumental power grows out of lobbying itself, while structural
power stems from the firm’s position in the economy. The implication is that in-
strumental power increases with lobbying activity. Fiercer lobbying, closer po-
litical connections and more donations mean greater instrumental power. This
payoﬀ does not exist with structural power. A firm can threaten the government
over and over again, but this eﬀort doesn’t change the firm’s position in the econ-
omy, and its structural power remains the same. Thus, the strategic structural
power requires actions, but it doesn’t expand because of additional activity. It is
constant and tied to the firm’s position.
One source of structural power that scholars have recently emphasized is eco-
nomic ideology. Ideas shapes the magnitude of business power (Bell, 2012). Bell
and Hindmoor (2014a) argue that politicians’ ideas led them to bail out banks.
I agree that the policymakers act depending on how they understand the impact
failing banks have on the economy. Had policymakers thought that banks were
irrelevant, theywould have let them fail. The problemof trying to explain bailouts
with ideas, however, is that they hardly vary. Policymakers have for a long timeun-
derstood that letting banks fail causes economic disaster. As Cassis (2011) shows,
policymakers have rescued big banks since the Baring Crisis in 1890. In particu-
lar during the recent crisis, all policymakers understood the dangers of bank fail-
ures. Thus, ideas could explain that bailouts occurred in all aﬀected countries,
but they cannot explain the variations across countries. Thus, ideational explana-
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tions add little explanatory value; they cannot explain why bailouts were bigger in
some countries than in others, or why some countries forced all banks to accept
state capital and others did not.Ʃ Ideational explanations better explain policies
when policymakers have diﬀerent ways to think about a policy, for instance when
choosing between stimulus and austerity or between economic integration or au-
tarky (Darden, 2009).
6.5 The American Presidency
Sometimes, the president gets what he wants from Congress; sometimes he fails.
There are a number of theories that aim to explain thewavering power balance be-
tween the executive and the legislature. Compared to other political systems, the
American president faces a particularly powerful legislature. Given this setting,
the president is more likely to succeed when he is at the beginning of his term,
when his party holds the majority in the Senate and the House, and with issues
that concern foreign, not domestic politics. In the fall of 2008, judging from all
of these theories, President Bush and his administration should have been weak.
But with the banking bailout they got what they wanted, and Congress proved to
be the weaker branch of government.
The reason for the strength of the president against Congress is the crisis it-
self. Crises require fast decisions and create a large threat—the meltdown of the
financial system. Because the lawmakers cannot acquire the necessary informa-
tion and expertise quickly, they defer to the executive branch.
This argument builds on explanations that rarely receive further attention.
Scholars of executive-legislative relations usually acknowledge that external, real-
world events aﬀect the institutional power balance, but treat them as random and
without systemic impact. This lack of attention is diﬀerent only for one type of
event, war. A number of scholars argue that war allows the president to act with
greater autonomy. Howell, Jackman andRogowski (2013) argue thatwar increases
the importance of the national interest, and Members of Congress defer to the
5. Bell and Hindmoor (2014a) claim that ideas can explain that the American bailout was
diﬀerent from the British bailout. As evidence they cite that the American government pur-
chased assets because of their “deep-seated aversion to public ownership.” However, purchasing
assets was merely an interim solution; the American government dropped this plan and ended
up injecting capital.
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president because they recognize that the president knows more about national
interests.
In this thesis, I argue that banking crises create a similar eﬀect. Crises essen-
tially eliminate legislatures as veto points. In contrast to Howell, Jackman and
Rogowski (2013), however, I don’t assume that lawmakers have a (constant) in-
formational disadvantage compared to the president. Rather, I assume that their
disadvantage is based solely on the speedof gathering information. They can learn
and catch up with the president, but they need time. Thus, with time, Congress
can catch up with the administration. The re-occurrence of issues builds up leg-
islators’ expertise, which reduces their disadvantage and their need to defer to the
president.
The findings in this thesis thus suggest that external events beyond war aﬀect
the relation between the executive and the legislative branches. Financial crises
occur frequently and they shift power systematically from the legislature to the
executive. Other types of crisesmaywork in a similarway. Crises thusmeritmuch
closer attention.
6.6 Politics andmarkets: Escaping the prison
Charles E. Lindblom (1982) has argued that the market imprisons policymaking.
Because politicians depend on business to invest, they need tomake policy in the
interests of business. He added, however, that “where there are prisons… there
are also jailbreaks” (Lindblom, 1982, 330). But when can the state break free? Re-
sponding to the crisis of 2008-09, some governments had to give way to banks,
others prevailed. Studying the banking bailouts helps us understand the weak-
nesses of the market prison.
At first sight, the recent banking bailouts come across as a dismal case of poli-
cymaking. Politicians channeled billions of dollars into failing banks, whichmany
observers have taken as evidence of a rigged political system: Bankers receive fa-
vors because they have donatedmoney to political campaigns, becauseGoldman-
Sachs bankers are in government, or because the banks have become too big to
fail. Thus, financial markets look like well-guarded prisons, and bailouts seem to
fit well into the overall rise of winner-take-all politics (Hacker and Pierson, 2010).
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I don’t contend the rise of inequality or the advantages the rich enjoy in cap-
italist democracies, particularly in the United States. But I argue that bailouts are
diﬀerent and showan instancewhenbusiness failed togetwhat itwanted. Bailouts
are not side-payments to banks at the expense of the public. They benefit banks
as well as the average Jane. Especially where pensions are invested in financial
markets, politicians have the incentive to absorb stock market shocks. The most
reliable voters—those older than 40—hold pension assets for their old-age in-
come. If they lose their pensions, they will vote for the opposition and throw the
government out of oﬃce. The prospects of elections impels politicians to protect
pensions. Banks donate to political campaigns and often have access to the gov-
ernment, but even if they didn’t, governments would rescue banks. People’s votes
prompt governments to restore financial stability.
Hence, a privatized pension system ties financial markets closer to the state.
In unfunded pension systems, the state tends to people’s old-age income; in pri-
vatized systems, this falls to financial markets. People save while they work, invest
the savings in stocks and bonds, and withdraw them when they retire. But if the
financial markets fail, democratic governments must intervene because the ma-
jority of people views income for the elderly as essential. Ceding pensioners to
market fate is no route to re-election. Thus, the failure of markets brings back the
state.
This ultimate responsibility is not confined to pensions, but occurs always
when the state relies on markets to supply public services. This can include pub-
lic transport, health or (nuclear) energy. A collapse of these markets turns con-
sumers into voters, and they demand the state to fill the gap. The state, as David
Moss (2002) has put it, is thus “the ultimate risk manager.” In consequence, pub-
lic services are never fully privatized. Whenmarkets collapse, the provisioning of
public services falls back onto the state. This ultimate responsibility puts another
constraint on the state; it reinforces Lindblom’s (1982) prison. The state does not
only need to keep business happy to ensure investment, it also needs to jump in
when markets fail.
The recent bailouts show, however, that the market prison has weaknesses.
For Lindblom(1982), the constraint throughmarkets on policymakers is a “mech-
anism.” It appears, like gravity in physics, as the natural law of the market system.
The decisions of thousands of businesses, which together make up the mar-
ket, build the prison for the state. A single firm is irrelevant. But in banking, as in
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many other sectors, the market doesn’t consist of thousands of firms. Big banks
make up large parts of the banking sector. Hence, the state doesn’t face an anony-
mous mechanism, but a few big banks, and the government can negotiate with
them, and they can lose. Focusing on individual firms rather than on almighty
markets opens up the focus from the state to the interaction between the state
and firms. And it is not necessarily the state who draws the short straw.
Lindblom is right to point out that the combination of democracy and cap-
italism confers a huge advantage to business. Policymakers depend on firms to
invest, grow and hire people. And when big firms, they receive state support be-
cause consumers vote, and in democracies, votes matter. Still, the state is not a
convict in Alcatraz. Rather than the market prison, the state confronts individ-
ual firms. And even giants like Goldman Sachs cannot ignore the threats of the
government. The state has its own power over firms.
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